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Abstract
This portfolio includes a selection of the work I have submitted for completion of the 
PsychD in Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology at the University of Surrey. 
This body of work is comprised of three parts. An academic section includes three 
essays, one drawn from each year of training. This is followed by the therapeutic 
section which includes a description of the three clinical placements I undertook as 
well as the final clinical paper. The latter is a position statement about where I 
currently see myself as a practitioner. Finally, the research dossier includes a literature 
review and two research reports, each the culmination of a year’s work.
Introduction to portfolio
This portfolio comprises a selection of the work I have submitted for the completion 
of the Practitioner Doctorate in Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology at the 
University of Surrey. I will attempt to say something about how applying to this 
course has made sense to me in retrospect, and I will try to describe how my research, 
academic, and therapeutic work have been shaped by my background and experiences 
and how they relate to each other. My central theme in this portfolio is compassion, 
how it can be lost, and yet how essential it is. I will conclude this introduction with a 
few words about each part of the portfolio.
I decided to pursue a career in psychology during the final two years of high school. 
At the time it was not very clear to me why I was choosing to pursue this path, but like 
other people of my generation I was expected to go to university. Following some 
rather difficult nursery years, I enjoyed a reasonably blissful primary school 
experience. However, halfway through high school I had become quite an anxious 
teenager. I did not really know why and I believe my decision to pursue this 
profession was partly related to making sense of this. I also knew I wanted to study in 
England. I was quite conflicted about my Greekness, a dilemma that I think I inherited 
from my father, who had travelled extensively and saw himself as a European man. I 
seemed to struggle with what I saw as the narrow-mindedness of our fellow 
countrymen, whose ethnocentricity and backwardness appeared at odds with the 
modem vision of the world that my father brought back from his travels. However, on 
a deeper level I think I struggled considerably with difference and complexity; I had 
very firm views about good and bad, wrong and right at that time. Despite my 
outwardly kind and friendly appearance, I can now see that I could not begin to fully 
negotiate these themes as I often struggled to find compassion for myself and 
sometimes for others; even worse I was unconscious of this. As I near the end of my 
training I also think that intellectual and professional work is intimately dependent on 
one’s capacity for emotional work and involves being able ‘to suffer the infinite pains 
of living’ (Joseph Schwartz, personal communication, 2012). Compassion is essential 
to make this more possible. I had not fully grappled with these issues until I started 
my training and had a second course of therapy which remains on-going.
After completing school I spent a year working hard to complete three A Levels and 
succeeded into getting in the university of my choice, Reading University. However, I 
found my initial training not wholly what I had expected. Reading had a strong 
programme in experimental psychology which I ended up finding largely uninspiring. 
Additionally I was overtly fond of rats (I owned three at the time) and did not take 
kindly to the adventures the poor rodents were submitted to. Although my training 
helped to significantly refine my critical and reasoning skills, the content often felt 
distant from real people and what happened between them. Most of my energy at the 
time was devoted to playing in a heavy rock band, which wowed unsuspecting 
audiences on two occasions. I did enjoy my final year, however, when I had an 
opportunity to participate in an experimental investigation of the transmission of 
social anxiety from mothers to infants (de Rosnay, Cooper, Tsigaras & Murray, 2006).
Despite my partial disillusionment, my desire to become an applied psychologist, a 
clinician, remained strong and I decided to take up an opportunity to return to Greece 
for a year, working as an assistant psychologist in the main hospital for the Hellenic 
Air force. The patients were mostly young people who struggled to complete their one 
year conscription service and members of staff who had mental health problems. 
Apart from my supervisor who had completed his psychology training in France, most 
of the other staff were psychiatrists or specialist registrars in psychiatry, as Greece’s 
mental health system is very medico-centric. Many of the doctors were also training to 
become psychoanalysts and a psychoanalytic framework ultimately informed 
everyone’s practice. This was to be the most significant formative experience in my 
intellectual life. I suddenly came across a way of thinking that I felt could explain my 
own and others’ difficulties, and I was impressed by the boldness and ambition of this 
theory. However thinking back, I also believe that what I experienced was 
psychoanalysis filtered through a medical perspective, and this was to feed into my 
own initial adhesion to certainty.
As a result I decided to return to the UK to do an MSc in ‘Theoretical Psychoanalytic 
Studies’. This was run by Peter Fonagy and Mary Target, and all of the speakers and 
teachers were members of the British Psychoanalytical Society. I also started my own 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy which was to last two years. I knew I wanted to train
further in this discipline, but I still wanted to be an applied psychologist first, to be 
able to do research and work in the NHS. At the time I believed in psychoanalysis 
rather dogmatically. I was searching passionately for a framework that would allow 
me to deepen my understanding of myself and others and basked in the illusion of 
certainty that I thought made this possible. In the few years that followed I took a 
short detour and started an MSc in Occupational Psychology. I enjoyed it greatly, but I 
still hadn’t decided how to proceed with my aspiration to do clinical work. I was not 
satisfied with what clinical psychology involved. At the suggestion of one of my 
teachers, I encountered counselling psychology, a field I knew little about. I soon 
realised that there was a discipline that combined my interested in psychology and 
psychotherapy and that promoted a set of values I could identify with. I worked very 
hard that year and prepared myself for interviews. I was accepted at the University of 
Surrey and also completed my MSc with a distinction. I was finally on my way.
During my doctoral training I was able to deepen my love for psychoanalysis, but also 
develop some much needed intellectual promiscuity. I was moved by the work of Carl 
Rogers and the compassionate and humane way he talked about his clinical work. I 
think being exposed to his work softened me a bit, and set me on a path of widening 
my intellectual scope. Cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) was also different than I 
had initially imagined it to be, and I found much of use within this model. I think 
perhaps one of the major intellectual changes for me was a shift away from a 
modernist and realist way of thinking to a more post-modernist and constructionist 
way of approaching theory, practice, and research. I found that constructionism was a 
key intellectual determinant for developing a more compassionate stance in life.
Introduction to Academic Dossier
During the first year I wrote an essay for the ‘theoretical models of therapy’ series on 
‘unconditional positive regard’ (UPR) as part of my reflection on the person-centred 
model. As requested, this was a commentary on an existing paper on one of Rogers’ 
‘essential conditions’. On a personal level I had become progressively aware that I 
was a ‘perfectionist’ and had ‘high unrelenting standards’. I often struggled to accept
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myself, my work with patients, and patients themselves. I believe that, unconsciously, 
choosing this ‘condition’ reflected an engagement with this struggle. I concluded that 
UPR is not always possible, but loss and reclaim of this condition could hold 
important communications about the therapy and particularly about the experience of 
the patient. I think it was around that time that I was beginning to realise the central 
importance of compassion, but also the importance of paradoxically allowing oneself 
to lose that at times.
During the second year my essay for the ‘theoretical models of therapy’ series was 
related to one aspect of therapeutic communication and the use of language, as I was 
reflecting a lot on discourse in my research report. I became interested in Jean Knox’s 
concept of ‘coercive communication’ (Knox, 2009) and I was curious about its 
relationship to projective identification (Klein, 1946). It is particularly important to 
highlight that for Knox it is the issue of agency that is at stake behind all 
communication. This construct is something I was also exploring within my own 
research on OCD, and it is also a central issue in ‘mentalization theory’ which I 
reviewed during my first year. Thinking about patients’ destructive behaviours as 
attempts to exert agency allowed me a different perspective that felt less blaming, but 
also more truthful.
Finally, during the third year I wrote an essay on ‘understanding human distress’, and 
specifically on anorexia nervosa. I drew on my work with inpatients with eating 
disorders and this was an opportunity to reflect on some of the considerable 
difficulties I was encountering in my CBT practice. It was helpful to have some 
dedicated time to gather my thoughts around understanding and working with this 
fascinating patient group.
Introduction to Research Dossier
I arrived at the course with a strong interest in mentalization (Fonagy et al. 2002) and 
already at the interview stage I talked about my desire to conduct further research into 
this topic. I found out that there were two mentalization groups running at University;
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a ‘pure’ one; and one that considered the relationship between mentalization and 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). I joined both and decided to combine my 
interest in mentalizing with my curiosity about OCD, as this was something I also had 
a strong interest in. I wrote a literature review that allowed me to deepen my 
understanding of the first and to consider possible ways of applying it to the second. 
Additionally, during teaching about qualitative research, I had the pleasure of hearing 
about discourse analysis (DA) from Adrian Coyle and a new love affair began for me 
(with discourse analysis not Adrian!) I seized the opportunity to carry out a discourse 
analytic reading of ‘final clinical papers’ during my qualitative project that year in an 
attempt to practice the method, and also to reflect on my own professional identity. I 
had also made an important intellectual discovery for myself. Both DA and 
mentalizing take a functional approach to discourse, albeit in different and mutually 
enriching ways. Mentalizing with its roots in attachment theory and psychoanalysis 
focuses on the coherence and continuity of narratives and what these ‘reveal’ about 
mental structure. DA on the contrary eschews the value of revelation and interiority 
and considers the interpersonal function of narratives. Moving between these two 
positions can be helpful in research and clinical practice.
I decided I wanted to do DA in my second year and I also thought it could be a novel 
way to approaching and understanding OCD. At this stage mentalizing no longer 
features in my research, but its influence is considerable as I suggest below. I was 
interested in the constructs of ‘agency’ and ‘responsibility’, two vital notions not just 
in therapy, but any human activity. Agency is a primary concern in mentalizing, but I 
was also wondering what it would be like to consider it not from a developmental or 
intra-psychic point of view, but a political and interpersonal one, in the context of its 
usefulness for counselling psychology practice.
During the third year, I decided to return to a positivist research method to continue 
exploring the state of affairs regarding the self and agency in OCD. Mentalizing is 
very much about the development of the self and self-regulation. This year I chose to 
consider the concept of self-ambivalence, a cognitive re-conceptualization of Freud’s 
classic views on the subject (Freud, 1894; 1896; 1915) that, in my opinion, still
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remain the most astute explanations of OC phenomena. I used a pure experimental 
paradigm which involved the university’s driving simulator.
Introduction to Therapeutic Dossier
This part of the dossier includes a description of the three placements I undertook 
during my training as well as my final clinical paper. I chose my clinical placements 
very carefully and was fortunate enough to get the positions that I wanted. For the first 
year I worked at a primary care service, a GP surgery. This was an ideal starting point 
to experience being with patients and to develop an understanding of the therapeutic 
relationship. Because of the short term nature of the work, six to eight sessions, I was 
able to work with eighteen different people, as well as see a number of others during 
weekly assessments. This was helpful in getting a broad experience of the different 
ways that human distress can present itself. In the subsequent year I was placed at a 
secondary care NHS setting, a psychotherapy department. I saw five patients for a 
period of three to nine months each. I also saw two patients for one session who did 
not wish to take up the offer of therapy. I had two supervisors from different 
psychoanalytic orientations who supervised three and two patients respectively. My 
third year was potentially the most challenging. I chose to work at a tertiary NHS 
placement, an inpatient anorexia nervosa unit. This involved extensive one to one 
therapy, group work, and family therapy. My duties involved significant amounts of 
reporting, liaising and consulting whilst working in this multidisciplinary team.
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Academic dossier 
Introduction to academic dossier
The academic dossier includes three pieces of work, one from each year of training. 
The first essay was the result of being asked to write a commentary on a paper about 
one of Rogers’s therapeutic conditions. This essay showcases a more playful way of 
writing, featuring frequent use of the T’ personal pronoun as is common in person- 
centred literature, and even attempting some, badly executed, attempts at humour! I 
also include a clinical example from one of my very first patients, where I get a real 
taste of how difficult it can be to negotiate negative feelings in therapy. I quite like 
this piece of work and the more personal way of writing. I believe that it contains the 
seeds of what has become the therapeutic stance I aspire to today; paying serious 
attention to the patient and not shying away from exploring the ‘negative 
transference’, but also being playful and humorous as much as possible.
The second essay is also from the therapeutic models of therapy series and is the result 
of being given permission to write about a subject of my choosing. I chose to explore 
‘coercive’ ways of communication from patients, because at that time I was working 
with quite troubled people at a psychotherapy department and was asked to pay 
particular attention to the ‘negative transference’ by my supervisors. One of the 
central themes of the essay is agency, a topic that I explicitly researched within 
obsessive compulsive disorder that year, but also one that implicitly permeates all of 
my research during all of the three years. This is a dense theoretical essay and it 
appeals to my more intellectual side that takes great pleasure from grappling with 
complex concepts and attempting to write with specificity and clarity. At the same 
time, the essay deals with very practical clinical issues and is not intellectual for the 
sake of it, I hope.
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The third essay is located within the ‘understanding human distress’ module from year 
three. I chose to write this essay to reflect on the work I was doing with anorexic 
inpatients that year. I am attempting to argue for a potential way of working in the 
NHS that tries to accommodate the limitations of context, and draws insights both 
from research (particularly qualitative) and clinical practice. I think it is quite a 
personal piece of work, not particularly intellectual, but quite practical and functional.
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^  V  A  ^  Chinese ideogram for Love or AyaTrtjv. A  Heart between the 
symbols for Acceptance, Feeling and Understanding (above and 
below), which symbolize a higher emotion.
Essay 1: a review o f ‘‘unconditional positive regard reconsidered” by 
Paul Wilkins.
The scene
Almost ten years ago, Paul Wilkins published an article in the British Journal of 
Guidance and Counselling entitled “unconditional positive regard reconsidered”. As a 
first year trainee counselling psychologist I was moved to review this article because 
it provides a starting point to restate both the importance and the complexity of 
unconditional positive regard (UPR) for counselling psychology.
The term UPR onwards was coined by a student of Rogers’ who in 1954 completed a 
theoretical PhD (Barrett-Lenard, 1998). In Rogers’ prior work (1951) a very similar 
idea was represented by the terms “acceptance” and “respect”. Although the thesis 
was not published, Rogers swiftly adopted the concept which in 1957 would 
eventually be articulated as one of the six core conditions for therapeutic change:
“For constructive personality change to occur, it is necessary that these 
conditions exist and continue over a period of time:
1. Two persons are in psychological contact.
2. The first, whom we shall term the client, is in a state of incongruence, being 
vulnerable or anxious.
3. The second person, whom we shall term the therapist, is congruent or 
integrated in the relationship.
4. The therapist experiences unconditional positive regard for the client.
17
5. The therapist experiences an empathie understanding of the client’s internal 
frame of reference and endeavours to communicate this experience to the 
client.
6. The communication to the client of the therapist’s empathie understanding 
and unconditional positive regard is to a minimal degree achieved (Rogers, 
1957 p.96, my italics).”
1 will use here the same operational definition of UPR that Wilkins employs in his
article, taken from Rogers’ (1957) landmark piece:
“It involves as much a feeling of acceptance for the client’s expression of 
negative, “bad”, painful, fearful, defensive, abnormal feelings as for his 
expression of “good”, positive, mature, confident, social feelings, as much 
acceptance of ways in which he is inconsistent as of ways in which he is 
consistent. It means caring for the client, but not in a possessive way or in such 
a way as simply to satisfy the therapist’s own needs. It means a caring for the 
client as a separate person, with permission to have his own feelings, his own 
experiences’ (p. 98).”
Why write this article?
Wilkins reports that the impetus that set him to the task is the fact that he sees his 
understanding of UPR as incomplete. He wonders about what is being asked of him 
and how he can do it. He tells us he is struck by the relative scarcity of material on 
UPR, which Bozarth (1998) describes as the curative factor in therapy:
“It puzzles me that what Bozarth (p. 83) describes as 'the curative factor in client- 
centred theory’ has received more limited attention than the other two core 
conditions (Wilkins, 2000 p. 124).”
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What is UPR?
The author presents two definitions of UPR, including the one by Rogers mentioned 
above. He also argues that it is not the same as agape, although he sees UPR as an 
important (and perhaps the most important) aspect of that. He adopts a very inventive 
method of trying to define UPR by exclusion, considering “conditional positive 
regard”, “unconditional negative regard and unconditional positive disregard”. All of 
these somehow lead to conditions of worth, whereas UPR as the author restates, 
undoes them.
How do you do UPR?
Wilkins reminds us that acceptance of the client is an essential part of counselling and 
psychotherapy. Based on Rogers’ theory of pathology, Wilkins suggests that one way 
of promoting unconditional self-regard can be achieved by receiving UPR by a 
significant other. A crucial point that he makes is that communication of UPR is 
essential for change. In the person-centred tradition the therapist’s UPR enables the 
client to accept herself and this allows for change, as to change oneself one must first 
accept it. However, to have an expectation or desire to change one’s client can hamper 
therapy as the client’s right not to change should be respected. In fact accepting the 
parts of the client that do not want to change in therapy is an essential aspect of it.
Clinical examples
The author then offers an example of a difficult client in order to demonstrate that 
although UPR is difficult it is worth the trouble; he feels that as he understood his 
client the client’s aggressive and hateful views begun to ease a little bit (but did not 
disappear as they were fundamental aspects of his personality). Wilkins here takes up 
Bozarth’s (1998) position that UPR is the main curative factor in therapy. Indeed he 
quotes Brazier’s view (1993, pp. 72-90) that it is the client’s capacity to give UPR 
rather than receive it, that is the transformative factor in therapy. He then offers a
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second example of a female client who at the end of therapy was more likely to do just 
that. Wilkins also makes the statement that UPR experienced in any relationship is 
growth promoting and this was indeed the case with this client for him.
The author then proceeds to argue that if “psychopathological” or “anti-social” ways 
of being are induced by conditions of worth then effective therapy is only limited by 
the therapist’s capacity to redress these. He makes a statement, which I think is rather 
profound:
“That the ability to offer effective therapy is limited by the therapist’s 
qualities, and not those of the client, lays a great responsibility on the therapist, 
for we will each only become more effective by addressing our own issues. 
Our ability to offer unconditional positive regard to others depends on our 
capacity for unconditional self regard (pp. 32-33).”
An example of a student working with a psychotic client, where the client’s right to be 
in his fantasy was respected, is brought forward to exemplify the acceptance of the 
whole of the client. Similarly, difficult clients who are, for example, attention-seeking 
or manipulative, should be accepted as such, since this enables understanding of the 
needs which are articulated through their dysfunctional ways.
How does UPR rank with respect to the other conditions?
Although Wilkins recognises that ranking the core conditions may be of little value, 
he emphasises UPR as the most significant factor, in opposition to Thome (1991, p. 
189) and Rogers (who according to Lietaer (1993, p. 17) saw congruence as the most 
important factor from 1962 onwards). His main argument is that when therapy breaks 
down a likely cause is the limited acceptance of the therapist:
“(I)f untreatable clients are unacceptable clients, then there is an implicit duty 
on therapists to maximise their ability to accept others. Because of this, it is
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not congruence which presents the greatest challenge to therapists, but 
unconditional positive regard (p.34)”
He concludes this to be the most fundamental attitude of the person-centred therapist. 
He believes that empathy and congruence are necessary to make UPR believable and 
UPR is impossible without these conditions first.
Such technical terms as UPR often refer to concepts (in this case an attitude) that can 
be very difficult to put into words and any such attempt will be subject to the cultural 
and historical norms of the era. The decision to use a technical term should be driven 
by practical imperatives; the reason for maintaining its use is that it more clearly 
conveys an attitude of significance for a therapist than everyday words. In this 
instance, this should be above and beyond everyday terms such as respect, 
acceptance, prizing or more complex phrases such as non-possessive warmth.
In summary, in this article Wilkins clarifies UPR by making the following points:
• The desire to change a client is counter to UPR, because it excludes the parts 
of the client that resist constructive change.
• UPR is the most fundamental attitude, above congruence and empathy.
• Failure to give UPR is often the reason for failure of the therapy.
• Failing to give UPR happens because of a failure to hold oneself with UPR.
• It may be problematic not to encourage positive aspects of the client, in the 
same way that negative aspects are treated.
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Wilkins’ recommendation about the therapist’s attitude can be outlined by the 
following table:
Towards the client Towards the self
Approach clients without prejudice 
Respect them for who and what they are 
Recognise that they are self-determining 
persons
Accept that one’s ability to offer 
UPR is limited 
Identify these limitations 
Seek to expand them
In the consulting room the therapist is asked to assume an attitude that does not 
probably come naturally to most people. UPR is probably an ideal and Rogers 
acknowledged that it is very difficult to adhere to. In everyday life most people who 
engage with others don’t usually have the space for UPR and in fact the application of 
conditions of worth may be the lubricant of human relationships. I hope to discuss 
some of Wilkins’ points through a clinical example.
Clinical example
I know from my client’s assessment with a senior colleague that she left her previous 
therapist because the latter demonstrated a lack of knowledge in a specialized area of 
the client’s rather complex profession. The client reported that this had left her feeling 
uncertain about the therapist’s expertise and therefore the therapist’s capacity to help. 
It sounded like it had been hard for this client to accept her therapist. Like my client, I 
also struggle with what I see as ‘perfectionism’ and as a trainee I am more worried 
than usual about getting things wrong. I think my concern about being seen as 
competent has in this case escalated into a dread that I will lose my client. During the
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session, I do my best to appear as an expert and outline a ‘treatment regime’ for her. 
Following the session I do not feel that I did a reasonable job. Will my client return? I 
go to supervision and talk about these thoughts.
Through discussion with my supervisor we reach the conclusion that there was 
conditionality aplomb in that session. In order for her to accept me, I must be an 
expert for her. In order for her to accept herself she must exert her obsessive expertise 
in preventing the catastrophes she sees everywhere. For me to accept myself I agree I 
have to be an expert; I too seem to share her perfectionistic view and I do attempt to 
prevent the catastrophe which for me would be to lose one of my first clients. I also do 
not really accept her as I ‘challenged’ her ‘unhelpful thoughts’ and suggested that we 
could develop alternative, more ‘realistic’, perspectives. If all this sounds complex it 
is because it was. I am feeling uncomfortable with all of this and I have by now 
become angry with both myself and the client for pursuing the exhausting task that we 
seem to set each other and ourselves. I certainly do not feel UPR now as I am rather 
cross with the way she appears to relate to me and others.
As I am attempting to make sense of all of this I am trying to unpack how my 
relationship with this client has unfolded so far. I try to take a position about what 
may be helpful and intend to run it by her when appropriate. I don’t think we should 
challenge her ‘cognitive distortions’. Rather we should work towards helping her to 
accept herself just as she is. Perhaps then she can also accept others as they are. I 
expect this will sound hard as her thoughts feel alien to her. But perhaps I can suggest 
that they are her own thoughts and deserve her respect and compassion. What about 
me? Well I need to accept myself as being less than perfect. Surely, I didn’t need this 
client to get myself all tangled up with this. Additionally, how can she accept herself 
when I do not accept her with all her troublesome thoughts and instead try to 
challenge them?
Nonetheless, the global loss of UPR in this session speaks volumes about this client’s 
way of being in the world. I hypothesize that the way she acts with others may make it 
very hard to accept her and I have seen how that happened to me. Additionally, I 
speculate that maybe others try to change her like I tried. Yet she is desperately in
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need of being accepted. Perhaps I can say something about that to her. I am also 
reflecting about what made it more possible for me to reflect on all of this. It was 
being accepted by my supervisor as I am, which allowed me to be more able to do that 
in turn. It involved accepting my anger and desire to change her as meaningful, as 
saying something about her relational ways. Compassionately reflecting on this 
allowed me to begin to take a different position where I did not castigate myself, but 
could be curious about the meaning of all of this. I think somehow I need to model 
this. Following Wilkins, I am thinking about the future and hope that one of the ways I 
can gauge therapeutic change is whether the client will be at some point able to accept 
both herself and me without the expectation that we should be experts.
I momentarily lost my capacity for UPR, but with help I was able to make some sense 
of what had happened. What I therefore think may be important is to be able to move 
between a position of having and not-having UPR. I think the therapist should not try 
to restrict negative feelings for the client, that is, sacrifice congruence to offer UPR. 
She should be congruent and allow herself to become hurt, annoyed, hopeful, liking 
and even to be pushed into a position of not feeling acceptant, momentarily. However, 
it is then necessary to reflect on her feelings because this can allow the most empathie 
response in that it truly reflects how the clients see themselves. For example the 
clients who anger me might tell me something about the way they feel towards 
themselves or how they believe significant others or people around them feel towards 
them. Then I can think of why they may be pushing me into actualizing this particular 
role. I believe that empathy and congruence can be linked to the movement between 
positions of having and not-having UPR, by assuming a stance of freely allowing a 
breadth of emotional and sometimes behavioural responses. However, I prefer to 
remain silent on whether one condition is more important than the others. I am content 
to say that I have found this to be an inspiring paper and have been able to think of a 
different way about the interrelation of conditions that made sense to me through my 
clinical experience.
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Finally, to be able to have UPR I need to acknowledge that the way that the client is 
operating is the best possible way of being for them at the moment:
“(I)t relates to esteem and respect for another. To experience the unconditional 
positive regard of another, I must be convinced of their deep, unqualified 
esteem and respect for their total being. (Wilkins, 2000, p.24)”
For me to be able to allow that, I must feel unconditional self regard. This stance is 
what I think ultimately allows the movement to take place between positions of losing 
and finally re-assuming UPR.
In conclusion, I wish to restate Wilkins’ view that wanting to change a client is 
actually a violation of UPR and indeed it has been argued for some time now from 
many therapeutic quarters that wanting to help and wanting to cure can be 
understandable, yet counterproductive tendencies in therapy.
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Essay 2: the language of projective identification: protolanguage and 
coercive communication.
Introduction
Modem psychotherapy, whether psychoanalytic or not, has embraced the concept of 
projective identification (PI) or something akin to it. It could be said that when the 
concept was articulated by Melanie Klein in 1946, psychotherapy started to take an 
inevitable interpersonal and intersubjective tum. Today, the therapist’s feelings are 
seen as fundamentally informing the therapeutic process about some aspect of the 
client or that of a significant person in their lives that remain unarticulated. The aim of 
this essay will be to illuminate some the discursive aspects of PI, demonstrating how it 
achieves a particular type of communication. I will be looking at the works of Thomas 
Szasz and Jean Knox to understand how projective identification takes place through 
the semantic content of speech, its prosody and the employment of what Szasz has 
termed protolanguage, to perform what Knox has called coercive or indexical 
communication. To argue my point I will need to make two extensions: I will be 
adding the use of the body in Knox’s views on coercive communication and will 
extend Szasz’s use of protolanguage beyond discreet physical (hysterical) symptoms. 
Ever since its introduction, the concept of PI has been articulated in different ways 
and even extended (e.g. Cashdan, 1989), so it is necessary to make explicit the version 
that will be tackled in this essay. Joseph Sandler (1987) provided a helpful 
clarification of its variations. He divided PI into three stages; in the current work I will 
be primarily concerned the second, but will also need to say something about the first.
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Stage I projective identification: nnconscions phantasy
Sandler (1987) locates stage I PI in the seminal work of Melanie Klein (1946). 
Influenced by Fairbaim’s (1952) work on schizoid processes, and whilst at work with 
severely troubled patients, she provided a developmental account of how the baby’s 
ego is split and how hated parts are projected into the m/other. The m/other is then 
identified with these parts and (s)he can now be hated or controlled as the infant no 
longer experiences him/her as separate. Sandler was one of the psychoanalysts who 
contributed to a view of relationships based on a general systems (von Bertalanffy, 
1968) or schema theory (Piaget, 1967), using the language of representationalism 
(Fonagy & Target, 2007). He therefore sees this process in terms of shifts in self and 
object representations within the infant/patient’s representational world:
“Although this formulation was put by Mrs. Klein in very concrete terms, it 
may be understood as referring to a process that occurs in fantasy, processes of 
change in the mental representation of self and object occurring at various 
levels of unconscious fantasy. The concreteness of the formulations can be 
taken to refer to processes imagined as concrete involving images of literal 
incorporation or of "forcing" something into an object (Sandler, 1987, p. 16).”
Stage I PI is then occurring in phantasy, that is unconscious phantasy, either during 
infantile development or in the present within the context of the therapeutic 
relationship and serves purposes defensive. The external object of the therapist is not 
affected; this is an unconscious belief about an internal object. Sandler notes that this 
claim is in tandem with Klein’s views on countertransference which remained faithful 
to Freud’s original formulation; in stage I PI, countertransference is seen arising from 
the therapist’s own unresolved conflicts and was unrelated to the influence of the 
patient.
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Stage II projective identification: coercive or indexical communication
In stage II PI, the therapist now unconsciously identifies with the projected aspects of 
the patient’s self or object representation and comes to be affected as an external 
object. Sandler refers to the works of Paula Heimann (1950) and Heirich Racker 
(1948-1958, in Racker 1968) that extended the concept of countertransference to 
include the contributions of the patient. Racker in particular linked 
countertransference explicitly to P l \  In these formulations the defensive consequences 
of PI are amplified as the therapist is seen to be emotionally moved and often 
prompted to action and acting out. However, it also opens up opportunities for seeing 
PI as a form of communication, providing a new source of information about the 
patient’s internal world. PI provides the point where defence converges with a desire 
to communicate about this defence and is captured eloquently by Greatrex:
“(I)t simultaneously and paradoxically contains the potential for something 
new to be experienced in context of the old... It is just at that point of 
intersection between the seemingly impenetrable bulwark built against 
intolerable psychic pain and attempts at communication that can penetrate such 
a barrier (Greatrex, 2002, p. 187-188).”
I think that the defensive and communicative aspects of PI can be usefully combined 
as they appear clinically by turning to Jean Knox’s (2009a) recent work on ‘coercive 
or indexical communication’. In this type of communication the aim of language is not 
simply to convey information, but to induce feelings and solicit actions:
“[W]e discover that language can serve other purposes, often far less noble, 
purposes that are hidden in the prosody of the sentences, the rhythm and 
intonation, beneath their overt meaning (Knox, 2009a, p.25).”
 ^ It is important to underscore here that this concept requires a clear distinction betw een subject and 
object and that the therapist's feelings are seen  as entirely the creation of the patient. Som e later 
view s conceptualize this state of affairs as a co-constructed situation and are sceptical of the subject- 
object division which is claimed to  express an artificial dualism, bedevilled by our propensity to  think 
in antinomies.
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Thomas Szasz, following the work of logician Hans Reichenbach (Szasz, 1960), 
divided the use of language into informative, affective and promotive. What Knox is 
referring to here is the use of language not to convey information (informative), but to 
induce feelings (affective) and elicit responses and actions (promotive). Such types of 
communication cannot be achieved through just the semantic content of speech, but 
require modifications in its prosody and, I would like to add, communications from 
the body.
Knox employs Roger Sell’s (2007) distinction between coercive and non-coercive 
communication to demonstrate how agency, communication and context are 
negotiated within an interaction. When coercive communication takes place the 
situation is characterized by the sending of a message, in one direction only, to a less 
active participant who will interpret the message based solely on the sender’s context. 
In this instance there is inequality between the two parties. On the other hand:
“(N)on-coercive communication then, distributes agency more evenly, and is 
bidirectional and bi-contextual. Communicants each discuss whatever it is they 
are comparing notes about from within their life-world and the very difference 
between their life worlds is what makes the process interesting and valuable 
(Sell 2007, p. 4, as cited in Knox, 2009, p.27-28)”.
This idea of interpersonal pressure has been seen as a crucial component of modem 
views on PI. Thomas Ogden (1979)^ stated thus:
“[FJirst, there is the fantasy of projecting a part of oneself into another person 
and of that part taking over the person from within; then there is pressure 
exerted via the interpersonal interaction such that the "recipient" of the 
projection experiences pressure to think, feel and behave in a manner 
congruent with the projection; finally, the projected feelings, after being 
"psychologically processed" by the recipient, are reintemalized by the 
projector (p. 358).”
Ogden captures all three stages of PI as described by Sandler in this description.
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In order to understand how communication can have affective and promotive 
functions it can be helpful to tum to Thomas Szasz’s concept of protolanguage (Szasz, 
1960). Szasz made an important contribution to psychoanalysis, whether that was his 
intention or not, in showing how non-linguistic discourses (primarily hysterical 
symptoms) could be employed to enlist help and negotiate power in intimate 
relationships, particularly as influenced by the discourses of 19^  ^ and 20^  ^ century 
psychiatry and the way these affected the ethics of helpfulness and helplessness. In 
his book ‘the myth of mental illness’ (1960), where this claim is made, his point of 
departure was hysterical symptoms. Nonetheless, I think his analysis is relevant to PI, 
and probably all instances of communication, in highlighting the capacity of the body 
to elaborate or to communicate beyond speech and especially through the use of body 
signs.
In examining non-linguistic signs, Szasz makes use of philosopher Charles Pierce’s 
(1903) distinction of signs that can be seen in the table below (using Szasz’s 
examples):
Relation to Object
Indexical
Class
Iconic Conventional
Connection of causality 
between object and sign
(e.g. smoke is an 
indexical sign of 
the object fire)
Connection of similarity 
between object and sign
(e.g. a map is an 
iconic sign to the 
object terrain)
Connection based on 
conventionality between object 
and sign
(e.g. words or 
mathematical 
symbols)
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Distinct from language, signs are first of all physical things. There is a triangular 
relationship between sign, sign user and object referred to as ‘sign relation’ or 
‘relation of denotation’ (Szasz, 1960, p. 107). However, to use signs is not the same as 
to use language. Szasz reminds us that from the point of view of logic, language 
necessitates the use of conventional signs and there is therefore no such thing as body 
language. The correct term is communication through body signs (including hysterical 
paralysis, blindness, deafness, and seizures). In Szasz’s view, body signs can be iconic 
or indexical and speak for themselves without necessitating the use of language. To 
elucidate this point he makes two distinctions.
Firstly, there is a difference between information and knowledge. Information is 
something contained in books, cloudy skies or tea leaves and can be decoded and 
understood. Knowledge is public by definition and he sees only people as containing 
knowledge; bodies contain information. This information consists of body signs. 
Secondly, still following Reichenbach and the tradition of logic, he draws a distinction 
between object language and metalanguage. The former refers to signs related to 
physical objects such as ‘chair’, ‘cat’, ‘dog’ and the latter to signs referring to other 
signs, that is metasigns, such as noun, verb etc. ‘Progressively higher levels of 
metalanguage may be constructed by forever introducing signs which denote signs at 
the next lower logical level (1960, p. 110)’. Whereas ordinary language consists of a 
mixture of object language and metalanguage he places body signs below object 
language, which is itself below metalanguage. Therefore ‘body language’, composed 
of iconic and indexical signs, constitutes a system more logically primitive than object 
language, as it consists of a communication system that denotes less than conventional 
signs. Szasz terms this ‘protolanguage’. Knowledge requires object language or 
metalanguage. Therefore, body signs contain information that can be deciphered, but 
not knowledge, because knowledge can only be expressed in object language or 
metalanguage. As what is expressed by protolanguage is not knowledge, but 
information, Szasz states persons send such messages ‘not as agents but as bodies 
(p. 113)’. There is ambiguity, as the information contained in the symptoms may or 
may not be read.
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In communication via protolanguage, what type of information is decoded depends on 
whether body signs are interpreted as iconic or indexical. Szasz examines the case of 
Frau Cecillie von M. (Freud, 1895) and her facial neuralgia. He explains that Freud’s 
revelation that the facial neuralgia could be understood by the metaphor ‘her 
husband’s insults were like a slap in the face’ works because of:
a. Similarity - Iconic Signs: The pain of the slap in the face is similar to the pain of 
facial neuralgia. The patient’s facial pain is an iconic sign of the pain due to a certain 
kind of neurological illness affecting the face.
b. Causation -Indexical Signs: A slap in the face causes facial pain.
The hallmark of projective identification is that it is an unconscious process. With 
respect to protolinguistic information, Szasz poses the crucial question of whether 
client and helper know that something is being communicated and what is being 
communicated. He explains that how a bodily sign can be understood depends on the 
interpersonal context. What is a fact is that the patient feels a pain in her face. 
Whether this will be considered as an iconic or indexical sign depends on the 
interpersonal relationship where this is reflected in. Frau Cecillie’s discreet symptom 
is broadcast and can be expected to solicit different interpretations based on context. 
Therefore what the patient knows unconsciously, Freud would have said, is that her 
bodily sign can be interpreted differently by different people and serve different 
purposes. This ambiguity is one of the central aspects of protolanguage and is crucial 
in how PI works:
“We may now consider the question concerning the connection between the 
use of protolanguage and the sender’s conscious knowledge of the message he 
so communicates. The relationship here is an inverse one: while it is evidently 
impossible to speak about something one does not know, it is possible to 
express, by means of protolanguage, something which is not clearly 
understood, explicitly known, or socially acknowledged. The reason for this is 
that learning and knowledge on the one hand, and symbolic codification and
33
communication on the other, are interdependent and develop together (Szasz, 
1960,p.ll3).”
Szasz states that the suggestive or affective use of language is to arouse certain 
emotions and to induce the undertaking of certain actions (e.g. poetry, propaganda, 
religious ceremonies, and dramatic symptoms such as “schizophrenic bodily 
feelings”). Knox (2009a) cites the example of Newspeak from George Orwell’s’ 1984 
which she saw as serving a delimiting function about not only what can be said, but 
also about what can be not said and what can even be thought. Szasz sees ‘body 
language’ as much more effective at inducing mood in others than normal language 
(e.g. tears). This is often heard about borderline clients who do not believe they can 
convey anything with just words, but require that the therapist experiences their 
feelings too. Szasz believes that the prosody of language can be changed by ‘strong 
persons’, but protolanguage is more likely to be used by the ‘weak’ especially if they 
do not expect or believe they will be listened to by persons of authority. As 
mentioned above, the ambiguity central to protolanguage can allow the sender to 
disown the message if it is interpreted inappropriately. This particular statement 
favours a more Freudian conflict based model. However, protolanguage is not only 
used in instances of conflict, but also when there is potential developmental deficit:
“Since the use of iconic body signs is the simplest communicational device 
known available to man, communication of this type varies inversely with 
knowledge and learning. The proposition that relatively less sophisticated 
persons are more likely to use protolanguage is consistent with our knowledge 
concerning the historical and social determinants of the so called hysterical 
symptoms... Conversations in this sort of protolanguage can occur only if the 
participants in the communicational process do not easily speak a higher level 
of language (p.l 13-114).”
Although the division I am presenting here was probably not on Szasz’s mind, it is 
relevant to discussions regarding the type of unconsciousness, conflict or deficit 
based, that we meet with in PI. Knox’s account is probably closer to a deficit model, 
unlike Szasz’s more political account, and is deeply concerned with the issue of
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agency and its potential failure to develop in early childhood. In the modem 
psychoanalytic account of mentalization (Fonagy, 1991), staking a claim for a 
psychosocial view of development, agency is not seen as a biological given, but a hard 
won developmental acquisition that depends on the quality of the m/other’s 
responsiveness (Fonagy et al. 2002)^. Knox (2009a), informed by mentalization 
theory, views coercive communication based on a teleological model of agency 
(Csibra & Gergely, 1998; Fonagy et al 2002) where agency is rooted in motor 
intentionality rather than reflection (Knox, 2009b). Resorting to protolanguage, then, 
involves the use of the body’s indexical and iconic signs and can be seen within the 
mentalization account as a developmentally earlier account of agency. On the other 
hand, symbolization can be seen as relying more on the use of object language and 
metalanguage, as opposed to protolanguage. Additionally, we could understand 
protolanguage as being used to communicate pre-verbal experiences, especially via 
the transference, which constitutes a classic psychoanalytic account. Knox further 
links the teleological mode of functioning (where actions are equated with their 
outcomes without the, developmentally more advanced, mediation of mentalization) 
to Terrence Deacon’s (1997) account of the use of iconic and indexical signs in the 
animal world, to demonstrate ‘how language becomes subverted from its symbolic 
function and is used in the service of indexical communication (Knox, 2009a p.31)’. 
Knox gives a good example of the baby’s cries which serve an indexical function in 
the m/other in ensuring the baby is attended to and survives. The pervasive sense of 
the baby’s crying is often described as getting under one’s skin and linked with the 
effects of PI in the adult therapeutic relationship. Knox captures this eloquently:
“Indexical communication is a pattern of relating in which any communication 
is coercive, in the way that an animal’s alarm call ensures that all other 
animals flee the approaching predator; the signal does not just point to an 
object, but its function is also to evoke a specific behavioural or emotional 
response from the other person, without giving them any space to reflect on 
that response or choose an alternative... When indexical communication
Although it is outside of the scope of this essay it's worth noting that Sandler's Third Stage PI, which 
refers to Bion's view s on the containing mother and the transformation of beta to  alpha elem ents, is 
linked with the developm ent of agency in the mentalization account which is heavily based on Bion's 
view.
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persists into adult life, it reflects the fact that the patient’s self-agency is stuck 
at the teleological level in which he or she only feels real through having a 
direct behavioural or emotional impact on the analyst (Knox, 2009 p. 29).”
Conclusion
These conceptual developments in the understanding of PI have been motivated as 
psychotherapists and psychoanalysts have worked with more troubled clients, 
particularly those referred to as personality disorders and especially borderline 
personality disorders. If a person lacks the capacity to articulate and elaborate on their 
felt experience, it is often not enough to suppress or ignore it, but will rather 
necessitate that another person takes on an auxiliary function in the relationship, often 
to the detriment of the latter. Additionally, the presence of the other person is often 
both the cause, providing the interpersonal context that creates volatile affective 
experience, and also the necessary apparatus to regulate this experience. Modem 
analytic approaches (e.g. mentalization) understand this state of affairs as a failure of 
affect regulation that leads to a failure of self-regulation (both in terms of the self as 
an agent, an author of actions, and the self as a representation encompassing all the 
things that are believed to be true of oneself- see Fonagy et al., 2002). The inability to 
deal with this felt experience, then, has the consequences that patients are unable to 
sustain their own sense of agency. The result is a type of coercive communication and 
interaction where the other person is forced to behave in a way that reinstates a sense 
of agency to the patient, whilst losing his/her own. Because of the difficulty of 
working with such patients, there is need for ongoing conceptual and empirical 
research to understand the workings of these ways of relating and some such is being 
undertaken within the field of mentalization (Bateman & Fonagy 2004; 2006). I hope 
that having shown how PI works as a sort of language (or more precisely language 
and signs) makes a small contribution to thinking about the processes that lead such 
patients to provoke situations that can be very hard to manage. The interested reader 
can refer to Knox’s work (2009a; 2009b) for some of the consequences to 
analytic/therapeutic technique.
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Essay 3: understanding and working with anorexic inpatient clients.
Introduction
Anorexia nervosa (AN) is defined as a ‘psychiatric disorder’ with the highest 
mortality rate (20%) and an average duration of five to seven years (Hoek & van 
Hoeken, 2003). It is considered very difficult to ‘treat’, not only because of the 
medical complications arising from not eating, but also because of its ‘ego-syntonic’ 
nature. The current position of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE, 
2004) is that, unlike bulimia nervosa, there is no preferred therapeutic intervention. 
However, I believe that counselling psychologists are uniquely placed to work with 
people with AN. I will argue how our emphasis on the therapeutic relationship and our 
expertise and attention to process can be beneficial in working with this client group. 
As most psychological work carried out in the NHS, where AN is usually 
encountered, has a cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) base, I will approach 
treatment from this perspective and think about how we can work within this 
paradigm.
Experience of the client and those they encounter
I will begin by giving an up to date account of the phenomenology of AN as 
articulated by the psychiatric community in the ‘diagnostic and statistical manual of 
mental disorders, text revision’ (DSM-TR-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 
2000) and in the proposed revisions in DSM-V (APA, 2012). The first criterion to 
diagnose AN is the ‘restriction of energy intake’. Secondly, diagnosis requires a ‘fear 
of becoming fat’, and/or ‘persistent behavior that interferes with weight gain’. Finally, 
the last criterion requires a ‘disturbance’ in the evaluation of weight and shape, a high 
impact of this on self-evaluation and absence of insight. This is the experience of the 
client as it looks from the point of view of the diagnostician.
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Phenomenological research in psychology has offered some valuable insights into the 
clients’ own experience of their difficulties. Dignon and colleagues (2006) identified a 
number of themes in clients’ reports of the aetiology of ‘not eating’. These were 
‘unhappiness’, ‘lack of control’, ‘obsession’ and ‘perfectionism’. Clients also reported 
that engaging in anorexic behaviours gave them a sense of well-being or euphoria and 
control, which led to further food refusal and increasing weight loss. Clients described 
this as a ‘downward spiral’ which they found themselves caught in. In order to further 
understand this ‘maintenance cycle’, clients have also implicated the broad social 
institutions they participate in such as their families, school and the media as 
contributing factors (Dignon et al., 2006). In order to clarify how anorexia is 
maintained, Williams and Reid (2010) used an online pro-anorexia forum to stage and 
subsequently analyse a discussion. Their central finding was related to the experience 
of ‘ambivalence’. Participants were undecided about how much they controlled 
anorexia or were controlled by it, and consequently their desire to hold on to it or give 
it up. They often saw it as a ‘tool’ they could use to manage a number of issues, which 
echoed previous research. It could be a means of control, of achieving perfection, of 
being happy, managing difficult emotions, but also of punishing themselves. 
Alternatively, they also experienced it as a ‘disease’ and ‘disorder’ that was actually in 
control of them and significantly impacted their life.
It therefore seems that anorexia is both a solution and a problem. Clients with AN 
seem to value their anorexia highly and, in my clinical experience, appear to become 
antagonistic when it is threatened. From listening to clients and participating in their 
family therapy, I think it is likely that they often did not have a voice in their family 
and their subjective experience was largely neglected. It would also seem that families 
with an anorexic member placed particular importance on eating as a shared activity, 
whilst simultaneously often being unable or unwilling to experience close 
relationships, negotiate the conflict inherent in these and generally talk about thoughts 
and feelings. Conversely, it seemed that often the dining table became an arena where 
these absences were negotiated and expressed symbolically. Taking stock of how 
clients report experiencing significant others is very important, not only in creating a 
joint narrative of the client’s difficulties, but also in being mindful of how these may 
tacitly develop in the therapeutic relationship.
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CBT models of anorexia nervosa
As already mentioned, there are no ‘recommended treatments’ for AN at this moment. 
In inpatient units in the UK, however, psychological help usually has a significant 
CBT component. Additionally, there has been a growing appreciation in CBT that 
working with very troubled clients necessitates both understanding the origin of the 
client’s difficulties and attending to the therapeutic relationship (J. Beck, 2005). 
Waller et al. (2007) have traced the historical development of CBT models for AN. 
They identified a first wave of CBT models which were primarily maintenance based 
(e.g. Fairbum, 1981; Gamer & Bemis, 1982). They reported that therapeutic failures 
eventually led a to a ‘transdiagnostic model’ (Fairbum et al., 2003) applied across the 
eating disorders, which however also remained primarily a maintenance model. As 
can be seen from the qualitative research described above, this can be very helpful as 
the clients themselves report being caught in a vicious cycle which is extremely hard 
to break. However, Waller and colleagues argue that early experiences need also be 
prioritized and recommend concentrating on the schema level of representations 
(Cooper, 1997; Waller & Kennerly, 2003). Waller’s recommendations are based on 
Jeffrey Young’s schema focused therapy (Young et al., 2003). This is, I think, a 
particular approach to CBT that resonates with the counselling psychological 
emphasis on creating a rich biographical narrative of the client’s difficulties and the 
centrality of the therapeutic relationship.
The fundamental thesis of CBT is that cognitions influence emotion and behaviour; 
how we behave depends not on just on situations, but how we experience them, 
including our own selves. CBT in all its variations is a highly collaborative venture 
(collaborative empiricism), where both client and psychologist become curious about 
the client’s difficulties and attempt to identify and challenge (or accept) the clients 
‘maladaptive’ cognitions. The therapist’s stance is based on transparency. In a 
classical CBT perspective (J. Beck, 2011) the therapeutic couple works on arriving at 
a joint formulation. This can visually depict the client’s early experiences and the 
‘core beliefs’ they lead to. It is then followed by the ‘attitudes/rules/assumptions’ that 
flow from these beliefs and finally the ‘negative automatic thoughts’ that arise 
moment to moment, as well as the feelings accompanied by these.
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Working with schemata involves significantly elaborating on early experiences. 
Young et al. (2003) define as schema a constellation of memories, feelings, bodily 
sensations, and self-other relational configurations, which develop in early childhood 
as a result of the interplay between temperament and early experiences. ‘Maladaptive’ 
schemata are self-defeating themes or patterns that perpetuate themselves throughout 
life. Young has articulated eighteen such schemas which are grouped into five 
domains: ‘disconnection and rejection’, ‘impaired autonomy and performance’, 
‘impaired limits’, ‘other directedness’ and ‘overvigillance and inhibition’. According 
to Waller et al. (2007), administering the Young Schema Questionnaire-Short Form 
[YSQ-S] to clients across all the eating disorders, has yielded high mean scores on the 
‘abandonment’, ‘emotional deprivation’ and ‘defectiveness or shame’ schemata (from 
the ‘disconnection and rejection’ domain). Young et al. (2003) offer distinct 
hypotheses about the early experiences that can lead to the development of each 
schema. They have also identified three behavioural responses to the triggering of 
schemata: ‘schema compensation’, ‘avoidance’ or ‘surrender’. These neatly 
correspond to ‘fight’, ‘flight’ or ‘freeze’. Fighting the schema, for example, entails 
behaving in an opposite way to the schema’s dictates.
However, identification of the schemata is something to be done in collaboration with 
the patient. Rather than standardizing the aetiology of AN (if that is even possible) it 
is more helpful to maintain a client centred stance and identify specific schemas for 
each client, as well as a tentative narrative about how early life might have led to the 
development of these schemata for this client. Moreover, explanations of aetiology are 
often arrived at by backdating observed and reported relationship patterns to early 
infancy and childhood and then ascribing these causal effects. If we take a more 
relational, process-oriented and constructionist perspective, we can see the client’s 
reports as context dependent and situated within the therapeutic relationship. Clients 
report remembered experiences within the particular relationship with the therapist 
and attempt to make sense of past experiences within the present and in light of the 
future. Therefore, reports need to be understood in context. Similarly, therapists may 
be keen to arrive at causal explanations to satisfy demands of the health setting and to 
soothe their own anxiety rather than remain in a state of not knowing.
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One of the limitations of the CBT model is that, despite its usefulness, it focuses 
primarily on the individual and her immediate family, rather than understanding social 
and political contributions. Additionally, it does not attribute any significance to the 
fact that AN is largely seen in women. It can be challenging for the counselling 
psychologist to make use of relevant critiques within a health setting and this is rarely 
explored in the literature. However, the psychologist must at least be thinking about 
these influences as this will shape the internal space that is receiving the client’s 
communications. I will briefly touch on these critiques in the conclusion to this essay.
Working with anorexic clients
The aim in schema focused therapy is to ‘heal’ maladaptive schemata and stop their 
perpetuation. Client and psychologist work together to identify these and the instances 
when these are triggered, including in the therapeutic relationship. As Young phrases 
it (Young et al., 2003) clients are helped to ‘flip out’ of self-defeating schema modes 
as soon as possible when these are activated. This can eventually allow clients to be 
more in touch with their core feelings and meet their needs in everyday life. Before 
proceeding further we need to consider the circumstances under which this may 
become more possible.
Firstly, the issue of context needs to be seriously taken into account. Counselling 
psychologists place central importance on this. Anorexic clients at the severe end of 
the spectrum are invariably seen in inpatient hospital settings due to the high medical 
risk arising from their emaciated state. The clinical approach to such clients cannot 
therefore be conceptualized outside of this context and what is possible within it. My 
own experience is that participation in this setting has a considerable impact on these 
clients. They often report feelings of intense shame and humiliation and react with 
intense anger and hostility. Being an inpatient is especially difficult because it 
deprives clients of control, the lack of which they identify as a major cause of their 
anorexia in the first place, as mentioned above. Additionally, it creates very powerful 
feelings for a client group who also testify to a problem in managing their emotions. 
For those clients who do not have insight into their difficulties inpatient admission is a
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profoundly invalidating experience. It is particularly difficult then that the main 
presentation of anorexia sets up the client to receive the exact opposite response from 
what they need, in a way. This lack of control experienced in inpatient settings has 
been identified as a common reason for drop out (Eivors et al., 2003). These feelings 
are justified as the inpatient experience is far from an easy one. However, these are 
often the only responses that clients are able to offer and fiercely refuse to take any 
responsibility for their well-being. My own experience has often been one of 
confusion, not knowing how much of my clients’ difficulties are the results of 
iatrogenic effects and how much of what they bring to the setting.
Therefore, much attention has to be paid the therapeutic relationship. The centrality of 
the therapeutic relationship is a central philosophical tenet of CP and the attention to 
process is the central area of therapeutic skills training. CBT can be fruitfully 
employed in a way largely congruent with these assumptions. The psychologist must 
begin by committing to a stance of radical transparency and collaboration. I believe it 
is helpful for the therapist to sensitively disclose their thinking processes and feelings. 
This is done both in the service of transparency and collaboration and also models and 
demonstrates links between thoughts, feelings and behaviours. However, the 
psychologist should be mindful that he is not unconsciously giving responsibility to 
the client for his own feelings and difficulties.
The anorexic clients I have so far worked with do appear to share some common ways 
of relating to the therapist. They often make very basic verbal contributions and are 
unable or unwilling to elaborate beyond a very basic degree. They tend to be both 
consciously and unconsciously protective of their thoughts and feelings. They can also 
be very aggressive and hostile towards the therapist and this can be a very difficult 
experience for the psychologist who needs to be very mindful of his own feelings at 
moments like these. Firstly, it can be tempting to subtly withdraw support and 
commitment to the client or worse retaliate by making critical and judgemental 
interventions. It is important to keep thinking and try to understand what sort of 
feelings and thoughts the behaviour is about and be able to sensitively and tentatively 
share this with the client, whilst also using the information to build up a picture of the 
schemata potentially being activated and the coping behaviours employed. As already
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mentioned, validating the client’s experience, including the difficulty of being an 
inpatient, is crucial. Unless clients begin to feel that the psychologist might be willing 
to understand them, they are likely to sabotage the therapy.
So far I have argued that a counselling psychological approach to anorexia involves a 
thorough appreciation and discussion of the impact of the context both on the client’s 
experience and the process of therapy, including the therapeutic relationship. It is 
then, I think, possible to proceed by collaboratively addressing the client’s underlying 
schemata. Clients can be given the YSQ, to identify fifteen maladaptive schemata (it 
has not yet been updated to eighteen). However, this must be done in full 
collaboration with the client; the psychologist takes a psychoeducational stance, 
explains the general notion of schema theory and therapy, as well as the rationale for 
the questionnaire. At this point it has to be emphasized that the psychologist has 
introduced his or her own meaning making framework to the client and the risk of 
invalidation is high. The client should therefore be encouraged to choose different 
schemata if they feel that these resonate more than the ones identified through the 
questionnaire and invited to give them different names or even change the content of 
each. The client should be offered photocopies of schema descriptions and other 
materials. If the session is being recorded the client should be asked whether they 
would like a copy of the recording. Additionally, they can be told that they can have 
the psychologist’s notes which are made during the session photocopied in the end. I 
include these details to exemplify the level of transparency that is, I think, helpful to 
these clients. The psychologist can then invite the client to share difficult situations 
and these can often be drawn from life in the ward. Alternatively, Young et al. (2003) 
offer a number of techniques, such as imagery, to access feelings during particular 
events and identify the schemata and coping strategies that are being activated. 
Consequently, behavioural experiments can be designed collaboratively to test and 
consolidate work from within sessions.
Ultimately, there a number of issues that can get in the way of recovery. In Williams 
and Reid’s (2010) study, participants reported feeling fearful of seeking recovery and 
doubted their ability to recover as a result of being entrenched in AN. Additionally, 
they explained that they felt negatively towards treatment and identified a number of
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limitations. Furthermore, a very important aspect of the therapeutic work is to pace 
therapy appropriately as severely emaciated clients’ capacity to reflect on their 
thoughts and feelings is usually compromised. CBT modules emphasizing thinking 
and behaviour, rather than feeling, may be more appropriate in the beginning, before 
work can concentrate on underlying schemata. In my place of work, for example, pen 
and paper tasks are usually used to access thinking and then feeling styles before more 
formal CBT takes place. This can help set up the working alliance and support clients 
in their capacity to access, tolerate and communicate their thoughts and feelings.
Conclusion
In this essay I have outlined one possible way of working with inpatient anorexics that 
I believe does some justice to the counselling psychological approach of working, 
within the limitations of an NHS setting. I have tried to argue for a collaborative, 
relational, process-oriented way of working which does not locate difficulties simply 
within the individual, but takes account of the therapeutic setting itself. I have, 
nonetheless, tried to underscore that the use of the therapist’s and the setting’s own 
discourses can be invalidating to this particular client group. Finally, from a critical 
point of view, it may be necessary to go even further to consider how society tacitly 
contributes to this particular problem. For instance, writing from a feminist 
perspective, Orbach (1993) described anorexia as ‘an unconscious social protest 
against the constraints and contradictions of women’s lives’ (cited in Dignon et al., 
2006 p. 943). Further complicating this picture is the possibility that, as Dignon et al 
put it, ‘protesting against the restricted, exploited and degraded role of adult 
femininity (p. 943)’ also seems to be a self-defeating pattern (much like the 
maladaptive schemata within the individual) which actually maintains a stereotype of 
‘neurotic women in need of control’. My own position is that this is an aspect of 
therapy that needs to be carefully considered by counselling psychologists and one 
that is an area of development for me; trying to further understand how to negotiate 
these issues in therapy and to be mindful of the political forces that silently operate in 
the therapy room.
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Therapeutic dossier 
Introduction to the therapeutic dossier
In this section I will attempt to introduce the reader to some of what I learned in my 
therapeutic practice. I start by introducing my three year long, two day per week 
clinical placements, highlighting some of the central learning that took place for me. I 
then present my final clinical paper where I will try to demonstrate how, at this 
moment, I understand the way I integrated theory, research, and practice and have 
established a position as an applied psychologist.
Year one
My first year placement was at a primary care NHS setting in London, a GP surgery. I 
saw eighteen patients for one to one psychological therapy. Each course of therapy 
lasted between six to eight sessions. I became familiar with basic referral processes 
and pathways, and also used a number of standard psychometric tests such as PHQ-9, 
GAD-7 and others. Brief information about all the patients I worked with can be 
found in my year one log book.
Other Activities
I attended weekly assessment sessions. Initially I observed my supervisor conducting 
fifty minute assessment sessions with patients referred from the surgery, then I 
conducted my own assessments with my supervisor present, and finally I ran these by 
myself. This allowed me to learn how to build an alliance in a short period of time in 
order to support patients to speak as freely as possible. At the same time I learnt how 
to contain their narrative within the allocated time space and to ensure I also received 
the necessary information to make an appropriate treatment decision or referral. In the 
course of the year it became more possible for me to combine knowledge with 
intuition gathered from experience.
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I also ran three courses of a CBT skills group. The basic version consisted of six one 
hour sessions and the more advanced involved four one and half hour sessions.
Year two
My second year placement was at a secondary care NHS setting, a psychotherapy 
department. During the year I saw five patients for a period of three to nine months, 
each in one weekly psychoanalytic psychotherapy. I also saw two patients for one 
session who did not wish to take up the offer of therapy. I had two supervisors from 
different psychoanalytic orientations who supervised three and two patients 
respectively. I was required to write verbatims of each session to present in 
supervision.
I learnt a lot about transference and counter-transference, the level to pitch 
interpretations at, and when to say something and when to hold back. Most 
importantly I began to learn the importance of tolerating anxiety, uncertainty, and not 
knowing. I also learned to be very attentive to what was said as well as what was not 
being said, particularly in the patient’s relationship to me. Brief information about all 
the patients I worked with can be found in my year two log book.
Other Activities
I attended weekly team meetings (clinical, management and multidisciplinary) and 
had an opportunity to present a verbatim of my work in one of the clinical meetings. I 
also received an introduction to art and music therapy.
Year three
My final year placement was at a Tertiary Care NHS setting, an inpatient anorexia 
nervosa service. Patients were women aged over eighteen who were at the extreme 
end of severity; according to various sources my placement was considered the last
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resort within the UK. I saw patients for different durations ranging from a few weeks 
to over six months. I also offered them different types of treatment. This involved two 
different, ten session manualized treatments, at twice weekly intensity. The first. 
Cognitive Remediation Therapy (CRT), focused on cognitive strategies or ‘thinking 
about thinking’. The second. Cognitive Remediation and Emotional Skills Training 
(CREST), focused on feeling strategies or ‘thinking about feeling’ and usually 
followed CRT. CBT was ideally offered after CREST but practically I offered it at 
various stages. This client population often presented me with considerable challenges 
in engaging and sustaining a therapeutic relationship. I believe I developed 
considerable experience in making contact with very hard to reach patients. Brief 
information about all the patients I worked with can be found in my year three log 
book.
Other activities
I also co-facilitated weekly psychological skills groups around cognitive flexibility, 
emotional versatility, and ‘worry’. These were not complex in content, but delivering 
them was no easy task. Encouraging patients to attend was often difficult. 
Furthermore, the challenge was also in maintaining a degree of enthusiasm and 
positivity when often met with avoidance and disinterest from patients during the 
group.
I also participated in weekly ward rounds. These were complex situations in terms of 
formulating verbal reports. I found I had to speak in a way that addressed the team, the 
patient, and the patient’s family. I had to find ways to be encouraging whilst at the 
same time highlighting the very real problems those patients had in their progress. 
There were a few instances where because of the psychological complexity of the 
patient, I had to take the lead in the process. This involved sensitively referring to my 
understanding of the patient, and how this could help us navigate what was happening 
in that moment. I would often make subtle references to transference and how this was 
affecting their state of mind at present. I was the only psychologist in the team who 
spoke in relational and process terms in ward rounds and received positive feedback 
about my contributions, such as in one instance ‘keeping the patient from discharging
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herself. It was heartening to discover that the counselling psychology way of working 
could be valued so highly.
I also co-facilitated family therapy sessions with a social worker colleague and found 
this a fascinating experience. Finally, I attended weekly compulsory ‘community 
groups’ which involved participation from all members of the community including 
members of staff to discuss any issues that patients had. These also necessitated gentle 
use of therapeutic skills (see final clinical paper). Similarly, my attention to process, 
transference and countertransference was very positively received by the team.
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Final clinical paper
As you set out for Ithaka 
hope the voyage is a long one, 
full of adventure, full of discovery.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops, 
angry Poseidon—don’t be afraid of them: 
you’ll never find things like that on your way 
as long as you keep your thoughts raised high, 
as long as a rare excitement 
stirs your spirit and your body.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops, 
wild Poseidon—you won’t encounter them 
unless you bring them along inside your soul, 
unless your soul sets them up in front of you.
(“Ithaca” by C. P. Cavafy, 1911. Translated by Edmund Keeley/Philip Sherrard, 1992)
Odysseus has always been one of my heroes. During the Iliad he is primarily located 
in the background. It is Achilles who has the privilege of being the hero of the story, 
but also carries the responsibility of the epic (Achilles means ‘he who carries a 
burden’). Odysseus works from the side-lines, occasionally stepping in and ultimately 
saving the day with his invention of the Trojan horse. During my training I came to 
understand that I too had a tendency to be outside looking in, rather than engaging 
deeply with my experience and facing the responsibility and also privilege of being 
present in the therapeutic relationship. When we encounter Odysseus in his own story 
he has to engage in a ten year journey to Ithaca. Now we see him facing a number of 
adversaries. And he often gets it very wrong. As Cavafy (1911) suggests it is one’s 
internal adversaries that one has to face in any journey. I think that my training was
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more than becoming a professional; it was also about starting the process of fully 
coming into being by finally being ‘in there’ on a personal level as well. The purpose 
of this paper is to offer a brief account of how this became more possible and how I 
developed into a counselling psychologist in the light of personal experience (Britton, 
2003). I will try to demonstrate how integrating theory research and practice was 
intimately interwoven with my further development as a person.
Developing an identity as a counselling psychologist
Training in a relatively young and emerging discipline still defining itself (Orlans & 
Van Scoyoc, 2008; Strawbridge & Woolfe 2009) meant that establishing an identity as 
a professional was often a struggle. The challenge was marked by the similarities 
between the discipline and sister professions such as clinical psychology, counselling 
and psychotherapy. In my experience, there are a number of central features in the 
practice of counselling psychology (CP). They are perhaps not unique to it, but the 
presence of all of these gives CP its distinct flavour. I attempt to outline them below 
as they constitute my position as a professional at this point in time.
Epistemological pluralism
Initially, I would see our work as taking into consideration multiple epistemologies 
both in research and clinical practice (McAteer, 2010). All knowledge is after all 
historically and contextually embedded. For instance, from a social constructionist 
perspective (Wetherell & Potter. 1987), approaching a patient’s"^  difficulty requires 
considering the different ways in which their distress is constructed, as well as the 
consequences for subjectivity and action that flows from these. I do not intend to take 
a relativist position, but acknowledge the need to shift between different ways of 
looking at a patient’s problems. Therefore, I cannot disregard the similarities that
 ^ Throughout th e  paper I use my preferred term  which is 'pa tien t', ra ther than  'client'. I am unhappy with the  
association of th e  word patient with the  medical model, but I am equally unsure abou t th e  overtone of 
superficiality th a t I see in such a business term  as client. Additionally, th e  word patien t com es from  Latin and 
m eans 'to  suffer'; I assum e th a t if psychotherapy is going to  lead anywhere th e  patient has to  em brace th e  reality 
of their suffering.
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appear evident between different ‘clinical syndromes’ and the need to often make 
decisions and predictions based on ethical principles including, but not limited to, risk 
and ‘prognosis’. Such decisions have to be justifiable in a way that can make sense to 
all stakeholders in a patient’s therapy. This has often been a challenge both because of 
my upbringing, but also because of my ethnicity. Greek society had been, until 
perhaps recent years, rather inward looking, self-protective and often downright 
xenophobic. It is perhaps the case that the struggles to develop an identity as a nation 
and the injuries from four hundred years of Ottoman rule, two world wars and civil 
wars have made Greeks feel as if they need to stick to their guns despite a need for 
flexibility and adaptiveness. The capacity to hold different points of view has been, in 
my experience, harder for Greek people and for me. But on a personal level it has 
been an emotional journey of struggling with complexity and difference that was 
about more than being Greek, but about the choices I was making unconsciously. 
Beginning to developing multi-ocular vision has meant having to struggle with the 
Cyclops in me and I think this remains an on-going process.
Critical position towards different models of therapy
In my opinion becoming a counselling psychologist is not equivalent to becoming an 
integrative psychotherapist as it is sometimes implicitly understood. Rather it is to 
develop a critical stance towards all theoretical models and be able to consider which 
way of working would be more suitable to this particular patient. This is a task that 
requires both systematic theoretical study (Draghi-Lorenz, 2010) and rigorous 
experiential training. Although counselling psychologists are not trained in depth at a 
particular model, their training in consistently oriented towards a deeply relational 
way of work. I came to this training having done an Msc in theoretical psychoanalysis 
and although it remains a central influence for me, I have also come to acknowledge 
the seductiveness and safety of a single model. The consequence of sticking to just 
one model involves the danger of complacency and lethargy. It can be like a Lotus 
fruit, reminding us of Odysseus’ perils when he encounters the Lotus eaters.
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Attention to process
It was particularly in my third year, working in an inpatient Eating Disorders Unit, 
that certain aspects of my identity as a relational practitioner became more salient. 
Perhaps the emphasis on process and the understanding of relational dynamics was 
brought out in clear relief as colleagues sought to consult me about patients I was 
working with. I was delighted to find that professionals from different disciplines (but 
perhaps less so from clinical psychology), found my insights around transference and 
countertransference useful in terms of working with a specific patient. Colleagues 
reported that they felt more compassionate towards the people they were working with 
when I had been able to offer insights about how the patient’s historical way of 
relating was repeated in, or at the very least influenced, their relationships with 
members of staff. I was also able to offer insights related to the group dynamics, 
unconscious processes and our contributions to these during our morning community 
groups when all of the patients and many members of staff would gather for forty 
minutes. For example, I suggested in one case how the group’s communications 
unconsciously revealed anxiety about members of staff that had left and worry that the 
patients would have to take responsibility for ‘training’ their replacements. I suggested 
that this might relate both to the population’s disappointment with their caregivers and 
their own willingness to shift attention from their own vulnerability by attending to 
the challenges that new members of the team might have to face. I received highly 
positive feedback on this observation. As counselling psychologists we can offer 
useful insights that can help us get disentangled and break free of the spell of 
troubling relational dynamics both in one to one and group work.
Emphasis on the therapeutic relationship
The central feature of working as a counselling psychologist, I think, remains an 
emphasis on the therapeutic relationship and the client’s phenomenology. I often use 
the simplistic shorthand of saying that we learn from Rogers (1957) about the quality 
of being in the relationship and from Freud (1901) about understanding the 
relationship. I think that the role of the psychologist in the clinical situation is to be a
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peculiar kind of witness, without being reduced to a bystander. One needs to make 
oneself fully available to experience with the patient what is going on. However, one 
also has to step out and take a third position (Britton, 1989).
Therapeutic practice
I shall now proceed to concentrate on some of my clinical practice and how I 
developed personally during the work. I was fortunate to succeed in being placed at 
primary, secondary and tertiary NHS settings, therefore getting a very full experience 
of the different facets of the national service. All three were vastly different, leaving 
me with the necessity and pleasure of becoming quite adaptive and flexible, not 
initially my strong points.
Year one
My first year placement was at a London primary care setting, a GP surgery. I saw 
clients usually for six to eight sessions. My supervisor was a counselling psychologist 
and integrative psychotherapist, a very accomplished and potent Asian woman. I 
suspect from the little I know about her that it had been a major accomplishment for 
her to occupy a prestigious position as running the surgery’s psychological services 
for more than a decade, having had to struggle with asserting herself despite her sex 
and ethnicity during her life. At the time, and in retrospect, I learned a lot about how 
to stand my ground, look after myself and be vigorous in my clinical and consulting 
work. I also learned much about the importance of boundaries in clinical work, taking 
more seriously attendance rates, clients’ requests and my own timekeeping.
I found working within an integrative model exciting. I think that I found the right 
amount of familiarity and unfamiliarity within it. I was encouraged to think in the 
psychodynamic way that I was familiar with and that my supervisor valued, but also 
allowed to take risks and try different experiential techniques (e.g. mindfulness) and 
CBT experiments such as thoughts records and behavioural experiments. I felt at ease
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with many of the assumptions within a broad humanistic model too. However, I was 
probably unsure about the optimistic position inherent in these. This was pronounced 
as I was acutely aware of how short term the work was. From my own experience of 
two years of previous therapy and the beginning of a new one at the start of the year, 
change came slow and a lot of work was necessary to shift longstanding ways of being 
in the world. I often felt powerless with this short term work. The challenge for me 
was to find a way of being comfortable with relaxing and being satisfied with offering 
a ‘good experience’ to the patient by ‘trusting the processes’. I also grappled with 
what standing back and being receptive looked like, what it felt like and how it could 
be made possible and this is not really something that can easily be put in words. But 
it did seem to involve trying to refrain from acting too fast or having undue 
expectations from myself and my patients. My work with a particular client, Mr 
Anderson, was to be quite influential in many ways during this time.
Mr Anderson was a white English man in his early thirties and an only child. Mr 
Anderson cared little for his appearance and even less about his conduct. He and his 
partner had recently lost their baby. Subsequently, his partner had left him as he had 
‘cuddled and kissed’ her fifteen year old daughter, as well as engaging in sexual email 
exchanges with another woman. Social services had not pursued the matter further. Mr 
Anderson needed help with his losses and had been referred by his GP to do so. It is a 
matter of public record that his GP had also been guilty of a sexual offence and 
appeared to be especially lenient with his patient.
Mr Anderson wept and talked about his problems in a way that felt apologetic and 
distant and left me feeling unmoved and manipulated. Mr Anderson could also be 
quite convincing about the reasons for his behaviour and I often found myself drawn 
to be softer and almost to agree with him that his actions were not contemptible. Was I 
on my way to respond like his GP? And what would that mean about me? I had to 
consider this in personal therapy and explore what hook he was finding in me. I came 
to consider closely my own relationship with power, control and intimacy, especially 
as a male. In supervision we carefully considered these issues and decided to extend 
his contract to twelve sessions. We thought that having a longer experience with a 
male psychologist would help him consider a different way of being.
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I slowly began to have more of a sense of what was going on. I think that Mr 
Anderson hated his own vulnerability and neediness -like many sexual offenders. It 
was a struggle for the both of us, but towards the end of therapy Mr Anderson talked 
about the loss of his baby again and this time I experienced him as being more 
congruent and deeply in tune with his loss. I too became aware that I had to hold back 
tears at the time. I think that Mr Anderson did, correctly, experience me as critical at 
times and I know that I can generally come across as quite critical. It seemed that 
perhaps it was more tolerable for him that I joined him in his deprecation rather than 
him owning his own guilt about his actions. However, I also believe that our work 
over the course of three months and my consistent presence communicated to him a 
way of bearing more of his own mixed feelings. Like me he could be both deeply 
disapproving of his actions, but also compassionate towards himself. In Begum 
Maitra’s words (personal communication, 2012) it is a matter of being genuinely 
curious and willing to encourage clients to understand ‘how they stomach what they 
do’. I think that holding on to the ambivalence of offering some measure of positive 
regard to my client whilst not forgetting my own feelings as a citizen and human 
being about his actions, set me in a course of struggling with complexity especially 
when it is in discord with the psychologist’s own values because of their sex, ethnicity 
or sexual orientation.
Year two
This year I was a placed in a psychotherapy department in the south of England. I saw 
five clients for a period of six to nine months each and had two supervisors, a Jungian 
analyst and Kleinian psychoanalytic psychotherapist. This was both a blessing and 
curse at times as their way of working was very different and I had to struggle further 
with ambivalence, much like I was doing in my research work. The degree of 
challenge I received in this placement was only equalled by the support I was 
privileged to be offered. I was delighted to be in a psychodynamic placement and to 
work in this way. However, I also came to recognise that I had a number of 
misunderstandings about it, which boiled down to the need to being more Achilles and
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less Odysseus in this context. Initially, I relied a lot on the security that my intellectual 
knowledge gave me and that seemed to allow me a protective distance. I was slightly 
arrogant at times about how much I thought I knew about my patients and often drew 
bold conclusions about their persons. I think I learned, the hard way, a number of 
things that year. I firstly realised the importance of staying with the immediate 
experience in the room and making tentative interpretations about what was going on 
in the moment for the patient, often in the context of the therapeutic relationship. I had 
to refrain from drawing too many conclusions about what I was hearing and trying to 
attend to the richness and complexity of the patient’s narrative at that moment. I also 
learned more about the value of standing back, something I still struggle with to this 
day. I could begin to see more how my perfectionism and lack of confidence made me 
spring into action and try to make things happen. I was also growing in realisation 
about the importance of compassion and how I often found it hard to really be kind to 
myself and to my patients. Reassurance, for example, something I grew up with a lot, 
is probably one of the most selfish and unkind things to offer unless used very 
carefully. Real kindness is, I think, more about showing confidence in people and that 
they can manage more than they think. Seeing clients as victims and becoming too 
protective of them has nothing to do with compassion, but more to do with the 
psychologist’s fear of the patient’s potency and aggression. These are I believe some 
of the real strengths of psychodynamic work as it is actually practiced.
In my opinion there is another crucial misunderstanding about a central principle of 
working analytically. It is often thought that the setting is designed to maximise the 
client’s anxiety so that this can become available for work in the room. It is portrayed 
as a more active process, whereas in my mind the therapist’s work is different. I see it 
as refraining from the social conventions that we leam in order to keep interactions 
relatively free of anxiety, conflict and doubt. Anxiety is therefore not provoked, but 
simply not avoided. I think this has the potential to be a liberating experience for a 
patient although it usually feels more painful for both members of the therapeutic 
couple than perhaps other ways of work. Having to stand back was often an anxiety 
provoking experience for me, but I could also begin to see some of the consequences 
of allowing more space for the patients. Another misconception is that the therapist is 
more distant. I think that the way we speak to our patients, if it is authentic, reveals an
61
awful lot about us, on a very deep and embodied level. This involved me continuing to 
shift from ‘therapy speak’ to a more authentic, direct and emotional way of putting 
things. How could I, a Greek man, have ever forgotten how to do this?
Mrs Baker, a white English woman in her early fifties, was referred to our 
psychotherapy department in order to address her impulsive binge eating and fear of 
getting bigger. Mrs Baker had recently been going through a number of changes. Her 
youngest son had left home to go to university. Her husband, a military man, had been 
stationed in the north of the UK for a few months by the beginning of her therapy. The 
client herself had retired from teaching young children and was therefore now living 
alone at home. Her eldest son, in his late twenties, lived nearby with his wife and their 
two children. Mrs Baker and I agreed that we would meet for around nine months. 
However, her husband was meant to retire and return home a short time before the 
anticipated end of therapy. Mrs Baker could not say if she could stay until the end of 
the time I had offered her.
Mrs Baker, currently at a weight she found bearable, told me how she felt she had 
replaced bingeing with impulsive shopping. She had closets overflowing with clothes 
she had never worn. It seemed as if she needed to give an illusion of fullness. Mrs 
Baker had had a very difficult first birth. Her placenta had stopped working and her 
son had nearly died, having been starved of nutrients for a number of days. When she 
saw him she reported that he had not been the baby she had been hoping for. It would 
seem that her rejection of her son was repeated years later when she sent him to 
boarding school, realising only much later that he had hated it fiercely. She now 
seemed to allow her son to bully both herself and her husband into unplanned baby 
sitting and money requests. Mrs Baker associated that she might be giving in because 
of the guilt she felt towards him.
As her therapy progressed, Mrs Baker disclosed that she had loved her husband, but 
had not felt in love with him. He had rescued her, when she was a late adolescent, 
from alcohol. This revelation occurred not long after her husband had returned home 
and she and I were contemplating how long she could attend for, which she could not 
answer.
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There were a number of features of the psychodynamic model that were helpful to her. 
As a person with some capacity for reflection and self-observation and reasonably 
motivated, Mrs Baker appeared well suited for a relational, insight-oriented form of 
psychotherapy. The frequency, length and constancy of the analytic setting were 
useful in allowing enough space for the subtle relational dynamics of this avoidant 
client to emerge. The purpose of this type of therapy could be seen filling the client’s 
gaps in self-narrative (Freud, 1915). However, there were also a number of 
longstanding themes around wanting and being wanted and feeling full and empty. It 
was fascinating to leam how I could be enlisted in playing out part of her own 
narrative. During the second year I had been quite worried about how successful I 
would be in this work, using a model that I valued highly and worried about coming 
up short. In supervision we considered that I seemed to be acting out her own 
projections and worrying about being wanted myself, something I also struggled with 
due to my perfectionism. I consequently became more able to talk about a number of 
issues with her and her worry in our relationship that she might not be wanted. I was 
not able to support her in continuing her therapy after her husband had retired and 
they moved homes. She cited a number of practical issues such as the need to drive an 
hour to get to me, as well as being frightened of ‘having to leave her husband’ as a 
result of our work, as if the aim of therapy was not to offer understanding, but to 
disrupt her life. She terminated unexpectedly and left a message to say she would 
write to me to explain, but I never received her letter. Again I was left feeling 
unwanted and there was no further opportunity to talk about this as her departure had 
silenced me. Being left with these feelings and thinking in supervision that this turn of 
events was likely inevitable was a humbling experience.
Year three
In my third year I was placed at an inpatient eating disorders unit for women aged 
eighteen and above. I had chosen this placement because I felt that it would offer me 
an experience of working in a setting where multidisciplinary work would be 
essential. This placement is probably the most prestigious unit in the UK and one with
63
a worldwide reputation of excellence. I was also curious about these patients being 
defined as ‘the hardest psychiatric patents’, being struck by the contempt and scorn 
that therapists viewed them with (Fleming, 2005).
I really struggled with the medical model that pervaded every aspect of life in the 
ward. I felt often constrained in working as I wanted and always felt under pressure to 
be working towards goals and to be demonstrating visible, behavioural changes. This 
was also exacerbated by my own perfectionism, so similar to that of my patients. 
Furthermore, if there is one place where compassion is under threat of extinction it 
was here. The degree of cruelty, hatred and criticism my patients felt for themselves 
and others were humbling and often left me feeling speechless with rage. Writing 
these words now I can see more clearly why I had led myself here. We were all 
struggling with the same things, but expressed it in different ways. I often felt out of 
kilter not knowing who feelings belonged to, what was right or wrong and up or 
down. But I also really learnt courage from these women, strength and perseverance. 
Sometimes knowledge and insight requires one to travel to hell, much like Odysseus 
had to do to consult the dead Oracle Teiresias.
The use of my supervisory relationship was also potentially the most complex of all 
three years. My supervisor was a counselling psychologist who was very impressive 
in her capacity to be a problem solver and a rich pool of CBT techniques. I learned a 
lot about thinking on my feet, being creative and working in this paradigm. However, 
I often struggled with letting go of my attachment to humanistic and psychodynamic 
models and think that I was sometimes not able to make full use of the help she was 
offering me. I think that unconsciously I felt as if working in a pure CBT way would 
somehow undermine my previous knowledge and expertise. My regret remains that I 
was not able to find better ways of addressing this. I also wonder whether my 
relationship to her mirrored some of the difficulties our patients struggled with. 
Anorexic patients often struggle to use others’ help. Simultaneously, being in 
relationship with my patients was often very challenging. They appeared to me to be 
suspicious of kindness and to act in a way that left me and other members of staff 
feeling deskilled, useless and ineffectual. A possible response in these eircumstances 
for all of us is to retaliate and withdraw help or lose hope and simply go through the
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motions. It was therefore particularly important to maintain confidence in my own 
value and hold a lot of hope for both myself and my patient. Nonetheless, I enjoyed 
this year most of all three years and I know now I would like to work more with these 
patients in the future. The following patient illustrates a case where I was able to more 
fruitfully combine what I knew with what I was learning.
Miss Clayton was a white English woman who was admitted to our unit at her 
eighteenth birthday following an inpatient admission in the adolescent clinic of our 
trust. After conducting her assessment. Miss Clayton was offered ten sessions of twice 
weekly ‘cognitive remediation therapy (CRT)’. This work centred on ‘thinking about 
thinking’ and consisted of using pen and paper tasks to elicit a client’s thinking styles 
and how they manifest in her broader life. Research has demonstrated that clients with 
anorexia typically exhibit specific cognitive vulnerabilities. The first is ‘weak central 
coherence’ and refers to difficulty in seeing the ‘big picture’ and focusing instead on 
details. The second, ‘difficulty in set shifting’, entails difficulty in switching between 
different stimuli. Additionally, this form of psychological therapy addresses 
‘perfectionism’ and aims overall to increase flexibility. At the end of her therapy Miss 
Clayton reported to me that she considered her attention to details, perfectionism and 
rigidity to be considerable obstacles to living her life. She could acknowledge how her 
life had been taken over by anorexia and impoverished. She explained that she found 
it very hard to engage in behavioural experiments because she felt she needed the 
control, security and sense of achievement that her anorexia gave her.
We agreed to continue with once weekly CBT in order to address her perfectionism 
and explore what her fear of losing control was about. This was quite poignant for me 
too as my own difficulties mirrored those of my patient. Using a pie chart to tease out 
how she constructed her self-worth we discovered that 100% was about anorexia. We 
were led to consider how she seemed to be in a bind between addressing her needs 
(being anorexic) which upset her family, or attending to them and being left feeling 
out of control. We noticed how she thought in a black and white way as a result of her 
perfectionism. As well as working in a CBT model, I considered it important to also 
attend to the whole person. Drawing from phenomenological and discourse analytic 
research I wondered with her whether her anorexia onset at thirteen had postponed a
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number of developmental dilemmas such as developing her own identity as an adult 
woman who could find a balance between respect for her own needs and those of 
others. Miss Clayton, who had been unwilling to talk about much else than food, 
became able to movingly talk about how she felt she was not interesting and people 
would not make contact if she was not ill. She could consider my view that her 
anorexia had allowed her to get attention, but not the kind she desperately needed to 
find her own way of being in the world. Talking about these issues and how they also 
manifest in our own relationship has allowed us to increase the helpfulness of CBT for 
her. For instance exploring her belief that being in a close relationship meant she was 
under pressure to comply with the others’ expectations, made engaging in behavioural 
experiments more possible. I see this relational way of doing CBT as especially 
indicative of practicing as a counselling psychologist and the benefits of doing so 
were clinically highly visible.
Conclusion
Odysseus recounts the fantastic events of his journey to the Phaeacian king and queen 
after he has been rescued from the beautiful nymph Calypso, who possessed by love 
for him has imprisoned him in her island. He then sets off to Ithaca and has one final 
challenge; to defeat Penelope’s suitors, reclaim Penelope and take his home back^.
I found that writing this paper has allowed me reflect on my own training and 
integrate in my mind much of what I have learned so far. I ultimately see relationality 
in clinical practice, critical thinking about theory and research and a holistic view of 
the patient’s phenomenology as the backbone of practicing as a CP. I have had to 
work hard to develop these insights for myself on a deep level, but it has also been a 
pleasure because they are largely aligned to my own values. I (try) to see human 
beings as complex and multi-layered beings which require multiple points of view to 
understand; yet this understanding has to emerge from within the relationship rather 
than just standing outside looking in. Like Odysseus, I am now much richer because
 ^ This part o f  the story is very meaningful to me, but space does not allow elaborating. It does, 
however, reflect the beginning o f a crucuial cgange that took place on a personal level.
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of my experiences and I too now have to face the challenges of post qualification on 
my final journey to Ithaca. However, I know that I have a few good friends to help me 
along like Athena, Telemachus and Eurycleia. Wish me well, reader, in the final step 
of my journey.
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Research dossier 
Introduction to research dossier
For my research I am presenting a literature review I conducted in year one, a 
qualitative research report from the second year and a quantitative study from my final 
year of training. My overall research topic is obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), 
with an emphasis on the capacity for agency.
My literature review involves an outline of ‘mentalizing’, a recent multidisciplinary 
construct with a psychodynamic base. It addresses social cognition from a clinical 
perspective and aims to illustrate how its development is intimately linked with the 
development of the self as an agent and producer of representations. In the second part 
of the review I attempt to apply this framework to suggest a novel model of OCD 
which advances self-vulnerabilities as an explanatory factor of obsessions and 
considers compulsions as attempts to exert agency.
My first research report examines ‘constructions’ of agency, and also responsibility in 
people who are diagnosed or self-diagnosed with OCD. Rather than a developmental 
exploration of agency from a realist philosophical perspective, this study is about the 
consequences for subjectivity and action of framing agency and responsibility in 
particular ways, discerned within talk-in-interaction.
Finally, during year three, my second report returns to a positivist framework and 
involves an experimental study about the specific self-vulnerability that I was 
discussing in my literature review, self-ambivalence, and its impact on checking as an 
attempt at agentic behaviour. This study involved the use of a driving simulator to 
create an analogue of an OCD experience in a nonclinical population.
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I believe that this body of research work can begin to demonstrate my commitment to 
pluralism, one of the central values of counselling psychology. It is a very different 
position than the one I left Greece with.
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Year 1: an introduction to ‘mentalizing’ and its potential application 
to obsessive compulsive disorder
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* R eq u ests  for  reprints sh ou ld  b e  a d d ressed  to  N ikolaos Tsigaras, D ep artm en t o f  P sych o logy , 
U niversity  o f  Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, U nited  Kingdom  
{n .ts igaras@ h otm ail.co .u k ).
72
Abstract
In the first instance the aim of this review will be to introduce the concept of 
“mentalization”. It will be demonstrated how mentalizing, the capacity to attend to 
mental states (thoughts, feelings, desires, beliefs) in oneself and others, is intimately 
related with the development and exercise of agency and affect regulation. Different 
types of pathology may be related to attempts to exercise these functions in the light 
of distressing affective impulses. In a clinical application of the theory, the view will 
be advanced that failures of mentalizing are related to Obsessive Compulsive Disorder 
(OCD). Evidence will be presented about the usefulness of conceptualizing OCD as a 
self-domain specific vulnerability. A fundamental ambivalence about the goodness of 
the self appears to be central in OCD, resulting in pathogenic representations and a 
preoccupation with eliminating these. This is often achieved in a developmentally 
primitive way which involves action rather than reflection, but which appears as an 
attempt to reinstate agency. The clinical implications are discussed.
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Introduction
The purpose of this review is to explore the concept of ‘mentalizing’ and attempt to 
consider some aspects of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) through this 
framework. ‘Mentalization based therapy (MET)’ (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; 2006) 
has become popular in the UK National Health Service (NHS) as a treatment of choice 
for borderline personality disorder (BPD). At the time of writing there is much 
conceptual (Bateman & Fonagy, 2012) and empirical^ work being undertaken to 
expand the application of mentalizing in other forms of psychopathology. However, 
OCD has not yet been one of them. Cognitive behavioural therapy is the treatment of 
choice in the NHS for OCD and can be effective to many service users. However in 
pure behavioural therapy it has been estimated that clients who refuse therapy, drop 
out, or fail to benefit amount to 50% (Abramowitz, 2006). Cognitive therapy is 
estimated to have similar success (Wilhelm & Steketee, 2006). The relationship of 
attachment to OCD has only recently begun to be explored (Guidano & Liotti, 1983; 
Doron & Kyrios, 2005; Doron et al., 2009; Doron et al., 2012). However, mentalizing 
as a specific attachment mechanism has not been considered in relation to OCD. It 
therefore remains important to consider novel ways of understanding and treating 
OCD.
Definition
Mentalization is the capacity to attend to mental states (beliefs, desires, thoughts, and 
feelings) in oneself and others (Fonagy, 1991). The capacity to mentalize entails being 
able to adopt an intentional stance (Dennett, 1987) which develops through secure 
attachment relationships (Fonagy et al., 2002); mental states are intentional states in 
that they are always about something. Mentalizing can also refer to the idea of giving 
a mental quality to something, such as a symptom (Allen et al., 2008). The concept 
can be seen as extending theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), to encompass 
self-development and affect regulation (Fonagy et al., 2002). Allen and colleagues 
(Allen et al., 2008) have made the bold claim that mentalizing may be the most
See http://www.controlled-trials.com/ISRCTN513Q4415 for a current trial of MBT on eating disorders 
and comorbid BPD.
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important common factor in all talking therapies. Whether this is true or not, the 
notion that psychotherapy may be about attending to one’s own and others’ minds is 
difficult to dispute and therefore makes the concept of mentalizing worthy of 
examination. The theory of mentalizing provides a multidisciplinary investigation of 
one of the fundamental predicaments and challenges of being human, not only the 
limitation of self-awareness, but also the lifelong struggle to know and cope with 
being oneself. When mentalization is impaired the capacity for self and other 
awareness as well as self-regulation is affected, as is reported in borderline personality 
disorder (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; 2006).
Mentalizing is related to a number of other terms, but is seen as capturing something 
beyond each of these (Allen et al., 2008). For example, theory of mind does not 
address the affective components of knowing one’s own or others’ minds. Empathy is 
more relevant to the affective knowledge, but relates to others and not the self. In 
other words mentalization includes empathy for the self as well as for others. 
Mindfulness, a concept recently imported into cognitive behavioural therapy (e.g. 
Linehan, 1993) from within a Buddhist context, is related to paying purposeful and 
focused attention to the present moment. Mentalizing proper is a function of the 
autobiographical self and refers to paying attention to the past, present and future. 
Mentalizing can also be explicit or implicit. Thus it can be about a rather automatic, 
preconscious, imaginative process or it can entail hard conscious mental work. 
Mentalizing is “thinking about feeling and feeling about thinking” (Target, 2007: 
quoted in Wallin, 2007 p.46) and also “seeing yourself from the outside and others 
from the inside” (Fonagy, 2007: quoted in Wallin, 2007). The argument for using this 
term is based on the usefulness of paying attention to particular processes in the 
clinical setting. Clinicians are therefore interested in clients’ capacity to flexibly 
imagine their own and others’ mental states within an autobiographical narrative, 
conjoined with an appreciation that they can never tell with certainty what others think 
and feel, while still demonstrating a curiosity in doing so. Some of the propositions 
that arise from an examination of the theory are laid out below:
1. The capacity to mentalize develops within a secure attachment relationship (Fonagy 
et al., 2002). Mentalizing is the psychological equivalent of physical approach and
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withdrawal; imaginatively exploring one’s and others’ minds depends on the presence 
of a secure base. Attachment is not simply a system ensuring physical survival, but the 
basis within which a representational system is produced (Fonagy et ah, 2002).
2. Affect plays a central role in knowing one’s own and others’ minds. The capacity to 
label and regulate feelings emerges in a safe attachment relationship.
3. Mentalizing is intimately related to the emergence of self-agency (Knox, 2011). 
Mental agency, the experience of oneself as a person with a mind and the capacity to 
grasp others’ minds, is a hard won developmental acquisition and not a genetic given 
(Fonagy et ah, 2002).
4. The capacity to know one’s mind is therefore not a given either. One can 
misunderstand what one thinks and feels (Fonagy et ah, 2002).
Origins of the theory
Fonagy and Target (2007b) have recognized that mentalizing, like attachment theory, 
is currently situated in the first generation of cognitive psychology and relies on a 
mindreading philosophical framework. They credit a number of theoreticians for the 
emergence of representationalism within psychoanalysis; Joseph Sandler (Sandler & 
Rosenblatt, 1962), and Edith Jacobson (1964), and more recently Mardi Horowitz 
(1992), Joseph Weiss (Weiss et ah 1986), and Daniel Stem (1985). These frameworks 
present a view of relationships based on a general systems (von Bertalanffy 1968) or 
schema theory (Piaget 1967).
Mentalization theory is a dense body of work as it brings into clinical consideration 
the problem of other minds, which is in itself a highly complex subject with a long 
history of investigation. Mentalization theory also brings together a number of diverse 
theoretical components each of which is backed by a long line of research. These are:
76
1. Peter Fonagy and Mary Target’s theory of Psychic Reality (Fonagy and Target, 
1996; 2000; 2008, Target and Fonagy, 1996; Fonagy et ah, 2002)
2. Fonagy, Howard and Miriam Steele’s laboratory research on Mental 
Representations o f  Attachment, (Fonagy, Steele, Moran, Steele & Higgitt, 1991; 
Fonagy, Steele & Steele, 1991; Steele, Steele & Fonagy, 1996)
3. Gergely and Watson’s work on affect labelling and regulation, the Social 
Biofeedback Model o f Parental Affect Mirroring (Gergely & Watson, 1996; 1999; 
Fonagy et al., 2002)
4. Fonagy and Target’s psychoanalytic work with borderline patients (Fonagy, 1991; 
Fonagy & Target, 1995b)
5. Anthony Bateman and Fonagy’s manualization of a Treatment fo r  Borderline 
Personality Disorder (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; 2006)
Development of mentalizing
Mentalizing is conceptualized as a capacity that develops through a dialectic process 
between mother and infant (Fonagy et al., 2002). Mentalizing develops within a 
secure attachment relationship which affords the opportunities necessary to begin to 
know one’s own and others’ minds (Fonagy et al., 2002). The capacity to mentalize is 
not inborn but rather
“(A) multistage developmental achievement that develops out of a host of 
capacities evident in early infancy that promote social engagement (Allen et 
al., 2008 p.74)”.
The subjective world needs to be organized so that internal states may have meaning 
before they can be communicated to others though language (Allen et al., 2008). The 
ultimate goal of development pertaining to mentalizing is the
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“(D)eveloping appreciation of the representational nature of mental states... 
(which) constitutes the ultimate sense of selfhood (Allen et al., 2008 p.74).
Dimensions of mentalizing
Mentalizing is a capacity that involves a number of dimensions (Fonagy, Bateman & 
Luyten, 2012); self versus other, external versus internal, objective versus subjective, 
past versus present versus future.
“The self reflective and interpersonal components in combination permit the 
differentiation of inner from outer reality and intrapersonal mental and 
emotional processes from interpersonal communications” (Fonagy et al., 2002, 
p.4).
In the clinical setting, mentalizing is useful because it allows addressing both “self- 
awareness” and “other-awareness” (Allen et al., 2008) depending on which is the 
patient’s area of greatest vulnerability. Indeed, much of what is termed 
psychopathology can perhaps be reformulated as an inability (either due to insufficient 
development or subsequent disruption) to disentangle these dimensions in psychic 
functioning. Developmental psychology has addressed the problem of mentalizing 
others (that is of knowing other minds) in the guise of theory of mind. One of the 
advances of mentalization is paying equal attention to knowing one’s own mind, 
especially in the clinical setting. It is now known that the same brain areas are likely 
to be activated whether attention is directed to the self or others (see below. Frith & 
Frith, 2003). This indicates that the interpersonal nature of human development 
provides the basis for understanding a mental state to be true regardless of whether a 
first or third person holds it (Allen et al. 2008). However, according to Lieberman 
(2007: quoted in Allen et al., 2008) there is a difference in attending to internally or 
externally focused processes in interpreting behaviour. An internal focus is associated 
with activation in a Medial Frontoparietal network, whereas external focus is 
associated with activation of Lateral Frontotemporoparietal network. Therefore 
attending to how I see myself and to how others may see me entails different brain
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processes. With respect to mentalizing the self, Moran (2001: quoted in Allen et al., 
2008) makes a distinction between first person (subjective) and third person 
(objective) knowledge, through perception, evidence, and inference. This may 
represent the difference between intellectually knowing something on the basis of 
rational evidence, and actually feeling something as being true for oneself. Subjective 
knowledge is not introspection, mindreading as applied to oneself; it involves the 
exercise of agency and hard mental work; whilst making up my mind about how I 
feel, I influence how I feel (Allen et al., 2008). Finally, Allen et al. (2008) suggest that 
mentalizing entails moving from implicit to explicit, which takes place over the course 
of development and over the course of psychotherapy.
The levels of the development of mentalizing
In advancing mentalizing as a reformulation of the problem of knowing other minds, 
Fonagy et al. (2002) have necessarily taken certain positions within developmental, 
cognitive, and philosophy of mind debates. Fonagy (2008) implicitly situates 
mentalizing the other within a broader capacity to adopt the intentional stance 
(Dennett, 1987), the interpersonal interpretive function (IIF). Fonagy sees this as a 
developmental function of attachment, arguing against a primary intersubjectivity (see 
Fonagy et al., 2002 chapter 5).
"IIF includes a cluster of mental functions for processing and interpreting new 
interpersonal experiences that includes mentalization and the cluster of 
psychological processes on which effective mentalizing depends” (Fonagy,
2008 p.6).
The IIF comprises of a cognition-oriented (IIF-C) and an affect-oriented (IIF-A) set of 
processes. IIF-A also includes Elliot Jurist’s (Fonagy et al. 2002) notion of mentalized 
affectivity, which refers to the experiencing a feeling and knowing what it is, at the 
same time. There are four emotional processing and control mechanisms that 
contribute to the developmental unfolding of IIF:
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a. Labelling and Understanding Affect
b. Arousal Regulation
c. Effortful Control
d. Specific Mentalizing Capacities (Fonagy & Target, 2002) and in particular 
interpersonal (other) mentalizing component.
These interpretive functions are subserved by “three separate but interconnected and 
interacting nodes within the brain that are related to social-detection, affect regulation 
and cognitive regulation (Fonagy, 2008 p.7, italics added)”.
Turning to mentalization specifically, the development of the ‘F, the agentive self 
(Fonagy et al., 2002), follows a trajectory from its foundation in bodily action to its 
mature expression in mentalization, and the appreciation of the representational nature 
of mental states (Knox, 2011). Fonagy et al. (2002) have attempted to illuminate the 
emergence of self-agency; the capacity to mentalize is bound with the ability to see 
oneself as a person with a mind, thoughts, and feelings. Interspersed in a description 
of the levels (Allen et al., 2008) of the development of mentalization below will be 
references to the processes (affect regulation and the development of psychic reality, 
joint attention, language development, & pedagogy) underpinning this development. 
Two of these, affect regulation, and the development of psychic reality, will be 
described in further detail as they may be particularly relevant to OCD.
Physical: Already at the age of about three months, infants start developing an interest 
in forms of biological motion, for example showing an interest in self-propelled 
objects (Crichton & Lange Kuettner, 1999: quoted in Frith & Frith, 2003). At about 
the age of six months they experience themselves and others as physical agents (as 
distinct from physical objects) due to the property of being self-propelled (Spelke et 
al., 1995: quoted in Frith & Frith, 2003); infants are surprised if an object, but not a
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person, moves by its own accord. The infants’ sense of agency at this stage emerges 
from an experience of the self as an author of actions though bodily movements (e.g. 
making limbs move). Up until the age of three months infants prefer perfect 
contingency in the environment’s responses (making a mobile object move with their 
legs has 100% contingency rate; Gergely & Watson, 1996; 1999); after this they 
prefer near but imperfect contingency (the mother’s mirroring displays). The 
distinction of biological from mechanical movement (Woodward, 1998: quoted in 
Frith & Frith, 2003), as well as the representation of actions of agents, is likely to be a 
prelude to the representation of the intentions of agents (Frith & Frith, 2003).
Social: Already from the age of three months, infants smile and vocalize more 
towards people than objects (Legerstee, 1992: quoted in Frith & Frith, 2003). Infants 
develop a sense of themselves and others as social agents through the awareness that 
communicative displays exert influence on other social agents (e.g. smiling prompts 
mother to smile). This aspect of self-agency has the richest research history; 
summarized in Fonagy et al. (2002).
Teleological: At about the age of nine months infants develop a sense of self and 
others as teleological agents whose actions are purposeful and goal-directed (Csibra et 
al., 2003; Csibra & Gergely, 1998; Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Infants expect agents’ 
action to be rational; that is efficiently directed towards goal attainment within the 
constraints of physical reality. Infants are surprised if an agent does not conform to 
this, but focuses instead on an invisible hurdle. They can separate the representation of 
goals of agents and the means used to reach these goals. However, goal-directed 
action is not understood as based on mental states, but based solely on observable 
physical reality. The ability to represent goals and the ability to reason “rationally” are 
likely to be important prerequisites of the ability to represent intentions (Frith & Frith, 
2003), and mirror neurons and motor intentionality are likely to be involved in the 
development of self-agency.
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Mentalizing: During the second year of life infants begin mentalizing the teleological 
stance (Fonagy et ah, 2002) by beginning to understand goal-directed action as based 
on mental states. The age of eighteen months represents a developmental watershed 
that signals the transition from infancy to childhood (Frith & Frith, 2003). Infants 
begin to interpret rational goal-directed actions as governed by intentional mental 
states. However, initially this understanding does not take into account false beliefs 
including pretence (Leslie, 1987), as evidenced by false belief tasks that are passed 
from age three onwards. The mentalistic self is able to comprehend the idea that 
agents’ internal states may not be correspond to reality and that additionally, agents 
may be able to select from a range of different interpretations of reality.
Autobiographical: By the sixth year of life, children organize memories of their 
intentional actions and experiences into a causal temporal framework (Povinelli & 
Eddy, 1995: quoted in Fonagy, 2008) that permits the development of a temporally 
extended autobiographical self, and the understanding of self and others through 
coherent autobiographical narratives.
Affect regulation: the social biofeedback model of parental affect mirroring
To understand mentalization we now turn again to the nature of a dialectic process 
between mother and infant through which affect and self-regulation capacities emerge.
“The experience of affect is the bud from which eventually mentalization can
grow” (Fonagy et al., 2002 p.376).
Fonagy and colleagues envisage two forms of affect regulation; one simpler process 
that entails the labelling of affective states and the regulation of arousal; and another 
where affects are used to regulate the self. Affect regulation is a prelude to 
mentalization but once mentalization has set in, the nature of affect regulation is 
transformed leading to the emergence of mentalized affectivity, the capacity to feel 
and know what one is feeling, to understand the subjective meaning of affects.
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Gergely and Watson (1996, 1999) have articulated a process of affect labelling and 
regulation leading to a conception of the self as having feelings; the infant only 
gradually realizes he has such things as thoughts and feelings. Primary representations 
of experience are organized into secondary representations of these states of mind and 
body (Fonagy & Target, 1997a). This model has its roots in Watson’s work on 
contingency (e.g. Bahrick & Watson, 1985; Watson, 1994). Watson and his colleagues 
speculated about the existence of an inner contingency detection module. They found 
that up until three months of age infants prefer perfect contingencies such as moving 
their limbs to push a mobile object that always moves in response to their movement; 
this allows them to establish their bodily boundaries (Fonagy et al., 2002). Anything 
that does not show a 100% contingency response is therefore external and ignored. 
Around three months of age a change takes place and infants start to prefer very high 
but imperfect contingency responses, which are usually found in a highly attuned 
other (e.g. mother). Gergely and Watson’s model follows a long tradition in British 
Psychoanalysis which locates the emergence of affect regulation and the development 
of the self in the infant-primary caregiver dyad (Bion, 1962; Winnicott, 1956). This is 
particularly so in Bion’s description of the emergence of thinking capacity within the 
infant-mother interaction and the container/contained (1962); and Winnicott’s work 
on mother’s mirroring. As Fonagy and colleagues put it, following the latter, the infant 
begins to fathom himself as having a mind, as having thoughts and feelings, if he finds 
himself in the mother’s mirroring gaze. For the infant to learn to regulate and label his 
affects the mother’s response to his arousal must be contingent and marked. This 
means that mother’s response needs to correspond to the feeling (contingent), whilst at 
the same time showing it is not her own feeling (marked). “Marked” refers to 
something being, labelled, for instance “marked as anger”. This can be achieved by 
exaggerating the response (e.g. by mixing it with irony), showing concern but also 
coping with the affect, or raising eyebrows indicating the response is for the infant’s 
attention (Allen et al., 2008). This allows the infant to develop a second order 
representation of his primary affect presentations. Ultimately, contingent and marked 
mirroring permits the infant to experience himself as an intentional being, a person 
able to adopt the intentional stance (Dennett, 1987). Failure to offer either a 
contingent or marked response may have consequences for the child’s later wellbeing, 
as will be discussed below.
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The development of psychic reality
Mentalization theory adopts a complex position to external reality by highlighting 
Vygotsky’s view that mind processes are interpersonal before being intrapersonal 
(Allen et ah, 2008), alluding to an original situation of shared consciousness (Fonagy 
& Target, 2007a). Within this, and through the same dialectic relationship between 
mother and infant, it is also psychic reality that develops. Fonagy and Target’s 
concept of psychic reality is based on observation of children (Fonagy et al., 2002) 
and extends Freud’s (1900) views which he developed in order in order to account for 
the observation that pathology provoked by actual circumstances leading to childhood 
trauma could be indistinguishable from that which had been the result o f unconscious 
phantasy. Fonagy and Target (2007a) highlight how, according to Freud, internal 
experiences such as mental states (beliefs, wishes, thoughts, and anxieties) could carry 
the compelling quality of “real” events. The concept of psychic reality referred to the 
internal perception of subjective experience rather than subjective experience per se 
(Michels, 1985; quoted in Fonagy & Target, 2007a). Fonagy and Target’s theory of 
elaboration of psychic reality states:
“(E)xtemal reality and internal reality cannot be seen as alternative 
perspectives, as figure and ground. Both internal and external reality are 
learned about within the mother-infant relationship. This shared process 
creates a sense of continuity between the experiences of internal and external... 
we now recognize that the intrapsychic and interpersonal domains of 
psychoanalysis come together in the intersubjective, in which reality is defined 
as a relational matrix that incorporates both the internal and the external 
world... The external comes to be something inherently ‘other’ (as opposed to 
self), but this is a developmental achievement, not accessible to all of us all of 
the time (p.918-919)”.
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Thus, the extension of consciousness is required since the infant finds and organizes 
his affect state through mirroring by an attuned caregiver (Fonagy & Target, 2007a). 
The extension of consciousness outside the body is likely to become strengthened 
after three months, with the switch to a preference for high but imperfect contingency. 
There are two modes of psychic reality. Psychic equivalence, a feature of the state of 
shared consciousness with mother, refers to the notion that internal reality is felt to 
equate external reality and vice versa. This can be further subdivided in the infant’s 
equation of her own mind with other minds and the mental realm’s equation with the 
physical (Fonagy & Target, 2007a). Rooted in the expectation of a shared 
consciousness is the child’s belief that everyone shares her own beliefs and, related to 
that, the view that she knows the contents of others’ minds and they know hers. This 
mode of thought is characterized by concreteness and lack of symbolization. As such 
it echoes Bion’s influential distinction between beta and alpha elements (Bion, 1970) 
and Hanna Segal’s demarcation of symbol formation from symbol equation.
At about the age of eighteen months comes the onset of pretend play. Leslie (1987) 
suggests the term “decoupling” to denote the separation of representations of thoughts 
from the representations of real events. A child watching his mother use a banana as 
telephone laughs and can separate the pretend from the real use of the banana. This 
suggests that there is an emerging capacity to represents the other’s intention (Frith & 
Frith, 2003). Fonagy et al. (2002) suggest that the pretend mode emerges perhaps as 
an escape from perceiving reality as too real as is the dictum of the psychic 
equivalence mode; in this mode internal reality is felt to be entirely decoupled from 
external reality. Thus in psychic equivalence mode, reality is felt as too real where in 
the pretend mode reality is felt as too unreal (Fonagy et al., 2002). Pre-mentalizing 
capacities are necessary for the bringing together of these two modes, which are 
integrated between the ages of three and five as mentalization is firmly established. 
Internal reality is not felt to equate to external reality, but not to be entirely unrelated 
to it; rather it is loosely linked and representational of external reality (Fonagy et al., 
2002).
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Mentalization and psychopathology I: borderline personality disorder (BPD)
Drawing from psychiatric classification, Roth and Fonagy (2005) define the main 
features of BPD as a pervasive instability of self-image, interpersonal relationships 
and mood. Essential features are a terror of real or imagined abandonment with a 
simultaneous fear of intimacy, as well as impulsive, violent behaviour that may lead to 
self-harm and suicide in the most severe cases. In an effort to bring together this 
phenomenological approach to BPD with psychoanalytic views by concentrating on 
the shared feature of impaired object relations, Fonagy focused on the mental 
representations of the self and objects (Fonagy, 1991):
“(T)he acquisition of a theory of mind entails the mental ability to denote 
beliefs and desires, as if these were in quotation marks, without the need for 
the belief to be shared or the desire to be experienced (Fonagy, 1991, p.23)".
Fonagy et al. (2002) have attempted to explain BPD patients’ phenomenology as due 
to activation of the teleological mode of psychic functioning. The authors have 
suggested that there may be a connection between the focus on understanding actions 
in terms of their physical as opposed to mental outcomes (a teleological stance), and 
the mode of experience of agency observed in self-destructive acts (Fonagy et al., 
2002). This is because BPD patients are assumed, as a result of attachment trauma, to 
forego mentalization as the perpetrator of abuse is also their attachment figure 
(Fonagy, 2008; Fonagy et al., 2002). The awareness that the person they rely the most 
is the same person who abuses them is too horrible a concept to fathom; it is 
preferable to not know what goes on in the caregiver’s mind. As a result of operating 
in the teleological mode, small changes in the physical world can trigger elaborate 
conclusions concerning states of mind. Patients frequently cannot accept anything 
other than a modification in the realm of the physical as evidence of the intentions of 
the other. Self-ageney and other awareness depend on action rather than reflection.
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This also reflects their observed need to induce feelings in the other instead of relying 
on communicating them ‘to get through to the other’.
In terms of the differentiation between internal and external reality, the failure of 
either contingent or marked mirroring has an effect not only on the outcome of affect 
regulation, but also on the emergence of a sense of reality. If mother’s affect is not 
marked and the child experiences it as the mother’s oww affect, then his internal 
experience is felt to equate to external reality; his internal experience is felt to be 
contagious and therefore terrifying and unmanageable. This can be the result of the 
mother’s own defences and reflects Winnicott’s (1956) idea that failing to find his 
own self in the mother’s mind, the child finds only the mother. The internalisation of 
the representation of another before the boundaries of the self are fully formed 
undermines the creation of a coherent sense of self. This notion derives from 
observation of mothers and infants; a mother that becomes distressed at the infant’s 
own distress is likely to be unable to manage the infant’s affect. In line with 
Winnicott’s ‘false self Fonagy et al., (2002) and Bateman and Fonagy (2004, 2006), 
have suggested that the infant internalizes the other not as an internal object but as a 
core part of his self. If the caregiver fails to contain the infant’s anxieties, metabolise 
them, and mirror the self-state, the infant, rather than gradually constructing a 
representation of his internal states, is forced to accommodate the object, an alien 
being, within his self-representation. This alien self in later life can only be managed 
by projective identification (Klein, 1946). Drawing from clinical practice they suggest 
that the person experiences a need to attribute this self to others and will then try to 
coerce them into experiencing his own thoughts, feelings, and perform his own actions 
in order to manage the sense of an alien body inside their self. These authors speculate 
that this may be the basis for a subsequent difficulty in differentiating internal from 
external reality, and may also be related to the experience of one’s own mental states 
as concrete reality. This can range in severity from struggling to imagine alternative 
points of view, to an incapacity to fathom alternatives in BPD and the emergence of 
psychotic phenomena. It is related to one of the central tenants of cognitive therapy, 
that thoughts are not facts.
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If the mother’s response is not contingent then the infant’s affect, as yet unlabelled but 
assumed to be prewired (to feel pain for instance), is not marked appropriately and 
Fonagy et al. (2002) suggest that this may be experienced as unreal. It might therefore 
be related to dissociative phenomena later in life, and also to the clinical observation 
that borderline and hysterical (in the analytic sense, see Freud, 1894) clients’ 
expressed affective narrative has an ‘as i f  quality that feels unrelated to the person’s 
inner experience. This essentially means that such clients often become ‘stuck’ in the 
pretend mode.
There is also a paradox in the relationship between attachment and mentalization. 
Recent FMRI studies (Bartels & Zeki, 2000, 2002) have identified the neuronal 
structures and circuitry that are activated in both maternal and romantic love. Both the 
sexual/romantie and parent child attachment systems suppressed activity in regions 
associated with negative emotions, social and moral judgments—all aspects of 
mentalizing. Both these types of love involve overlapping areas (specifically the 
oxytocin and vasopressin sensitive circuitry). These studies suggest that strong 
affective bonds, whether in parent-child or adult romantic relationships, inhibit not 
only negative emotions, but also the neuronal networks involved in making social 
judgments (mentalizing) about that person. This discovery has led to a reformulation 
of the relationship between attachment and mentalizing (Fonagy, 2008). As Jeremy 
Holmes (2010) proposes:
"(t)here is a complex, ‘U-shaped relationship between arousal/affect regulation 
and mentalizing. When arousal is low, explicit mentalizing is put to one side -  
we just get on with things without thinking too much about them. Equally, 
beyond a certain level of arousal, mentalizing is impossible, and flight, fight or 
dissociation is activated (p.l I)".
Additionally, the capacity for mentalization in the context of attachment is likely to be 
in certain respects independent of the capacity to mentalize about interpersonal 
experiences outside the attachment context (Fonagy, 2008). The quality of the 
attachment relationship with the caregiver would determine amongst other things how 
often the attachment system needs to be activated, which would be inversely related to
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opportunities for safely exploring the caregiver's mind and honing one's mentalization 
skills (Fonagy, 2006; 2008). On the contrary, the robust establishment of a capacity to 
mentalize means that the individual is more likely to be able to retain a mentalizing 
capacity even when the attachment system is activated by powerful 
relational/attachment related concerns (Fonagy, 2008).
Mentalization and psychopathology II: obsessive compulsive disorder
Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is one of the most incapacitating of the anxiety 
disorders (World Health Organization, 1996). It is characterized by the occurrence of 
unwanted and disturbing intrusive thoughts, images, or impulses (obsessions), and 
compulsive acts/rituals aimed at reducing distress or preventing feared events from 
occurring (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Although mentalization has been 
extended to many other clinical domains such as: antisocial personality disorder 
(Bateman & Fonagy 2012), anxiety (Rudden et al., 2006; 2008; 2009), eating 
disorders (Skârderud, 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; Skârderud & Fonagy, 2012), depression 
(Luyten, Fonagy, Lemma & Target, 2012), psychosis (Brent, 2009), autism (Sharp, 
2006), trauma (Allen, 2008; Allen & Fonagy, 2012 ), family therapy (Fearon et al., 
2006), psychoeducation (Tobias et al., 2006), engaging parents in child psychotherapy 
(Slade, 2008), parenting (Sadler et al., 2006), and violence in schools (Twemlow & 
Fonagy, 2006), there does not seem at the moment to be an application of this to 
obsessional phenomena.
Mentalizing has largely been derived from the study of BPD (Fonagy, 1991; Fonagy 
& Target, 1995; Fonagy & Target, 1997; Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; 2006) and has 
focused on the emergence and regulation of a sense of a self in order to account for 
self-disorder. However, it is possible that mentalization deficiencies are present in all 
types of pathology especially if, as Allen et al. (2008) claim, mentalizing is the most 
salient common factor in all psychotherapies. Additionally, these authors explicitly 
consider symptoms as well, to be failures in mentalizing. It is possible that whereas 
personality disorders may involve a global impairment in self-regulation. Axis I
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anxiety disorders such as OCD may feature domain specific vulnerabilities. Some 
researchers (Rudden et al., 2006; 2008; 2009) who have examined mentalization in 
panic disorder have suggested that mentalizing failures may be specific to areas of 
unconscious conflict underlying the symptoms of panic. We take a similar position 
here, suggesting that if mentalizing can be helpfully applied to OCD, it is in 
considering OCD as a domain specific self-disorder. The rationale for doing so is 
based on a relational clinical principle which involves moving the focus away from 
symptoms and towards a deeper therapeutic exploration of self, identity, and 
relationships. Evidence will be presented below that symptoms in OCD are intimately 
related to vulnerability in sufferers’ sense of self.
Self-regulation
There is now increasing evidence to suggest that OCD may be such a self-disorder; 
OC phenomena entail affective distress that may be related to failures in self­
regulation. Salkovskis (1985) originally argued that ordinary intrusive thoughts, which 
occur to non-clinical populations as well (Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis & 
Harrison, 1984), can become obsessions if an individual believed that they would be 
personally responsible for preventing the harm that the thought related to. As a result 
they would be more likely to engage in compulsions in order to prevent the feared 
outcome. To accommodate the clinical finding that not all OCD patients were worried 
about consequences, Salkovskis (1989) extended the term responsibility to involve 
responsibility about maintaining one’s own safety and self-worth. Developing this 
perspective of inflated personal responsibility further, Rachman (1997, 1998) 
suggested that intrusive thoughts can escalate into obsessions when the sufferer 
believes that they are revealing hitherto hidden aspects of their self. The sufferer fears 
she will be seen as evil, dangerous, unreliable, or potentially uncontrollable. The result 
is considerable affective arousal which the patient will attempt to regulate by 
compulsive actions. As in Salkovskis’ perspective, it is the high self-relevance of the 
intrusions that explains the transition into obsessions. Bhar and Kyrios (2007) recently 
reviewed additional studies related to self-evaluation. Rowa and colleagues (Rowa & 
Purdon, 2003; Rowa et al., 2005) found that intrusions were distressing if they
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specifically threatened one’s valued self-perceptions. Frerrier and Brewin (2005) in 
accordance with Rachman, also found that for people with OCD, intrusions result in 
significantly more negative self-evaluations than anxious controls. Moreover, Ehntholt 
and colleagues (1999) conducted a study investigating self-worth in individuals with 
OCD, people with other anxiety disorders, and normal controls. By coding self-worth, 
they found that participants with OCD were more likely to link their self-worth to 
other people and their relationships, than were participants in the anxious group. 
Participants with OCD considered that others would be critical and judgemental as a 
result of the harm they feared inflicting. Conversely, the anxious and normal controls 
expected other people’s responses to be more lenient in the same event. So far 
research seems to indicate that a preoccupation with the worth, morality, or lovability 
of the self is primary issue in OCD.
Ambivalence, self-ambivalence, and early attachment experience
A recent construct that has been advanced to increase the specificity of our 
understanding of self-vulnerabilities in OCD is that of ‘ self-ambivalence’. 
Ambivalence appears to be an issue for both BPD and OCD sufferers, albeit in 
different ways. The capacity to tolerate ambivalence refers to subscribing to a view of 
a mixed self and others who can be both good and bad at the same time. In BPD, 
psychodynamic models have usually emphasised that the experience of abuse leads 
children to split off the abusive caregiver and create an ideal version in his/her place 
to protect the person on whom they depend completely. The result is two diametrically 
opposite representations which remain dissociated from each other and are by 
consequence mirrored in sufferers’ self-schemata. Ambivalence appears to be 
problematized differently in OCD; good and bad are not dissociated from each other, 
but they do not mix either; they coexist. This state of affairs, self-ambivalence, derives 
from Guidano and Liotti’s (1983) developmental hypotheses about people who later 
go on to develop OCD. Considering empirical research and clinical case studies, they 
advanced a number of hypotheses about the early attachment experience in OCD 
sufferers:
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“The course of attachment is such that it supplies the child with two distinct 
and opposite interpretations of both self and reality, which in every moment 
appear equally as plausible (p. 112).”
They hypothesised that vulnerability to OCD was the result of two opposite but 
equally strong trends in parenting style. These could be distributed between two 
parents or could be located within the first parent with the other parent agreeing or 
failing to challenge the first. There would be a number of possible configurations, but 
the end result would be equal evidence for the caregiver to be seen as good or bad and 
consequently for the child to see herself as both of high and of low self-worth. A 
simple example is a devoted parenting style, committed to the child’s practical well­
being, but one which lack any displays of affection.
Bhar and Kyrios (2007) operationalized Guidano and Liotti’s concept and devised a 
questionnaire to measure it. In order to test whether self-ambivalence was correlated 
to OC phenomena, they conducted a study comparing people with a diagnosis of 
OCD, anxious controls and community controls. They found that OCD participants 
were significantly more ambivalent than the non-clinical groups, but did not differ 
from anxious controls. Bhar and Kyrios suggested that there may have been a 
possibility of a sampling issue because both groups showed equally strong OCD 
beliefs. As such, the authors concluded that self-ambivalence may not be specific to 
OCD, but it is at least relevant. Additionally, their correlational study did not establish 
that self-ambivalence is the cause of OCD phenomena and beliefs. These authors have 
since only extended this research to hoarding. More recently, Tsigaras and colleagues 
(Tsigaras, Simonds & Hegarty, 2012) devised an experimental paradigm and offered 
some evidence that a threat to morality self-domain may activate self-ambivalence and 
lead to increased checking behaviours.
Psychic equivalence & pretend modes: action versus reflection
A novel redescritpion of OC phenomena would be that as a result of the activation of 
self-ambivalence due to external or internal events, self-agency is expressed in
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compulsive action rather than mentalistic reflection. In cognitive therapy, Aardema 
and colleagues (Aardema et al. 2009) have developed and tested the ‘inferential 
confusion’ model, where they identified the inference of doubt as primary and all 
other obsessive-compulsive phenomena as secondary. In their view people with OCD 
experience doubt because they rely more on possibility based, rather than reality based 
(sense based) information. These authors recently published an experimental design 
that offered some evidence about their model. However, there is no strong argument 
to suggest the primacy of inferential-confusion as the core aetiopathogenic factor in 
OCD. Instead, it could be argued on a theoretical basis that these authors describe 
functioning in the psychic equivalence mode. However, because opposites are not 
dissociated in psychic reality, as in BPD, but coexist, external reality is equivalently 
seen as involving two simultaneous outcomes (one reality and one possibility) that are 
equally possible.
Although both in OCD and BPD the consequence of the above would be the 
subsequent activation of the pretend mode, the clinical presentation is different 
because of the difference in self-vulnerabilities. Fonagy et al. (2002) have speculated 
that the use of the pretend mode is associated with the inconsequentiality of violent 
behaviour in BPD. We suggest that the same applies in the compulsive solutions of 
OCD patients where representations are decoupled from reality and therefore actions, 
imaginative or actual, are inconsequential, leading to an inability to ‘learn from 
experience’ (Bion, 1970). Fonagy et al., 2002 have reinterpreted Freud’s (1920) 
classic ‘fort-da’ vignette as an episode of the child using a game (pretend mode) to 
regulate an internal experience of abandonment (perhaps the prevalence of the psychic 
equivalence mode turns mother’s temporary absence into perceived abandonment). 
Although Freud was relating this example to repetition compulsion in general, the 
repetitive nature of this game echoes the compulsive enactments of people in the 
throes of obsessive-compulsive phenomena. In response to the activation of self­
ambivalence in psychic reality, the attachment system is activated. As such 
mentalization shuts down and external reality is perceived in the psychic equivalence 
mode. In response to the experience of psychic equivalence the obsessive person then 
enters the pretend mode; like the young child in Freud's example, the OCD sufferer is
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attempting through the compulsive behaviour to generate a sense of agency and 
mastery. As Wallin (2007) writes, in the psychic equivalence mode:
“(t)here is no “I” that interprets or creates experience but only a “me” to whom
experience happens (p.47)”.
During the pretend mode the patient seems to oscillate between a position of 
trusting and not trusting his mind, which may be the phenomenological counterpart of 
an oscillation between secure and insecure attachment. For the obsessive person this is 
a matter of affect regulation and the end of the pretend mode comes when there is a 
feeling of rightness, when a particular identity of perception is achieved (Sandler, 
1976). This results in the restoration of a ‘background of safety’ (Sandler, 1965) 
which Fonagy (2001) has suggested may be the phenomenological counterpart of 
secure attachment.
This may explain an anticipated argument against the claim ‘OCD sufferers do not 
think’, as many clinicians would argue that they think profiisely, and at least some 
display mental compulsions such as counting etc., only. It is possible that there may 
be a misperception of what thinking really entails. Bion (1970) has written much 
about thinking and learning from experience and in many ways it resembles 
mentalizing; obsessional people repeat their compulsions over and yet are unable to 
learn from their actions. To restate, obsessive-compulsive thinking may be more 
related to a primitive mode of exerting self-ageney where imaginative or actual action, 
rather than representational reflection is employed.
Obsessive compulsive content
A final remark has to be made about the content of obsessive compulsive 
phenomenology. Cognitive therapy has concentrated on the ordinariness of mental 
intrusions and the apparent exaggerated response of OCD sufferers to these. As 
suggested above, the presence of OCD possibly represents a surface manifestation of 
an enduring internal conflict and a fundamental ambivalence about the self (Freud,
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1894; 1896) that is either less pronounced or more tolerated in nonclinical 
populations. As a result, intrusions are more frequent and more intense in OCD 
sufferers. Freud (1894) made the observation that conflicts which could not be 
mentalized could still be expressed symbolically by means of condensation 
(metaphor) and displacement (metonymy). More recently, George Lakoff (1980) has 
advanced a view that indeed metaphors are not simply stylistic figures of speech, but 
rather they underlie all thought and are based in somatic action. Therefore in OC 
phenomena the broad theme of the conflict can remain in the foreground, but is 
negotiated in areas of experience that are more manageable than the potential original 
conflict. For instance a preoccupation with contamination, cleanliness and hand 
washing could be seen as an attempt to prevent feelings being mixed or being messy, 
particularly in attachment relationships involving sexuality and aggression. Fear of 
harming others whom one cares deeply for could be seen as the coexistence of love 
and hate that is not allowed to ‘mix’ either. Doubt about one’s sexuality or their 
partner’s feelings would still be a manifestation of trying to eradicate any normal 
doubt or again neutralize mixed views of the other or the self. However, the way the 
ambivalence is expressed is in a way that is fundamental to its nature, through 
concrete and simplified, black and white manifestations. In summary, the above 
hypotheses can be represented diagrammatically as follows:
Activation of self­
ambivalence
Activation of 
psychic 
equivalence 
mode
Activation of 
pretend mode
(process level)
Displacement 
and condensation
(content level)
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Conclusion: implications for treatment
This paper has outlined some of the key principles of mentalizing and has attempted to 
advance a possible theoretical application to OCD. Cognitive models of OCD, 
although sophisticated and potentially very useful, might be making an error in only 
concentrating on symptoms. The position advanced here is a plea to broaden the scope 
of clinical and research inquiry to address potentially aetiopathogenic vulnerabilities 
at the level of the self. There is now considerable evidence about the centrality of 
domain specific vulnerabilities, potentially related to a fundamental ambivalence 
about the goodness of the self. Regardless of the type of therapy offered to a patient 
this may require attention being shifted to areas of identity and relationships. The key 
function of the therapist would involve helping patients attend to how their minds 
represent their own self-experience. Patients’ focus on symptoms, mirrored by 
clinicians in the cognitive tradition could be problematized because of the circular 
discussions these can generate, at least in specific contexts (Tsigaras, Simonds & 
Hegarty 2012). Additionally, compulsive activities can also be problematized by 
collaboratively attending to the pretend mode quality of these and by highlighting the 
simplistic, black and white representations that these involve. More nuanced, subtle 
and complex representations within the safety of the therapeutic relationship can start 
to be elaborated and ambivalence can lessen by increasing tolerance to mixed feelings.
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Personal reflection
My interest in mentalization can be traced back to the academic year 2004-2005, 
during which I undertook an MSc at University College London entitled ‘Theoretical 
Psychoanalytic Studies’. For my dissertation at the end of the year I was working on 
the late Joseph Sandler’s contributions to an object relations approach to 
psychoanalytic theory and practice. As Sandler was Fonagy’s predecessor as professor 
of psychoanalysis at UCL, and Peter was intimately familiar with his work, my 
dissertation was supervised by the latter. I therefore became familiar with work on 
mentalization which in many ways continued Sandler’s integration of (first 
generation) cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis through the application of a 
representationalist, schema theory of relationships as organizing principles of the 
internal world.
Although far from perfect at the moment, mentalization theory captures something 
quite fundamental about being human for me. I have found this framework enticing 
because of its capacity to integrate insights from different traditions and because of 
the compassion and humanity of its principles. I also think that cognitive therapy, 
which I appreciate deeply, has chosen a rather unproductive way of conceptualizing 
some aspects of treatment of what can be a disabling mental illness which is unlikely 
to abate in one’s lifetime. I think it is a hugely complex theory and felt a strong need 
to provide a primer of sorts, mostly for myself. However, I also have some strong 
opinions about OCD which I wanted to put forward. In writing this review I am 
mainly making an exposition of mentalization, keeping criticisms for the second part 
of the review when I am discussing OCD.
In clinical practice too, mentalizing can be a very helpful framework to think in. Even 
in primary care, with clients that are perhaps not as severely damaged as would be 
seen elsewhere, a few clinical observations repeatedly emerge, vying for attention. 
Clients with anxiety disorders are often deeply concerned about becoming humiliated
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and ashamed because others will, in their view, think less of them, criticize them or 
even mock them. As Mary G. Rudden and Barbara Milrod’s team in the US have 
suggested, clients may have intact global mentalization skills, but may be unable to 
think about their symptoms. Widening this observation, I am struck by the fruitfulness 
of asking what the imagined consequences of their symptoms mean to these clients, 
about their own selves and others. Their oft stated views that they are incompetent or 
failures, that others are will laugh at their distress and criticize them, raise a profound 
question about how they develop these representations. This may provide 
opportunities during a session for addressing mental states in the client or others 
depending, as Jon G. Allen suggests, on ‘what is the client’s area of greatest 
difficulty’. The same author also suggests that in trying to think about how we feel 
and feel what we think, we influence these processes, essentially making up our own 
minds on the way. I also suggest in this paper, whilst essentially re-inventing the 
wheel, a different way of approaching symptoms in OCD. I can think of more than 
one client who was able to say that in compiling lists for behavioural experiments or 
drawing thought records, they felt in so many words, that parts of their selves were 
being deemed to be unacceptable and were coming under attack, challenging and 
changing them. Not underestimating the force of unconscious resistances, this had 
quite an impact on me as it reflected my own deeply held belief that acceptance of 
symptoms as meaningful and using valuable problem solving techniques may be a 
better way to start a dialog. It is also an opportunity to incorporate insights from the 
neurosciences as social cognition has become the exciting target of a lot of research.
Throughout this piece of work I am writing within a positivist philosophical tradition 
and much of my discourse is medical. As counselling psychologists I think it 
necessary, and indeed expected, to be well versed in different philosophical and 
epistemological traditions, even if sometimes we do not fully agree with them. I 
found it hard at times to formulate my thoughts in a way that felt congruent and 
authentic. Simultaneously, I have attempted to demonstrate a familiarity and skill in 
formulating my thoughts in this manner. In the second year I intend to approach OCD 
from a socially constructionist perspective and in the third year I will likely return to 
positivism and conduct a quantitative study. This approach is something that I am
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committed to because it ultimately functions as an antidote to my own tendency to 
often see things in just one way. Navigating the complex terrain of mentalization has 
forced me to consider many different theoretic viewpoints and I think it is the 
cognitive equivalent of an emotional journey to have more mixed feelings and 
experience the world in a more nuanced way. I think it will be a long process, but I 
believe I am doing many of the right things to get closer to my goal.
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Appendix 1: literature search terms
Using EBSCO these  are some of the  searches have been particularly helpful:
Mentaliz*
Reflective Function* 
Embodied Cognition 
Mirror Neurons 
Fonagy (auth) 
Bateman (auth) 
Gergely (author) 
Target (author) 
Gallese (author) 
Slade (author)
Allen (author)
Having gone through the reference lists of the  following line by line:
"Mentalization, affect regulation and the development of the  self (2002)" by Peter 
Fonagy, Gyorgy Gergely, Elliot L Jurist & Mary Target.
"Mentalizing in Clinical Practice (2008)" by Jon G. Allen, Peter Fonagy and Anthony 
W. Bateman.
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The Editorial Board of the  British Journal of Psychology is prepared to consider for 
publication:
(a) reports of empirical studies likely to  further our understanding of psychology
(b) critical reviews of the  literature
(c) theoretical contributions Papers will be evaluated by the Editorial Board and 
referees in term s of scientific merit, readability, and interest to a general readership.
1. Circulation
The circulation of the  Journal is worldwide. Papers are invited and encouraged from 
authors throughout the  world.
2. Length
Papers should normally be no more than 8000 words (excluding the  abstract, 
reference list, tables and figures), although the  Editor retains discretion to  publish 
papers beyond this length in cases where the  clear and concise expression of the  
scientific content requires greater length.
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Abstract
Background and Aim: Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is a disabling psychiatric 
condition. It is characterised by anomalous subjective experience that is seen by 
sufferers as incongruent with their existing self-narrative and treated as unwanted and 
irrational; sufferers report being unable to discount its validity and attempt to 
neutralise it with often elaborate rituals. Current medically based treatments of OCD 
such as cognitive behavioural therapy report partial successes. In this study the 
validity of a sole reliance on a medical ontology is questioned and social 
constructionist approach to understanding OCD is advanced. The ways that people 
self-positioned as suffering from OCD construct accounts of agency and responsibility 
are examined within two online support forums.
Method: Two internet fora were used as sources and the data were analysed using a 
multi-level discourse analysis.
Results: A number of discursive practices around agency and responsibility were 
discerned. Internet posters abnormalized subjective experience which allowed them to 
problematize its emergence. Agency for the production of problematic aspects of 
subjectivity was attributed to OCD as an external entity or to aspects of subjectivity 
that are constructed as external to the speaker’s agentic self. These practices worked 
towards disowning this subjective experience and renouncing responsibility for its 
negotiation. Internet posters contested consequences for action arising from the 
problematic experience by orienting to dilemmatic binaries around which experiences 
could be legitimately termed as the product of OCD and therefore ‘not real’. The use 
of a medical discourse permitted and solidified these practices which were reproduced 
by support seekers and respondents. A longer extract is presented which demonstrates 
how a support seeker both appeared to request and consistently discount reassurance 
about the ‘reality’ of his experience.
Conclusion: These strategies reduce responsibility, but also minimize agency and 
opportunities for resolution of dilemmas. The discursive constructions consistently 
lead to circular conversations and linguistic dead ends. It appears that these strategies.
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largely influenced by a medical discourse, offer some stability, but appear inadequate 
to resolve sufferers’ distress. The implications for psychotherapy are examined.
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Introduction
Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is a complex and debilitating form of 
psychological distress, characterized by repeated ‘intrusive’ thoughts, images or 
impulses (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). The psychiatric community has labelled these 
as obsessions to highlight the tenacity with which sufferers adhere to them and these 
can be of sufficient severity to cause considerable distress either by being time- 
consuming or by the levels of affective strain on sufferers’ experience (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). Compulsions are actions such as checking or counting 
aimed at neutralizing the distress caused by the obsessions and preventing feared 
consequences. Obsessional content can be highly idiosyncratic and is shaped by the 
individual’s personal experiences, as well as the socio-cultural context they occupy 
(Clark, 2004; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980).
What appears common in clinical experience is that sufferers present with thoughts 
and feelings that they cannot account for and that they see as incongruent with their 
experience and label as ‘irrational’. The dominant model for the understanding and 
‘treatment’ of this phenomenon in the UK is cognitive behavioural therapy (Clark, 
2004) and operates within a firm medical methodology, ontology and epistemology. 
Historically, as Martens (2009) points out, that there has been a
“shifting emphasis from socio-moral priorities, that is a focus on maintaining 
the individual’s moral obligations to the society within which s/he lives, to 
autonomist, individualist striving that values personal “growth” and 
accomplishment. Moving from a character base that focuses on one’s social 
conformity, a personality-driven social structure emphasises “the quest for a 
unique self’ (Martens, 2008).”
With this change of perspective from character to personality, medical discourse has 
gained in importance and power and has in turn begun to profoundly influence not 
only how distress is understood, but also the way that people express their distress. 
The emphasis on the individual has meant that medicine has naturalized an 
intrapsychic understanding of suffering which has inbuilt in it an inoculation against
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understanding the way that distress affects the performance of social functions and 
constitutes human relations. Additionally, ‘anomalous’ experience is seen as an 
irritant to the quest for the unique self and obstacle to personal growth. Why people 
may ‘have anomalous experience’ in the first place is not contested either.
Medically based cognitive models (Beck, 1976) of OCD in particular are relatively 
recent but have been progressively influential both in its conceptualisation and 
treatment (see Foa & Stekestee, 2002 for a review). The basis in this model is that 
‘intrusive’ thoughts are an ordinary phenomenon of everyday experience (Rachman & 
de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984). However, people that are eventually 
diagnosed with OCD respond differently to these thoughts. In what Salkovskis (1985) 
originally conceptualized as the ‘appraisal-belief model’, the ‘misinterpretation’ of 
these intrusive thoughts, images or impulses leads to the development and 
maintenance of the disorder (Rachman, 1997; 1998, Salkovskis, 1985). Originally, 
Salkovskis (1985) argued that the likelihood of an intrusive thought becoming an 
obsession was contingent on the individual’s belief that they would be personally 
responsible for preventing the harm that the thought related to. As a result the 
individual would be more likely to engage in compulsions in order to prevent the 
feared outcome. There have been a number of further theoretical and empirical efforts 
to identify further intrapsychic determinants such as perfectionism, need for thought 
control, overestimation of the importance of thoughts and overestimation of danger 
(Clark, 2004) or sufferers’ vulnerabilities in mentalizing (Tsigaras, Warren & 
Simonds, 2012).
The provision of psychological help implicitly or explicitly involves an exploration of 
agency and responsibility. It is, or should be, a continuous evaluation of the complex 
relationship between the two and where they can be located in order to make change 
possible. Treatment strategies of OCD (Clark 2004) with their medical basis usually 
follow Salkovskis’ model in arguing for the normality of the intrusive thoughts while 
constructing sufferers’ relationship to these as pathological. Patients are therefore 
assisted in challenging their problematic adhesion to the importance of the intrusions. 
Although the relationship of these intrusions to the self has recently been a focus of 
experimental research (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007; Tsigaras, Simonds & Hegarty, 2012)
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their occurrence is not seen as a meaningful production. Patients are therefore not 
positioned as responsible for these and are not expected to exert agency in reflexivity. 
Behavioural treatments operate by ‘exposure and response prevention’ in order to 
gradually reduce the anxiety associated with these thoughts. On a cognitive level 
multiple tools are used to show to clients how they exaggerate the validity and 
consequentiality of these thoughts. Whereas this can be helpful to many, it is also not 
helpful to all. In pure behavioural therapy it has been estimated that clients who refuse 
therapy, drop out or fail to benefit amount to 50% (Abramowitz, 2006). Cognitive 
therapy is estimated to have similar success (Wilhelm & Steketee 2006).
These success rates make it necessary to continue researching ways to help. One 
avenue is to continue to refine theoretical and research models within the established 
medical paradigm and the current author has contributed in this way (Tsigaras, 
Simonds & Hegarty, 2012; Tsigaras, Warren & Simonds, 2012). Current success rates 
indicate that this approach cannot be discounted and we know too little about human 
suffering to reject treatment strategies in one fell swoop. However, it is also necessary 
to maintain a critical stance about the impact of medical discourses, and one way to do 
this is to problematize entrenched notions of agency and responsibility, put forward by 
either patients or clinicians. The avenue that this study is taking is to explore how 
people self-positioned as having OCD ‘do OCD’ in a particular context. Specifically, 
the focus of this study is the way that they construct agency and responsibility using a 
discourse analytic methodology. The principle author’s speaking position is from that 
of a counselling psychologist and flows from the author’s dilemma about the need to 
combine an empowering socio-political agenda with a practical exploration of what 
the therapeutic couple can achieve by negotiating these two notions in the consulting 
room. Although strictly individualizing problems is considered unhelpful (Foucault 
2002[1964]; Martens, 2009) a study of what clients can be held responsible for and 
where they can exert their agency is essential, as long as the discursive milieu clients 
live in is seriously taken into account. This position is not set out to discount CBT, 
which can be very helpful, but to problematize the sole reliance on a medically 
influenced intrapsychic model of ‘psychopathology’. The author’s position includes 
the assumption that distress is a socially constructed practice and therefore a study of 
interpersonal events is a particularly useful terrain to understand it. The usefulness of
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naturalistic materials within research has been repeatedly asserted by Jonathan Potter 
on the basis that it entails people’s everyday practices without the disruption caused 
by participants orientation to a researcher within an interview context (e.g. Potter, 
2010).
Internet fora are a new source of such naturalistic materials. They are ‘virtual 
locations’ on the internet where people can participate in semi-synchronous 
communication (SSCM), by posting messages that can, through the participation of 
other posters, develop in a thread which resembles a discussion. In the last decade 
there have been a number of studies using discourse analytic approaches to study 
interaction in internet fora. Different authors have demonstrated that participants treat 
such threads as discussions, and have applied conversational analytic principles of 
turn taking and interaction (Sacks, 1992) to study exchanges in this context (Antaki et 
al. 2006; Lamerichs & te Molder 2003). The purpose of this study is not to ‘reveal’ 
structural aspects of OCD, but rather to identify some ‘contingent truths’ in this 
context. Some tentative views will be put forward about how these can be useful in the 
clinical context.
Method
Discourse Analysis. Discourse Analysis (DA) is a broad type of methodology of 
qualitative research which entails ‘(t)he collection and analysis of verbal material, 
spoken or written, and emphasizes properties such as structure and variability and 
focuses on action’ (McKinlay & McVittie, 2008 p. 11). In this study a multi-level 
discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) will be employed. This entails 
examining how forum participants use available discourses to achieve interpersonal 
aims, making active use of the structural aspects of the forum to perform recognizable 
social actions in order to manage accountability (Antaki et al. 2006). Simultaneously, 
it entails examining how participants are also constrained by these discourses with 
consequences for action and subjectivity. Participants’ identities can themselves be 
seen as discourse practices used to attend to the normative and often contradictory 
requirements of asking for and offering support (Lamerichs & te Molder 2003). Both 
the resources and constraints that participants face are specifically delimited by the
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particular context of the forums which can be understood as institutional settings that 
operate particular ideologies. The accounts that participants produce for their distress 
are therefore constrained by a need to fulfil membership criteria which determine 
whether support is offered or denied (Varyeda & Antaki’s 2009). In this study the 
analytic lens will shift between these different levels in order to yield the richest 
analysis that space permits.
Forum Descriptions. For the purpose of this study two online English language fora 
were selected, "Stuck in a Doorway (SIADf and "OCD-UIC. In terms of users and 
posts, these are the two oldest and largest spaces for online discussion of OCD. The 
ideology of the OCD-UK as revealed by their research digest and their OCD guide is 
medical. Recommended therapies are CBT and psychopharmacological interventions. 
Stuck in a Doorway is an international English language forum only and is not part of 
a broader platform like OCD-UK. However, it is the largest one on the internet. In 
their support forum, ‘sticky’ posts are situated in the first page of the discussion and 
remain there despite new posts. One such relates information that can be clearly 
understood as medical and CBT in orientation. Similarly, the forum contains a small 
bookstore and the books on offer have similar content. These orientations are not 
surprising as the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE)’s guidelines for 
mental health only endorse these as primary two treatments for OCD.
Ethics. We considered the ethics of analysing online carefully, taking into account the 
work of previous authors. Both forums are ‘open access’ and therefore available in the 
public domain. There is no requirement to create an account to read these materials. 
We have followed other authors (e.g. Ridley et al., 2009) in not seeking permission 
from either the fora’s administrators or individual participants. However, we 
anonymized our internet posters and typed some of the quotes into Google to ensure 
they were not searchable.
Sampling Strategy. All data was collected between April and June 2011. Keyword 
searches were used to generate relevant threads, consisting of a number of posts each 
by using the websites’ inbuilt ‘search’ functions. Initially an effort was made to 
generate words that were closely related to ‘agency’ and ‘responsibility’. Oxford
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Thesaurus of English (2009) was used to identify synonyms and antonyms for these 
words. The words selected for input in the keyword search and their respective 
frequencies can be found in Appendix I. In SIAD the search was narrowed to the 
‘subforum’ of ‘Sufferers’ Lounge’ and in OCD-UK to ‘Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder (OCD) -  Support Forum’.
Keyword Selection. The final keywords for the generation of the data were selected to 
ensure a heterogeneous representation as is possible. The first: ‘Guilt’, was 
theoretically driven as it is central to CBT constructions of OCD. The second: 
‘ROCD’, was data-driven and is a lay, poster-constructed category which stands for 
‘Relationship OCD’. It is a ‘type’ of OCD which is characterised by unwanted doubt 
relating to feelings of attraction and could entail the person’s doubt about their own 
feelings or that of their partner. This was a quantitative decision as it featured in the 
largest number of posts. Finally, five threads were chosen at random, outside the 
keyword search from both forums. This tripartite approach (theory-driven, data-driven 
& random), in conjunction with using two different fora, aimed at increasing the 
contextual breadth of discursive constructions related to agency and responsibility.
Thread Selection & Coding. At the start, a number of threads were read carefully 
searching for commonalities and divergences in content and process related to issues 
of agency and responsibility. Initially, posts were mainly coded in terms of their 
content. We started looking at content that related to areas of life that are normatively 
considered important sites where agency and responsibility are negotiated, for 
example ‘confessing’, ‘sexuality’, ‘harm’, ‘decision making’. As the analysis unfolded 
we started to code in discursive terms. With specific discursive practices beginning to 
be identified, there were additional searches for threads that included these instances. 
This also entailed returning to the data and formulating new themes. Also, different 
themes were grouped together under new encompassing themes as analysis proceeded. 
For instance, we had an initial category of ‘Constructing oneself as a passive agent’. 
This was an instance in which posters used terms such as ‘convinced’ (to be or 
become convinced of something), ‘have’ or ‘get’ (have/get a thought or have /get a 
feeling) where the poster presented a situation as a ‘happening’ to them of which they 
were passive recipients. Another category was initially labelled ‘Attributing agency to
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thoughts’. This category includes instances where thoughts were given physical 
agency, most often constructed in locomotive terms (such as coming, going returning, 
branching). Ultimately these two categories were grouped under a master theme of 
‘Externalizing Agency’ as this was the visible work being done in the data.
In the end twenty five threads were selected for analysis, ten generated by using 
‘Guilt’ as a keyword, ten by searching for ROCD and five chosen randomly. The 
threads were ranked in order of relevance to the theoretical question. The process of 
analysis benefited from a collective discussion between the three authors, until there 
was agreement that the end results would be obvious to a reader. One longer extract 
for analysis was selected for a few different reasons. The poster presented his problem 
in considerable detail. Additionally, this was one of the posts where all of the 
discursive practices identified in the analysis were visible, as well as the way they 
worked together. Furthermore, it was a significantly long thread spanning more than a 
hundred replies to the original post; as such it presented a helpful opportunity to 
observe an extended sequence of exchanges between the posters which could allow 
the nuances of their interaction to become visible.
Analysis
Abnormalising subjective experience
This discursive practice involved an active repudiation of thoughts and feelings by 
stressing their ‘irrational’, ‘unwanted’ qualities and emphasising the 
incomprehensibility of their occurrence. Posters largely engaged in a process of 
abnormalization (Potter, 1996). For example posters wrote ‘And I am talking about 
things that, to the logical mind, are not really a huge deal’ or ‘I know deep down 
inside me that I haven't do anything wrong but somehow...’. Within the ROCD 
context the abnormalising was achieved by establishing the incomprehensibility of the 
thought (‘...the thing is nothings really changed from before when things were normal 
he still does the things he always has, he loves me so much and I could never find 
such a kind hearted guy and we've always had this amazing connection’.). This
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discursive practice is not always present, but when it can be discerned it appears to 
support the externalizing practices that follow and also can be seen as working up an 
anomalous identity position that warrants support in this context.
Externalizing agency
This discursive practice frequently appeared in the narrative of origin. Posters 
described the cause for the support request as the result of having been the recipients 
of ‘thoughts’ or ‘feelings’ which were unwanted, irrational and incongruent with their 
existent self-narrative (abnormalising subjective experience). These were either 
reported to be morally reprehensible or, especially in the case of ROCD, signified 
undesirable but inescapable consequences for action. Posters used words such as 
‘convinced’ (‘For the last 10 weeks I have been convinced that I have 
viewed/downloaded inappropriate pictures of children [...]’) or ‘become convinced’ 
(‘Now I have become convinced I may have infected someone with HIV or hepatitis 
[...]’). On occasions agency was placed on one’s mind/brain (‘i find it really hard to 
have sex because i get all upset when it gets to it cause my mind is telling me i dont 
want to sleep with him’).
More frequently, agency was located on thoughts (‘cant believe two weeks ago I was 
reasonably happy these thoughts wouldnt cross my mind, but now its 24/7 especially 
guilt, how do I stop these’). Posters used verbs such as ‘have’ and ‘get’ when 
orienting to them (‘I have icons that she makes sex with her exes and this makes me 
very depressed anxious very jealous and it kills our very good sex life and mine sex 
drive.’). These thoughts could trouble the poster (‘Please help I don’t know what’s the 
matter I’m being really troubled by thoughts right now as always and I can’t stop 
crying etc’) or fill them with painful feelings (‘These thoughts fill me with dread 
which upsets me so much, i just want to be normal.’)
Speaking in terms of ‘having’ or ‘getting’ thoughts and feelings is not exclusive to this 
context, as these posters live in a psychologised culture (Rose, 1996) and such 
expressions are commonplace. However, this interpretative repertoire is relied on 
heavily to achieve two particular constructions. Posters are constructing themselves as
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split subjects, tom between conflicting thoughts, feelings, views or agendas that are 
incompatible with their core, existing self-narrative. Simultaneously, they position 
themselves as passive agents, simultaneously assuming an identity as sufferers. 
Through extemalization of agency, posters were able to diverge responsibility from 
their executive selves and these attributions were central to most posts. There were 
some instances in the data where the extemalization was less obvious, because of the 
use of personal pronouns, but the exceptions could still all be understood to work up a 
position of passivity. For instance a constmction of now think that’ was achieving 
the same goal as it implied the existence of an executive self that had to submit to 
alien thoughts and feelings.
Constructing OCD as an external agent
This constmction was an instance of extemalizing agency. It is presented as a separate 
category because it allows for the construction of OCD as a disease category and also 
provides a solution to being ‘split’ as a subject by constructing an executive self that is 
suffering from a parasite. CCD’s agency is constructed in very physical terms 
(‘blowing it out of proportion’, ‘latches on to a random thought, magnifies it and 
interprets it as something bad’, ‘mns wild’, ‘takes hold o f ,  ‘plagues’) often using 
extrematization (Pomerantz, 1986) such as OCD ‘always gets you where you hurt 
most’. Posters also personalize OCD as ‘a battle of the mind’, ‘very devious and 
scmpulous’, as ‘smart and knows how to push buttons’, as ‘a beast’. These 
constructions also allowed posters to explicitly diverge themselves of responsibility 
(‘you are NOT the one constmcting these images in your head OCD is so realize OCD 
is the bad one not you!’), as well as agency.
Orienting to dilemmatic binaries
This discursive practice followed taking up a position as a split subject and involved 
an attempt to rectify the dissonance that was developing in posters’ identities. Posters 
constructed dichotomous accounts, establishing a dilemma around whether something 
was ‘real’ or not, with OCD being equated with ‘not-real’ (‘is this real or is it OCD?’) 
Posters ask for support in making such decisions: ‘But I don't know how much of this
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is OCD and what is real’. Members of the forum usually offered reassurance by 
making this decision for the poster (‘To me, a fellow responsibility OCD'er, it sounds 
obvious to me that your situation is definitely OCD and not reality’, ’Just reading your 
post, is was very evident to me that it is laced with OCD’, ‘Listen to me, it is OCD’). 
The implication was there were only two interpretative possibilities, as thoughts and 
feelings could be only rational or irrational, real or OCD. Qualifying a thought as 
OCD allowed individuals to disown reported aspects of their subjective experience 
that did not fit in their existing narratives. Consequences for action were predicated on 
determining whether something was ‘real or OCD’. There was usually a preferred 
binary which involved dismissing the incongruent thoughts, and posters were often 
positioned as asking for ‘reassurance’. In interaction, agency and responsibility for 
this decision were placed on others.
As a result of the above discursive work, posters presented themselves as taking up a 
dilemmatic position in response to their problem. (‘I have been really struggling with 
functioning with these intrusive thoughts for over 10 weeks now and have so far 
resisted begging to buy my laptop back’ or ‘can someone please just help me the thing 
is i know if i end this relationship i will be worse and i will regret it 100% i will never 
meet another like him , thankyou.’). Posters constructed a situation where on account 
of illness they are unable to exert agency and take responsibility.
We will now turn to the analysis of a longer extract. I have included here those parts 
of the thread that are most relevant to the research question. An ‘ [...]’ symbolizes that 
the next part has been omitted. I present an initial post by ‘John’ that emerged from a 
search with ROCD as a keyword in OCD-UK. In this section John posts an exposition 
of the problem with a request. This is followed by an initial exchange with ‘Rita’ 
where John resists Rita’s reassurance and advice. Consequently both Rita and another 
poster, ‘Simon’, respond to John’s resistance.
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Initial post: Can ccd really make me feel this?
1 John: Things w ere  going really well, my girlfriend was over staying with m e for nearly th e  last two m onths and
2 everything was ace. Anyway, a new guy started at work and after about a week o f working with him, for som e
3  reason when I looked a t him I got this feeling/thought that I was a ttracted  to  him, specifically his m outh, and
4  now it feels like I actually am . Specifically Just his m outh, but it's enough to  convince m e that I have a crush on
5  him, it feels like I really am attracted to  it/him and it's making me feel awful.
6
7  My girlfriend lives in th e  States and is due to  be coming over here to study after th e  Summer and us get a place
8  together, now I feel like I can 't do that because actually I'm gay. I feel horrendously guilty whenever I speak to
9  her because now I’m convinced that I'm actually gay and th a t I fancy this guy a t work.
10
11 kj
12
13 I've had 'spikes’ in th e  past w here I was convinced I fancied my m ates, but I always managed to let them  go
14 and a fter a while they didn't feel real - but this tim e I’m convinced It's different and it’s real. I really don 't know
15  w hat I should do - 1 love my girlfriend and want to  be with her, I was so looking forward to  us living together
16 and  th e  future and now this has happened, and I'm convinced I'm gay, that I should split up with her and th a t I
17 have no futu re with her.
WS
19 L.]
21  I'm sure I could accept it if th is w as th e  norm for me, but I'm convinced th a t a t 25, this Is th e  first time I've ever
22 truly felt like this, o r th a t's  w hat it feels like. W hat scares me even m ore Is th at I’ve never been one to define
23  sexuality in strict black and w hite term s, so I feel like there 's  a possibility that this cuold be real. All I know Is
24  that it makes me feel supremely anxious and uncomfortable, and these feelings a re  definitely unw anted. I
25 can 't say why though - 1 guess I j ust don’t  I ike them  for w hatever reason. I don 't wa nt to  be gay, I want to  enjoy
26 a future and relationship with my girlfriend, but how can I if I fancy a ma n?
27
28 I don 't have any sexual desires tow ards men, never fantasise about them or anything else, nor have I ever had
29 a gay experience. And I have had spikes about fancying friends before, but this time I’m convinced it’s real and
3 0  different and honestly can’t  see  how I can get past it,
31
32 L..J
33
34 I honestly cannot see  th a t this is ocd, and if ft Isn’t then  w hat? Then I m ust be  a t least bisexual, if not gay. That
35 definitely compromises my relationship, to  me.
36
37  ,
38
39  Rita; hey there, this is a classic ocd thought so yes it's definitely your ocd. ocd will fix on anything th a t will
40  upset you or make you feel bad, hence th e  Idea of fancying a guy a t work when you have a girlfriend will do
41  the trick, use th e  usual ocd-destroying tools, don’t challenge th e  thought just let it be. eventually th e  thought
42  will fade as It will no longer cause you distress.
43
44 take care, *posterisfeof nome*
45
46  John: Yes, but it's not just a thought. It feels like I'm attracted attracted  to  him, specifically his mouth. I know
47  th a t  sounds weird.
48
49  Rita; it will feel like th at though as it has to  for you to believe It’s real, if your mind w as telling you that you
5 0  w ere attracted but th a t it was It, then it wouldnt feel real. 1 recommend you read this, it should help
51 http://www.ocdonline...hilliDson7.ohp. please go easy on yourself and recognise this for w hat it Is, th ere  are
52  many o th er people on here who have experienced th e  sam e thing, th e  key to  knowing th is is ocd is th e  level of
53  anxiety It gives you x
54
55  John; It doesn’t always give me anxiety but it does always make me feel uncomfortable and nuhappy. Honestly
56  makes me feel like I should split up with my girlfriend, because I must really be gay and it'd be th e  right thing
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57  to  do. But I w ant to  b e  w ith her, it's  not w hat I w ant to  do. W hat should I do? Having though ts a b o u t th is  guy
58  while I'm With her is awful.
59
6 0  I...]
61
62 Simon: W e cannot help th e  feelings and  though ts w e a re  getting, unfortunatly  its a part o f  th e  illness and th e t
63 do  seem
6 4  real, but its w hat you a re  doing to  keep them  revolving is th e  problem , asking for reasu rance/rum inating /
65  engaging with th e  though ts e tc
66
67  [...]
68
69 John: Do you m ean to  say th ey 're  real feelings? In th a t case, it's not ocd and I m ust be experience a gay crush,
7 0  in Which case how  can I carry on and enjoy being with my gf and feeling in love w ith her?
The most overarching discursive practice in the majority of the data is the construction 
of OCD as an external agent. This construction delimits the linguistic opportunities 
that are available in the discussions and it is one that is not contested by any of the 
participants. This is made possible and sustained by the use of a medical discourse 
where OCD is designated as a disease entity with its own intelligence and symptoms. 
Participants further externalize agency by distributing it to individual components 
(e.g. thoughts or feelings), some of which can be contested by debating their 
relationship to OCD. This is done by orienting to dilemmatic binaries and disowning 
subjectivity. The fundamental problem appears to revolve around being a split subject. 
Posters use different discursive tools, some of which are structurally specific (such a 
invoking a group identity), but they all operate within these broad discourses.
‘John’ titles his post ‘Can OCD really make me feel like this’. Already from the title 
of the thread, he constructs OCD as an external agent potentially able to exert 
influence on his feelings. This extemalization in this context is telling of an 
underlying medical discourse which allows asking whether something is a symptom 
of an underlying disease. Additionally, this support request is articulated as requiring a 
diagnostic view which is usually a request made to an expert such as a doctor. 
Therefore participants are invited to assume such experts positions which is 
legitimised by their intimate and shared experience of ‘suffering’ (Sufferer’s Lounge).
The extemalization is further elaborated by distributing agency to a thought or feeling; 
John ‘gets this feeling/thought’ (line 3). He constructs his subjectivity as yielding to 
this agent as ‘it now feels like I am attracted to this man’ (line 5). The consequence is
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that ‘now I feel like I can't do that because actually I'm gay’ (line 8) and ‘now I'm 
convinced that I'm actually gay and that I fancy this guy at work’ (line 9). It is also 
possible to observe that John draws a number of conclusions as a result of this 
thought/feeling and occupies a dilemmatic position around his commitment to his 
relationship.
The discursive practice of externalising agency operates closely with abnormalising 
parts of one’s subjectivity. Initially this is done by John’s reported failure to account 
for the origin or the thought/feeling (‘for some reason’, lines 2-3). He is pressing the 
irrationality of his feelings by emphasizing that it is ‘(s)pecifically just his mouth, but 
it's enough to convince me that I have a crush on him’ (lines 4-5). John continues to 
present himself as drawing conclusions that are, as Clark (2004) writes, ‘flimsy’, but 
‘irresistible’ (‘it’s enough to convince me’). He restates strongly in lines 28-30 
employing a number of extreme case formulations:
“I don't have any sexual desires towards men, never fantasise about them or 
anything else, nor have I ever had a gay experience.”
and in lines 21-22:
“I'm sure I could accept it if this was the norm for me, but I'm convinced that 
at 25, this is the first time I've ever truly felt like this, or that's what it feels 
like”.
Later, he explains in lines 46-47:
“Yes, but it's not just a thought. It feels like I'm attracted attracted to him, 
specifically his mouth. I know it sounds weird.”
John’s abnormalising means that he inoculates against further probing of his 
circumstances. Additionally, expressing his problem in an OCD forum where this 
practice is common solidifies this inoculation.
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What John is here submitting as contestable, is whether this externalised, and 
abnormal subjective experience is ‘real’ or OCD. Its agency cannot be discounted but 
its legitimacy can. Perhaps the most powerful pivot in this debate is therefore the 
posters’ orientation around ‘dilemmatic binaries’. John is looking for evidence to 
discount his problem as ‘not-real’ and therefore as OCD. In lines 13-14 he writes:
“I've had 'spikes' in the past where I was convinced I fancied my mates, but I
always managed to let them go and after a while they didn't feel real - but this
time I'm convinced it's different and it's real.”
At the same time, there is something seemingly artificial about this debate as the 
preferred binary option is usually clear (lines 25-26):
“I don't want to be gay, I want to enjoy a future and relationship with my 
girlfriend, but how can I if I fancy a man?”
John’s post gets a number of replies and he also writes back.
John and Rita
In lines 39-42, Rita offers a response that is very common in the two forums under 
investigation, one o f ‘reassurance’.
“[Tjhis is a classic ocd thought”.
This qualifies the problem not as ‘real’, but as ‘definitely your OCD’ (line 39). Rita is 
unequivocally orienting towards John’s preferred binary option and aligning with 
John’s preferred self-narrative; it is OCD, not real, John is not gay and does not have 
to leave his girlfriend. Rita, validates, John’s externalisation as she also constructs 
OCD as an external agent that ‘will fix on anything that will upset you or make you 
feel bad’ (lines 39-40).
134
What is noteworthy is that in this as well as the majority of the posts examined John’s 
resists the reassurance he appears to ask for. His strategy is to sustain the dilemma 
around the binary of real/not-real:
“Yes, but it's not just a thought. It feels like I'm attracted attracted to him, 
specifically his mouth. I know that sounds weird.” (lines 46-47)
His method of establishing what is real is about how it ‘feels’ (also lines 13-14). There 
is a degree of arbitrariness about this which makes it hard to argue against. In line 49- 
53, Rita responds to John still within the binary of real/not-real.
“it will feel like that though as it has to for you to believe it's real, if your mind 
was telling you that you were attracted but that it was it, then it wouldnt feel 
real.” (lines 49-50).
Rita normalises John’s protest by expressing an expert position. She reiterates that all 
John has to do is ‘recognize this for what it is, there are many other people on here 
who have experienced the same thing.’ (line 52). This is a further normalization of his 
response and she urges him to comply with her diagnostic assessment. She solidifies 
this with an additional expert opinion on a technical aspect of OCD that ‘the key to 
knowing this is ocd is the level of anxiety it gives you’.
John marshals another challenge to the ‘key’ by stating that ‘It doesn't always give me 
anxiety but it does always make me feel uncomfortable and nuhappy.” (line 55). It 
appears from the data so far that both parties are caught in a debate around the 
‘technicalities’ which will determine whether the problem is OCD or not.
John and Simon
In lines 62-65 ‘Simon’ writes:
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“We cannot help the feelings and thoughts we are getting, unfortunatly its a 
part of the illness and thet do seem real, but its what you are doing to keep 
them revolving is the problem, asking for reasurance/ruminating/ engaging 
with the thoughts etc”.
Simon’s post is particularly interesting and can be seen to be working towards a 
number of aims. Up to that point John places responsibility for diagnosis with the 
other posters while working hard to rebuff them. Simon offers a challenge and he 
formulates a particular version about what John is responsible for and how John can 
be agentic.
Simon constructs ‘us’ as passive agents who cannot ‘help the feelings and thoughts’ 
they are getting and they are not responsible for them. He employs a medical 
discourse where ‘these thoughts and feelings’ are the product of the ‘illness’. 
Therefore, Simon is explicitly attending to John’s emphasis on ‘what it feels like’ 
confirming the externalisation of the thoughts. Instead he problematizes John’s 
response as the space where John can exert agency instead of ‘asking for 
reassurance/ruminating/engaging with the thoughts’.
Additionally, Simon is undermining John’s resistance by suggesting that it orients him 
as an out-group member mirroring Rita’s earlier strategy. Simon explicitly invokes 
group identity as he refers to ‘we’ which includes the forum members and possibly the 
OCD population, and places John as one of ‘us’, unequivocally determining John’s 
position as an OCD sufferer and part of the group. The implication as a member of the 
group means that John must accept the group’s advice.
John replies to Simon in lines 69-70, by explicitly restating the binary (‘Do you mean 
to say they're real feelings?’). It is not clear how he draws this potential conclusion 
from Simon’s post. It is possible that John’s somewhat incomprehensible response is 
to reinvoke the dilemmatic binary. He follows it immediately with an associative 
chain presented as a leading to an inevitable outcome (‘In that case, it's not ocd and I 
must be experience a gay crush, in which case how can I carry on and enjoy being 
with my gf and feeling in love with her?’). The urgency of this manoeuvre could be
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understood to attempt to destabilise Simon’s challenge by emphasis John’s 
helplessness.
Consequences for action and subjectivity
There are a number of discursive practices at work and their deployment offers 
multiple points at which John’s constructions could have been problematized. Some of 
these opportunities are described below.
The pervasive construction of OCD as an external agent can be understood on the 
basis that the two fora are saturated with a medical discourse which makes possible 
for posters to claim that the illness ‘makes one have these thoughts and feelings’. 
However, the availability of this discourse solidifies the posters propensity to disown 
and negate parts of their subjective experience. Initially, constructing OCD as an 
external agent might displace responsibility for undesirable thoughts and feelings, but 
it also robs John and the other posters from their own agency and power. This practice 
seems to offer short term rewards, but it is a linguistic cul-de-sac. It leaves posters 
grappling with the nature of OCD rather potentially attending to the negotiation of 
complex subjective experience. In fact Simon suggests that ‘We cannot help the 
feelings and thoughts we are getting, unfortunatly its a part of the illness and thet do 
seem real’ (lines 62-64). This precludes a view of people as the producers of 
meaningful thoughts and reduces responsibility, but also agency. Again, it is the 
experts’ position that is reproduced here: everyone has nonsensical intrusive thoughts 
(but see psychodynamic, existential or person-centred models for a different view). 
Consequently, emotional experience that is at odds with an existent self-narrative is 
disowned and abnormalised instead of eliciting curiosity. By labelling it as OCD it can 
be deemed as not-real and therefore annihilated. However, John’s resistance could be 
understood as indicating that this experience is compelling and cannot simply be done 
away with by pathologising it.
John seems to lack the language to negotiate complex identity beyond black and 
white, gay or not gay, OCD or not OCD. John’s abnormalising of his experience is not
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problematized either. Posters do not contest John’s unwillingness to reflect on the 
incomprehensibility of his experience. It is implicitly seen as neither his responsibility 
nor an area he can exert any agency in. Likewise, John’s orientation to dilemmatic 
binaries is not only uncontested, but also it is reproduced by the other posters. Many 
of the interactions that take place in this thread are very similar. One of the mysteries 
in this post is why John vehemently resists the reassurance that he appears to crave. 
The original post is quite long and the author’s experience of reading John’s 
continuous rebuffs was one of frustration and exhaustion. One hypothesis is that 
within this thread, John is ‘carrying’ the thread’s lack of satisfaction with the 
ideological status quo. As stated above, it is possible that emotional experience is 
compelling and cannot be disowned. John might be trying to develop a different view, 
but both the way he framed the problem and the forum members’ responses are 
working against this possibility. It could be speculated that the system in this forum is 
demonstrating both a desire to unsettle its own balance as well as a commitment to 
resist it.
Additionally, posting his problem in an OCD forum means that the content of John’s 
problem is not looked at beyond something that is real or OCD. In order to 
problematize this it may be helpful to shift the analytic lens momentarily at the level 
of content and away from the level of discourse. Looking at it still from a functional 
perspective, one could be curious about the timing of his problem. John’s becomes 
worried about his sexuality at a moment in time when he reports he is going to be 
undertaking a new commitment of living with his girlfriend. If John decides he is gay 
then he cannot be with his girlfriend as he himself states. Perhaps as well as a desire 
John’s is also worried about what this might entail. This is only a possible reading but 
attending to this absence is perhaps missing from the black and white treatment that 
John and the posters treat his concern.
Discussion
In studying these large online forums, we cannot guarantee to have identified all of the 
discursive practices that are deployed by people who are self-positioned as having
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OCD, or to suggest that the ones we did identify could occur in a different context. 
However, the discursive practises we did discern were readily visible and very 
consistent across posts in the two different fora (Craven & Coyle, 2007). Additionally, 
the use of a medical discourse, through which many of these practices were made 
possible, suggests that they may be more representative of OCD talk in general rather 
than orientations to the structural features of online locations. It remains a possibility 
for future research to investigate different non-naturalistic contexts such as 
psychotherapy sessions or face to face research interviews.
This study attempted to make explicit posters’ constructions related to agency and 
responsibility, that is what doing OCD looks like in the context of a support forum. 
Initially, these appear to be consistent with a medical understanding of distress which 
makes it possible to externalise part of one’s subjectivity and personify it as a disease 
entity. This also happens within a psychologised Western culture with its emphasis on 
interiority, and posters can do substantial discursive work by reference to internal 
states. Mental states are then used to make possible the constitution of an artificial 
continuity where certain thoughts and feelings are understood to be part of a 
nosological phenomenon (Foucault, 2002 [1969] p.3). We have seen that a medical 
construction of OCD allows it to be attributed agency, often physical and mental. It 
also becomes personalized, a feature that is common in psychological disorders (e.g. 
in anorexia, see Ridley et al., 2009). In turn, this discourse is solidified by the 
maintenance of a collective identity assembled around this dominant ideology. 
Firstly, an ill identity is occupied through the use of a positivist model which views 
distress as grounded on a faulty brain which can cause a problematic perception of an 
externally independent reality. Therefore, faulty perceptions of reality can be amended 
through external group corroboration. The participants of the forum align under a 
collective identity that is defined in opposition to a persecutory entity; this leads to 
collective agreement to produce and reproduce these constructions of OCD. It is 
particularly at the point of action that this medical ideology is often reproduced (in our 
example following John’s resistance Simon presses: ‘go get the CBT’). This finding 
is consistent with Varyeda and Antaki’s (2009) research who similarly demonstrated 
how the allegiance to a medical model of distress in a bipolar forum, dictated help- 
seeking ways on which group membership could be offered or denied.
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This externalising practice both makes possible and is sustained by additional 
practices. Posters also use a discursive practice which entails the construction of 
binaries in terms of disease-positive-or-negative thoughts/feelings. The forum’s 
members are then called to align with the poster’s preferred option which is, however, 
a predetermined affair. There appears to be a collusion to simplify subjective 
experience in this dichotomous way and other possibilities that may be more 
empowering are not explored (for instance John’s relationship with his girlfriend or 
his relationship with men). The original poster’s resistance to taking up the 
reassurance (which they appear to work so hard to ensure it is the only option offered) 
may be construed as further evidence that their ‘either/or’ constructions present a 
language very limited to negotiate a construction of self that can orient to the 
complexity of lived experience.
Implications for research and practice
The usefulness of this research is hopefully to illuminate how people craft versions of 
themselves and their problems which they may bring in the clinical context. We 
cannot anticipate what exposure service users may have had to a particular ways of 
understanding their distress when they see us. Individuals construct their selves 
differently and, as Willig (2011) points out, clients bring their own worldviews in 
therapy, which includes their own, potentially implicit, constructions of self. She 
offers a thorough analysis of different self-constructions and example of which is the 
following:
“There are also clients who think of themselves as machines which can be 
fixed or re-programmed in order to ensure smooth functioning in the future. 
Such clients are willing to co-operate but presume that the therapist is 
equipped with the tools and techniques required to do the job. Within such an 
understanding, the self is conceived as the owner of the machine who is taking 
responsibility for seeking out expert help in order to have it repaired (Willig,
2011 p. 2).”
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There is certainly evidence form the data that the context plays a significant role in 
determining the linguistic opportunities that they may have access to, and in this 
context the dominant framework is the medically based CBT. At the same time these 
resources are made based on widely available and entrenched psychologised 
discourses which permit thoughts and feelings to be readily abnormalised when trying 
to negotiate novel, complex, or anomalous subjective experience. This strategy 
reduces responsibility for the client, but also minimizes agency and opportunities for 
change. We can see in our longer extract that these discursive constructions actually 
lead to dead ends because they are not really understood by other readers to be 
interpersonal strategies. It is worth considering that these constructions may lead to 
similar circular interactions in the consulting room as well.
If these findings are deemed noteworthy, more research on actual psychotherapy 
recordings might be useful in illuminating how agency and responsibility are 
negotiated in different therapies, their relationship to self-constructions, and the 
effects of the medical quotient in different therapeutic modalities. I hope to have 
demonstrated, however, that failing to problematize certain discursive practices in this 
data appears to offer a semblance of equilibrium for the participants, but also 
engenders a circular conversation that undermines rather than empowers sufferers.
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Reflective report
This study pursues my interest in OCD further, since my attempt to understand it from 
the point of view of ‘mentalizing’ last year. I decided to look at it from a different, 
socially constructionist point of departure this year. I have been particularly attracted 
to the basic premise that things can always be constructed differently and this is 
something that I find fascinating. Additionally, I felt that internet fora offered a rich 
data source to pursue a discourse analytic study of OCD.
I found the process challenging as it entails a particular stance that is quite unusual in 
everyday life, but it is through this positioning that it becomes possible to question 
things that we actually work hard to take for granted. I found that quite often I would 
slip back into an intrapsychic way of looking at the data, which was exactly the 
viewpoint that I found sometimes problematic and thought merited critique in this 
context. I had to put a lot of work to stand back again and again from the data. As I 
was further analysing, I then found myself struggling to decide what level my analysis 
would be more suitable oriented to. I found myself wondering whether it was the 
orientation to internal states that my posters wrote about that merited a discourse 
analytic treatment or the entire utterance of ‘struggling with an internal state’.
Through my initial readings of the data, I had already begun to form some initial 
conclusions that both helped with the analysis and at times got in the way. It was 
particularly during those moments that I had to stand back and try to lay them aside 
before reengaging with the data. I was noticing that internet posters were constructing 
their problem in ways that made it very difficult for anyone to challenge them and 
help move things forward. I realized that I was trying to find ways to challenge this by 
pointing out that it was this immunization that constituted the problem itself.
As I was continuing my research I became curious about the constructions of self that 
these participants were implicitly advancing. I was also noticing that these productions 
were becoming naturalized and therefore very difficult to think outside of. At the same 
time as a counselling psychologist I became increasingly curious about how to
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respond to this phenomenon both in research and in clinical practice. What I was 
beginning to clearly articulate to myself was that it seemed it was not always possible 
to reconcile taking the client’s view of him or herself at face value and also hoping to 
help them. I was troubled by constructions of one’s thoughts as irrational and that the 
solution was to try and brand them as OCD so that they could be disregarded. I felt 
that the participants were doing a disservice to themselves and were narrowing down 
their subjective experience considerably. I felt quite concerned that their practices 
seemed to maintain their struggles instead of resolving them.
I became immersed in trying to tease out the implications that constructions of agency 
and responsibility had in potentially legitimizing practices that disabled people rather 
than helping them question the way they conducted themselves and the implications 
this had for their ways of being. At the same time I was questioning how this stance 
can be maintained without positioning oneself as someone who can see what the client 
can’t and knows best about what the client needs. Of course this is also a criticism that 
has been levelled against discourse analysis; stepping outside phenomena and 
claiming a privileged capacity to discern the discourses that people use. At the same 
time the question emerges of what constructions I was making in my analysis. I tried 
to address this as I really was quite critical of the particular constructions the internet 
posters were making and wanted to make a case for undermining the medical 
discourse that I thought was sustaining them. Ultimately, it seems that it is always 
impossible to comment from a non-political position and to have no assumptions. 
These are not original views, but they were startling discoveries made in practice, 
experientially, rather than reading about them and understanding them intellectually.
If therefore research is an ethical endeavour, the realization of how my own agenda 
was inevitably shaping my work was curiosity provoking. And yet both research and 
therapy are processes that require conviction and depend on having some sort of 
confidence that my work is good and helpful. I am somewhat reassured that in 
qualitative research the reader can inspect the data and judge for themselves if 
interpretations are convincing and reasonable.
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I found my engagement with this strand of qualitative research this year quite helpful 
in another way as well. I was reflecting in parallel on what I have been learning from 
therapy this year, which is that one of the most important tasks for both therapist and 
client is to remain curious. I find myself thinking often that what really matters is not 
the discovery of answers but the development of the capacity in both parties to engage 
with ideas and maintain a capacity to challenge our views. I was finding that discourse 
analysis has illuminated for me this year that people are not simply describing their 
problems to me. They live their lives with me for an hour every week and what is at 
stake for us to understand is exactly the social practices they engage in during their 
therapy hour.
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Appendix 1: W ord Search Results
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Stuck In A 
Doorway
OCD-UK
Agency
Titles 0 0
Entire Threads 27 90
Power (Synonym)
Titles 8 10
Entire Threads 500 719
Effective (Synonym)
Titles 5 8
Entire Threads 500 771
Effectual (Synonym)
Titles 0 0
Entire Threads 0 0
Fail/Fail ure (Antonym)
Titles 3/4 5/17
Entire Threads 292/281 511/
Responsibility/Responsible
Titles 25 2
Entire Threads 218 105
Accountab ility/Accountab le (Synonym)
Titles 0/0 0/0
Entire Threads 9/12 8/5
Blame (Synonym)
Titles 3 2
Entire Threads 469 329
Culpability (Synonym)
Titles 0 0
Entire Threads 2 0
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Duty (Synonym)
Titles 1 0
Entire Threads 101 47
Fault (Synonym)
Titles 5 6
Entire Threads 500 354
Liability (Synonym)
Titles 0/0 0/0
Entire Threads 6/14 3/5
Exemption (Antonym)
Titles 0 0
Entire Threads 0 0
Free/Free-dom (Antonym)
Titles 27/3 34/4
Entire Threads 500/315 345/321
Immunity (Antonym) 0 0
Titles 0 0
Entire Threads 23 26
Irresponsib-ility/Irresponsib-le (Antonym)
Titles 0/0 4/7
Entire Threads 2/83 5/8
Guilt
Titles 55 90
Entire Threads 500 557
Regret (Synonym)
Titles 2 16
Entire Threads 375 26
Remorse (Synonym)
Titles 2 1
Entire Threads 65 15
Innocen-ce/Innocen-t (Antonym)
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Titles 1/1 0/2
Entire Threads 14/198 27/281
ROCD
Titles 156x25 37 (19 April to April)
Entire Threads 500 179
Spike
Titles 242 46
Entire Threads 500 556
Spiking
Titles 19 9
Entire Threads 461 148
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Appendix 2: Coding
Externalizing Agency
Thread 3. “For the last 10 weeks I have been convinced that I have 
viewed/downloaded inappropriate pictures of children [...]”
“The intrusive thought then branches off [...]”
4. “I am a nurse and there are a number of patients I've convinced myself over the 
years I've harmed or even killed. As a newly qualified midwife, I became convinced 
that I'd [...]”
“I woke in the night, convinced that something terrible had happened.”
“Now I have become convinced I may have infected somone with HIV or hepatitis 
[...]”
8. Then I have intrusive thoughts like what if you deserve to hurt yourself and you are 
a bad person. I know that this are just thoughts but they bother me.”
9. “cant believe two weeks ago I was reasonably happy these thoughts wouldnt cross 
my mind, but now its 24/7 especially guilt, how do I stop these”.
“Firstly you need to stop trying to NOT have these thoughts. The more you fight a 
thought the more it is going to fight back harder. Your thoughts are NOT your 
WANTS you are not a molester, a bad man or someone who is going to hurt his child 
these are non invited intrusive thoughts that are not you and you are not something as 
a result of them. When the thoughts come and they will instead of thinking No, No No 
No let them come when they come and you accept that yeah this thought is horrible 
but you know what its not a concious effort for me to produce this thought it will lose 
it's power.”
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“I know this is hard and you have been told before... but you can't stop the thoughts... 
it's not the thoughts so much that are the problem because we ALL get random, 
strange, and sometimes disturbing thoughts even without having OCD. But it's the 
importance you attach to them and your reaction that makes the difference.”
“The first thing is to stop trying to "stop" the thoughts. It's the most natural thing to 
want do but the biggest mistake that we all make. Trying to stop the thoughts actually 
gives them reality and real meaning. The thought isn't the problem, it's your reaction 
to the thought that causes the problem. The thoughts are horrible, I really do know 
that....but you have to try and accept and understand that they are thoughts created by 
OCD, by an anxious mind....not by something that poses any threat to anyone. I really 
know how real the threat seems, but no-one is at risk or in danger from the thoughts 
you're having...apart from your own current well-being.”
II . “I have suffered pure ocd thoughts about parafillia, violence, sexual thoughts etc 
one after the other then more recently am i a lesbian, bisexual those thoughts then 
switched onto do i love him?”
“Don't "confess" these thoughts to your boyfriend. Tell him you are having a lot of 
anxiety and OCD thoughts, but there's nothing really to be gained by telling him what 
the thoughts are.”
13. “All of a sudden i could vision him standing next to my ex and i had to make a 
choice who i would choose to be with. This made me totally freak out, as i shouldnt 
have had this thought as i dont want to be with my ex. But deep down i keep 
questioning it and thinking "well what if i do really and im just supressing it"”
14. “i find it really hard to have sex because i get all upset when it gets to it cause my 
mind is telling me i dont want to sleep with him ,”
15. “have really bad intrussive thoughts and icons wich include my girlfriend.”
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“I have icons that she makes sex with her exes and this makes me very depressed 
anxious very jealous and it killes our very good sex life and mine sex drive.”
16. “These thoughts fill me with dread which upsets me so much, i just want to be 
normal.”
“Relax, these are normal anxiety feelings and they mask our true feelings, acting on 
our anxiety emotions can be dangerous, because regret only makes our anxieties 
worse later. Our true feelings are quiet, soft and tender, our anxious feelings are loud 
and overpowering, so its important to be calm to know what our true feelings are.”
“One thing i need to ask. My spikes are all at different levels! I could have 1 Spike 
and i can handle it and tell it to **** of, other spikes are bloady carzy, i cry about 
them, there soo convincing! andd make me extremely depressed! But how can i just 
brush them off??”
“It will only make you more miserable, because the harder you look for feelings, the 
more they're not going to be there.”
“Trust the fact that your OCD is switching gears and ride through the anxiety that all 
those thoughts give you. Don't engage with them, and they won't win.”
20. “However, sex at the minute is the only thing where the OCD thoughts still come 
into their own. Whenver we have sex, I start to panic and the anxious thoughts go 
mad. I think "oh my god that didn't turn me on... I'm so anxious... I obviously don't 
fancy him..." and I feel like crying. I have no sex drive. I don't know what to do about 
this.”
“(name), the techniques I really try are agreeing with the thoughts in a superficial kind 
of way- like "oh yeah, that's right, I don't love him. I'm gonna leave him" and actively 
telling myself that I will agree. I've found that when I do that, the thoughts give up 
almost straight away because I'm telling them I'm not going to argue with them. And I 
try and carry on my relationship exactly as normal. My thoughts were really bad when
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I moved in with him 6 months ago... but I still moved in with him, regardless, and I 
think that that actually helped my OCD. Some one on here once said (can't remember 
who it was) that there are no rights and wrongs, there are only choices... and 
ultimately we should make the choices and not let our OCD do that for us.”
“As for what I did, I mainly agreed with the thoughts, and actively said to myself I 
wasn't going to argue, I was going to live my life. Plus being really busy is a great 
distraction and I found they've faded with time, touch wood. Applying what I usually 
do to this, I think maybe the best thing for me to do when having sex would be to 
really concentrate on sexual thoughts and what we are doing, instead of trying to stop 
thoughts. It would probably increase my sex drive too!”
21. “Please help I don't know what's the matter I'm being really troubled by thoughts 
right now as always and I can't stop crying etc”
“All kinds of thoughts are coming into my head like seeing a picture of my friends cat 
and having horrible thoughts of what to do to it? [...] Last night I was with a friend of 
mine and the thought kept popping into my head throw the beer at him or even worse 
strike him one.”
“ive had really awful sad heart wrenching thoughts too, many many times and feel the
need to play it out and make myself as sad as i can,”
“Thank you for your reply it really means alot,I don't know how to handle this
anymore I really don'y the thoughts are really horrible”
23. “i really hate all these thoughts and i feel as if im really becoming them”
“Im unclear if these thoughts are dehabilitating at the moment because i dont feel 
100% but im definitely not as bad as i was, but i still get thoughts of hurting myself 
down there! Its everything dirty that I wouldnt ever want to do, its not me but im 
really struggling to just knock them out of my head and get on.”
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‘T would also appreciate advice on how to deal with the thoughts as ive got a lot of 
different ones coming in at the moment and im used to dealing with the one 
distressing thought xxxx”
25. “I get thoughts like that as well. While I was playing Crysis 2, I had this one 
thought of, "okay, if I can just get through this part without killing thw NPC's, then I'll 
stealth by the whole thing", now, this was during the middle of the mission and I had 
already killed some so I decided to use the Restart Checkpoint button and then 
decided to stealth through what I can to prevent killing the NPCs.”
Constructing OCD as an External Agent
Thread I. “I think it's the OCD blowing it out of proportion - you're latching onto 
things and making them into something they're not”.
“u know there is no meaning behind it...it just happened, its all in your mind and OCD 
is a battle of the mind...dont drag anyone else into this battle because u have the 
strength to beat it urself. The need to confess is all a part of ur OCD”.
“You are right about randomness of the mind. A normal mind does not dwell upon the 
random thoughts and quickly moves away from them, probably forgetting that the 
thought ever intruded on the brain. An OCD mind, which is very devious and 
scrupulous, latches on to a random thought, magnifies it, and interprets it as something 
bad”.
8. “I know deep down inside me that I haven't do anything wrong but somehow, I feel 
OCD is trying to put a twist on things by making this thought try and make me believe 
my teen learning experiences worse than what they were.”
9. “Now think of this is context of you, you are NOT the one constructing these 
images in your head OCD is so realize OCD is the bad one not you!”
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“The thoughts are horrible, I really do know that....but you have to try and accept and 
understand that they are thoughts created by OCD, by an anxious mind....not by 
something that poses any threat to anyone.”
“Hey (name) its still OCD what could happen is when one thought loses it's power the 
the thought changes again to get the anxiety levels up again. OCD is smart it knows 
how to push out buttons. Don't let it.”
“OCD can cause so many variations of distressing thoughts, when we're in a 
heightened state of anxiety (like you are) the thoughts go firing off in all sorts of 
directions, with all sorts of thoughts.”
10. “Although ocd may be playing a part people without ocd would still fill guilty”
“Im not blaming ocd for what i done for one second,and im also not saying i feel 
guilty justbecause i have ocd. I know i would be the same regardless.”
11. “My ocd keeps flipping from one thing to another i havent had a break since xmas, 
not even a day...theyve all been full of obsessions it's like i can't break the cycle and 
each obsessions seems as real as the other.
“The OCD runs wild, our anxiety goes through the roof and we get depressed and just 
want to sleep until the bad feelings have gone-“
“and you are feeling the need to tell him because you want his reassurance, which isn't 
helpful in the long-term as the OCD will come back in another way.”
“as much as possible try to see it all as OCD not you, its very hard when its so 
overwhelming though isn't it.”
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“I have been getting thoughts about my dog and being scared of accidently harming 
her I know its different circumstance but its both that tricky bloomin ocd, and I have 
tried not to avoid her, but yes its hard.”
12. “I am currently engaged to the most amazing girl i could ever wish for, which is 
why i think my ocd is plaging me so much.”
“Everytime im work my ocd just takes hold of me and i cant seem to shake it off.”
“I do have my good days, were i couldnt be happier with her and these are amazing. 
Why cant my ocd just leave me to be happy??”
13. “It makes you engage more as this is one of the most important things to you. 
OCD plays on this ! This is OCD, so when you get that feeling of panic, obsessing 
what to do, spending more time on it than normal, do another behaviour. I know its 
hard, i go through similar pain. Just tell yourself its OCD and carry on.”
“but because it felt real it must be true....?? vW , thats the ocd wanting a reaction, and 
the reasons we are being bombarded by the thoughts and doubts, is because we have 
ocd and it makes us so anxious ”
16. “Trust the fact that your OCD is switching gears and ride through the anxiety that 
all those thoughts give you. Don't engage with them, and they won't win.”
15. “but i fight with my ocd every day”
16. “So i know full well that any wedding of my own will be plagued by ROCD. I just 
want to enjoy life but feel its impossible!”
17. “I wish I knew how I stopped but unfortunately this was right before my hoed set 
in and when that happened looking at the photos just stopped as I had other things to 
obssess about.”
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18. “It (ROCD) makes me think all kinds of crazy things such as 
- 1 don't love my boyfriend
- 1 am only with him because I feel sorry for him 
- 1 would be happier on my own 
- 1 want to break up with him”
“I think ROCD masks all feelings and it is impossible to know sometimes what you 
truly think.”
19. “My problem is I've only been with my boyfriend a few months, and the ROCD 
struck within a month of us meeting, before any 'falling in love' etc occured on my 
part, so now I'm totally confused as to whether I'm just not feeling love for him 
because we're not right together, or because I'm obsessing about it etc.If you've been 
with your partner a long time and had r-ocd free times you know that you love them 
and have experienced those feelings but becuse my relationship is quite new I haven't 
had that so I don't know if these feelings of panic about not feeling right etc are 
because we're just not suited or because of the ocd.”
“R OCD is so random.”
20. “Third, what kinds of strategies did you employ to get through your HOCD and 
ROCD before? I have struggled with these as well, and I can assure you that the same 
strategies that you used to survive those two monsters can be used here as well. OCD 
may sound different each time it appears, but it is essential just a master of disguise 
who is always the same underneath its ever-changing exterior. #Fourth, it seems to 
me that your OCD is affecting sex precisely because sex is so important and you could 
not possibly bear to see it affected this way. Recognize that it is your OCD that is 
preying on you, and recognize that it is absolutely NOT any sort of commentary on 
your relationship.”
“Sixth, OCD has a way of being like a pair of glasses that distort the truth, and when 
you are looking through those glasses you need not believe what you see. Again, 
recognize that you are dealing with OCD, and choose (You can do it!) to discount the
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information it is feeding you. It is no secret agent of the mind who has top-secret 
information that has been repressed or squelched in some manner. Choose instead to 
focus on pleasing your partner like the article I sent you above says, and don't let 
yourself be boggled by inconsistencies and even failures. You're human, and 
gloriously so. Now go and live, and teach that OCD who's boss. © ”
21. “Fts part of the ocd unfortunately and it is awful, it always get you were it will 
hurt most,”
22. “And (OCD) makes you not do things and having an eating disorder annorexia or 
obesity can make you feel similar to the ways in which ocd makes you feel as the 
symptoms are really similar!”
“Never under-estimate the OCD Beast
“The suicide thoughts are very common OCD thoughts....but in typical form, they 
transform as well. We've learned about OCD, we know that these type of thoughts are 
quite common and dismiss them...so then the OCD mind goes and ups the ante with a 
"Yeah, but....it's alright you labelling this as OCD but what if you were depressed, 
then you might do something stupid." It's just another "What I f  question that OCD
throws at us. I appreciate how scary it is I've had this myself. I think it's just
another sort of self-sabotage that OCD is expert in.”
25. “Okay, so I love, love, love gaming. It helps me to relax from all of this anxiety 
that OCD brings. But what happens when OCD comes into gaming? I obviously bring 
the anxiety with me into gaming and start thinking all sorts of things.”
“Like, I also want to point out there that I believe a bit in relgion and think (or my 
OCD thinks) that playing violent video games or video games that have "hell-like" 
figures in them will bring me to Hell. Now, this can get annoying as many games out 
there are violent.”
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“All i can suggest is play, play, play all the more! Don't let your ocd/anxiety come 
between you and one of the activities you enjoy doing. Take that risk of being BAD 
and carry on gaming © ”
Orienting to Dilemmatic Binaries
Thread 2. at first i thought maybe it was my ocd and now i thuink i just deserve to 
suffer for what i did”.
4. “But I don't know how much of this is OCD and what is real.”
“To me, a fellow responsibility OCD'er, it sounds obvious to me that your situation is 
definitely OCD and not reality.”
“Just reading your post, is was very evident to me that it is laced with OCD... An 
OCD'ers imagination is oftentimes stronger than the truth.”
“Listen to me, it is OCD”
12. “Does this sound like a OCD worry?”
13. “i guess im asking cos i know deep down it is OCD. Its such a dicy theme for me 
as its not just about me. It gives it more sense of realism. If that makes sense?”
‘but because it felt real it must be true....??
14. “these feelings feel so real i am currently having therapy but i have felt like this 
for a year now and i am not willing to give up i just want some answers of what am i 
going through cause i want to feel that excitement and the full love in the relationship 
again i have always worried since i can remember about everything”
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16. “What i really cant get my head round is if it feels so real, how can i be sure its 
not??”
“The thought of it being real and me having to upset him by finishing it makes me feel 
sick!!!!”
18. “The main problem for me is that I don't think I even have ROCD and I think I 
actually feel these things.”
19. “I find it impossible to differentiate between the real feelings and the obsessing, so 
it's like I'm trapped.”
21. “I think it's the Ocd don't know if that's bad or not.”
22. “So you see I'm asking is this OCD? I wanted to know so when I say to myself to 
ignore this and that its OCD I genuinely know this is another symptom of this which 
strangely is made worse because my sinuses and ears are blocked and I can't hear
100% does that make sense to anyone or am I being a freak I w
“I think the question you have asked is a very good question. Because i would muddle 
up non ocd days with ocd days and then make more days into ocd days!”
25. “If it's a religious view, you need to change that view, cuz gaming is great Ô  If it's 
ocd, threat it like ocd, meaning don't do the compulsion (restarting a game for 
example) and keep playing with the anxiety. Don't avoid gaming because of fear and 
respond in the right way (accept and move on © ).”
“But, if it is OCD, which I honestly feel like it's a mixture of religious perspective and 
OCD, maybe I can calm it down a bit. “
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Abnormalising subjective experience
Thread 1. “And I am talking about things that, to the logical mind, are not really a 
huge deal...”
“I am not at all attracted to her so it’s not like I am dealing with unrequited love or 
something, I just feel terribly guilty for having touched myself thinking about her, 
even though nobody got hurt or whatever. Maybe I did it because I feel safe around 
her? Who knows, in any event she really doesn’t arouse me. It's not as though I am 
now afraid that I am in love with her and will try to make advances on her,”
8. “I know deep down inside me that I haven't do anything wrong but somehow, I feel 
OCD is trying to put a twist on things by making this thought try and make me believe 
my teen learning experiences worse than what they were.”
“I feel like I'm in another universe sometimes and once again I am being held back by 
something completely irrelevant, which is a personal and private thing and something 
I know hasn't affected anyone in any way as this thought only occured whilst I was on 
my own. In fact, it's something I haven't even thought about in my life until this 
week!”
11. “I feel like everything he does winds me and i can't cope, i feel like im going to 
loose control and tell him to stop it and he isnt even doing anything bad, but the 
tinyest thing or word he says sends me into panick alert...the thing is nothings really 
changed from before when things were normal he still does the things he always has, 
he loves me so much and I could never find such a kind hearted guy and we've always 
had this amazing connection. We Never argue, he's been my rock throughout this 
tough year and has stood by my side the whole way and it was only a month or so ago 
i was saying i never want to loose you and he assured me i wouldnt. Now this is all 
flipped and I want to run a mile.”
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“Even if i ended the relationship i know it wouldn’t solve anything? There is no reason 
to end it apart from this horrible feeling and me turning into a total b***h with him 
because he can’t do anything right.”
13. “This made me totally freak out, as i shouldnt have had this thought as i dont want 
to be with my ex. But deep down i keep questioning it and thinking "well what if i do 
really and im just supressing it"”
14. “i got into a relationship that has lastest 22 months , at the beggining of the 
relationship it was perfect the only that wasnt was me because i had some trust issues 
but no reason to have them ata ll. anyway 6 months into the relationship i was on the 
way to his around about an hour of being at his i burst into tears i didnt know why i 
was crying i didnt stop crying for two days till i calmed down , my partner was crying 
to as he thought i didnt love him anymore which was silly because nothing went 
wrong for me to fall out of love i belive there has to reason which there wasnt ever 
since he sed that i cant get it out of my head .anyway a year on and i am still feeling 
not my self my mind keeps saying i dont love my boyfriend or hes not the one , or hes 
not attractive but deep down i love him and hes the most gorgeous man ive ever m e t, 
we are perfect together and he has never hurt me in any way.”
15. “I must say tha i am with her 5 months now and she is 24 very pretty low profile 
very good haracter she loves me a lot and she never gaves me a reason to be jealous. I 
dont know her exes at all so my thoughts are very irrational and allogical. I try to not 
give so much meaning to this thought and to ignore sometimes i win sometimes not. It 
destroyes my relationship.”
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Appendix 3: Social Science and Medicine’s Guidelines for Qualitative Papers
There is no one qualitative method, but rather a number of research approaches which 
fall under the umbrella of ‘qualitative methods’. The various social science disciplines 
tend to have different conventions on best practice in qualitative research. However 
SS&M has prepared the following general guidance for the writing and assessment of 
papers which present qualitative data (either alone or in combination with quantitative 
methods). General principles of good practice for all research will also apply.
Fitness for purpose
Are the methods of the research appropriate to the nature of the question(s) being 
asked, i.e.
• Does the research seek to understand social processes or social structures &/or 
to illuminate subjective experiences or meanings?
• Are the settings, groups or individuals being examined of a type which cannot 
be pre-selected, or the possible outcomes not specified (or hypothesised) in 
advance?
Methodology and methods
• All papers must include a dedicated methods section which specifies, as 
appropriate, the sample recruitment strategy, sample size, and analytical 
strategy.
Principles of selection
Qualitative research is often based on or includes non-probability sampling. The 
unit(s) of research may include one or a combination of people, events, institutions, 
samples of natural behaviour, conversations, written and visual material, etc.
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• The selection of these should be theoretically justified e.g. it should be made 
clear how respondents were selected
• There should be a rationale for the sources of the data (e.g 
respondents/participants, settings, documents)
• Consideration should be given to whether the sources of data (e.g people, 
organisations, documents) were unusual in some important way
• Any limitations of the data should be discussed (such as non response, refusal 
to take part)
The research process
In most papers there should be consideration of
• The access process
• How data were collected and recorded
• Who collected the data
• When the data were collected
• How the research was explained to respondents/participants
Research ethics
• Details of formal ethical approval (i.e. IRB, Research Ethics Committee) 
should be stated in the main body of the paper. If authors were not required to 
obtain ethical approval (as is the case in some countries) or unable to obtain 
attain ethical approval (as sometimes occurs in resource-poor settings) they 
should explain this. Please anonymise this information as appropriate in the 
manuscript, and give the information when asked during submission.
• Procedures for securing informed consent should be provided
Any ethical concerns that arose during the research should be discussed.
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Analysis
The process of analysis should be made as transparent as possible (notwithstanding 
the conceptual and theoretical creativity that typically characterises qualitative 
research). For example
• How was the analysis conducted
How were themes, concepts and categories generated from the data 
■ Whether analysis was computer assisted (and, if so, how)
Who was involved in the analysis and in what manner
• Assurance of analytic rigour. For example 
Steps taken to guard against selectivity in the use of data 
Triangulation 
Inter-rater reliability 
Member and expert checking
The researcher’s own position should clearly be stated. For example, 
have they examined their own role, possible bias, and influence on the 
research (reflexivity)?
Presentation of findings 
Consideration of context
The research should be clearly contextualised. For example
• Relevant information about the settings and respondents/participants should be 
supplied
• The phenomena under study should be integrated into their social context 
(rather than being abstracted or de-contextualised)
• Any particular/unique influences should be identified and discussed
Presentation of data:
• Quotations, field notes, and other data where appropriate should be identified 
in a way which enables the reader to judge the range of evidence being used
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• Distinctions between the data and their interpretation should be clear
• The iteration between data and explanations of the data (theory generation) 
should be clear
• Sufficient original evidence should be presented to satisfy the reader of the 
relationship between the evidence and the conclusions (validity)
• There should be adequate consideration of cases or evidence which might 
refute the conclusions
Amended February 2010
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Year 3: An experimental manipulation of self-ambivalence: its 
impact on checking behaviours
Nikolaos Tsigaras^
^University of Surrey
*Requests for reprints should be addressed to Nikolaos Tsigaras, Department of Psychology, 
University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, United Kingdom 
(n.tsigaras@hotmail.co.uk).
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Abstract
Background and Objectives. Self-evaluation has been considered to be a potential 
causal factor in the genesis of Obsessive Compulsive (OC) phenomena. Recent 
correlational research has amplified the specificity of these findings by implicating a 
threat to valued self-domains, such as morality and competence. Simultaneously, the 
construct of ‘self-ambivalence’ has recently been put forward to explain the specific 
self-vulnerability that may account for OC phenomena. Self-ambivalence refers to the 
coexistence of conflicting beliefs about the lovability, worth and morality of the self, 
as well as a preoccupation with establishing these. Social psychological studies have 
shown that higher self-ambivalence predicted a more negative self-evaluation in 
response to self-relevant positive or negative events. The proposed study investigates 
the impact of manipulating self-ambivalence within the domains of morality and 
competence on the specific OC phenomenon of checking.
Method. Twenty one participants (female=15) were recruited from the University of 
Surrey, UK, as well as from personal contacts of the author. Participants undertook a 
two stage task. They were initially exposed to a driving simulator which run a script 
that was designed to leave participants in doubt about having caused an accident. 
Three different conditions were involved. In the two experimental conditions, the 
participants were primed to consider driving as either a morally or competence laden 
activity. In the control condition participants were primed to attribute their 
performance to poor road conditions. It was hypothesized that the possibility of 
having caused harm would activate participants’ self-ambivalence on the domains of 
morality and competence in the two experimental conditions. The second task was a 
sorting paradigm designed to capture checking. Three dependent variables were 
measured: number of instances of checking behaviours (perseveration), time taken to 
complete the task and self-report of confidence in performance.
Results. Perseveration in the morality condition was significantly higher than the 
control. Perseveration in the competence condition did not differ from either of the 
other two conditions. A trend was also identified where time taken was higher in the
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morality condition, but was not significantly so. There was almost no variation in the 
self-report of performance across the three conditions.
Limitations. The study was conducted on a small population that consisted almost 
entirely of doctoral psychology students. Additionally, the three conditions were not 
equal in numbers, with the morality condition having the fewest participants.
Conclusions. The findings that self-relevant events can likely affect an OC 
phenomenon resonate with existing research. The implications of self-ambivalence 
being implicated as a potential factor in OC checking, as well as threats to participants 
morality as activating more checking behaviours are discussed in the light of relevant 
findings. Further research suggestions are made as well as tentative clinical 
recommendations.
170
Introduction
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is a complex and debilitating form of 
psychological distress, characterized by repeated intrusive and distressing thoughts, 
images or impulses (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). These are referred to as obsessions 
and they are of sufficient severity that they cause considerable distress either by being 
time-consuming or by the levels of affective strain they cause to the sufferer 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Compulsions are actions, either motor (e.g. 
checking) or mental (e.g. counting) aimed at neutralizing the distress caused by the 
obsessions. Obsessional content can be highly idiosyncratic and is shaped by the 
individual’s personal experiences, as well as the socio-cultural context they occupy 
(Clark, 2004; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980).
Cognitive models (Beck, 1976) of OCD are relatively recent, but have been 
progressively influential in its treatment (see Foa & Stekestee, 2002 for a review). 
Salkovskis (1985) originally conceptualized OCD in a way that came to be known as 
the ‘appraisal-belief model’. Intrusive thoughts, images or impulses occur to 
nonclinical populations (Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984), 
but the misinterpretation of these by people with OCD leads to the development and 
maintenance of the disorder (Rachman, 1997; 1998, Salkovskis, 1985). Salkovskis 
(1985) argued that the likelihood of an intrusive thought becoming an obsession was 
contingent on the individual’s belief that they would be personally responsible for 
preventing the harm that the thought related to. As a result the individual would be 
more likely to engage in compulsions in order to prevent the feared outcome. To 
accommodate the clinical finding that not all OCD patients were worried about 
consequences, Salkovskis (1989) extended the term responsibility to involve 
responsibility about maintaining one’s own safety and self-worth.
Developing this perspective of inflated personal responsibility further, Rachman 
(1997, 1998) argued that intrusive thoughts mutate into obsessions if they are 
misinterpreted as revealing negative aspects of one’s personality that one has been 
unaware of, such as that one is out of control, evil, immoral, or harmful. As in 
Salkovskis’ perspective, it is the high personal significance of the intrusions that
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explains the transition into obsessions. Bhar and Kyrios (2007) subsequently reviewed 
three recent studies about the importance of self-evaluation in the generation of 
obsessions and compulsions. Rowa and colleagues (Rowa & Purdon, 2003; Rowa et 
al., 2005) found that intrusions were distressing if they specifically threatened one’s 
valued self-perceptions. Frerrier and Brewin (2005), in accordance with Rachman, 
also found that for people with OCD, intrusions result in significantly more negative 
self-evaluations than anxious controls. Additionally, OCD sufferers are more likely to 
interpret intrusions as indicating that they are a danger to both themselves and others. 
Ehntholt and colleagues (1999) also conducted a study investigating self-worth in 
individuals with OCD, people with other anxiety disorders, and normal controls. By 
coding self-worth, they found that participants with OCD were more likely to link 
their self-worth to other people and their relationships than were participants in the 
anxious group. Participants with OCD considered that others would be critical and 
judgemental as a result of the harm they feared inflicting. Conversely, the anxious and 
normal controls expected other people’s responses to be more lenient in the same 
event.
Within this framework, compulsions can be understood to be employed as a counter­
measure to the obsessions in order to neutralize the negative self-evaluations. 
However, people with OCD actually maintain and even exacerbate the frequency and 
appraisal of the intrusions, by relying on strategies such as thought suppression and a 
range of compulsive activities (Clark & Beck, 2010; Salkovskis, 1985).
Negative self-evaluation in specific self-domains
Recent research explores the relationship between self-evaluation and OC phenomena 
in more detail. Doron and Kyrios (2005) reviewed the literature on self-evaluation and 
proposed that thoughts or events that challenge highly valued self-domains may 
negatively affect a person’s self-worth. This can consequently lead a person to have 
thoughts and actions aimed at the threat, compensating for the perceived injuries. This 
statement in our view brings together both Salkovskis’ view about consequences and 
Ranchman’s view about self-evaluation. In a recent correlational study by Doron,
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Kyrios, and Moulding (2007), it was found that young adults who reported higher 
sensitivity to self-domains of morality, social acceptability, and job/school 
competence were more likely to report OCD-related cognitions and symptoms. In 
another correlational study, Doron et al. (2008), extending the findings to a clinical 
population, discovered that individuals with OCD reported higher levels of sensitivity 
in the self-domains of morality and job competence than individuals with other 
anxiety disorders. From a social psychological perspective too, most modem person 
perception models emphasise competence and morality as valued self-domains in 
oneself and others (but see Leach et al. 2007, for a view of morality as more basic). 
However, as Doron et al. (2012) point out
“(I)t is unlikely that every person experiencing an aversive event that 
challenges such self-domains will be flooded by negative self-evaluations, 
non-adaptive beliefs, and obsessions. Formost people, experiences challenging 
sensitive self-domainswould result in the activation of distress-regulation 
strategies that can dissipate unwanted intrusions, reaffirm the challenged self, 
and restore emotional composure (p. 166).”
Self-ambivalence
Kyrios and colleagues have proposed the construct of self-ambivalence as an 
exploratory cause of OC phenomena. They base their research on Guidano and 
Liotti’s (1983) cognitive theory and define self-ambivalence as:
“(T)he presence of conflicting beliefs about self-characteristics (e.g., I am 
moral and I am immoral), uncertainty about self-worth, and a preoccupation 
with establishing the “ tmth” about one’s moral standing, lovability and self- 
worth. Guidano and Liotti argue that individuals prone to obsessionality 
(including OCD phenomena and obsessive compulsive personality traits) have 
highly ambivalent beliefs about their self-worth, and in particular about their 
moral virtue and lovability (Bhar & Kyrios, 2007, p. 1847).”
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and
“Having high levels of self-ambivalence does not mean that someone believes 
they have little worth, a concept more closely related to self-evaluation. 
Rather, it means that they are not sure whether they are a “worthy” person, and 
as a result they become vigilant in searching the environment or their own 
experiences for evidence for or against their worthiness, concepts more closely 
aligned with notions of self-structure and process (Frost, Kyrios et al., 2007, 
p.233).”
Guidano and Liotti’s position is particularly valuable as an integrative view, being a 
reformulation of Freud’s influential views on obsessional neurosis (1894, 1896) and 
particularly his well-known single case study of Ernst Lanzer (Freud, 1914). Freud 
had clinically implicated an ambivalent evaluation of both the self and other to the 
common obsessive compulsive phenomenon of checking during the psychotherapy of 
this patient.
In order to test whether self-ambivalence was correlated to OCD phenomena, Bhar 
and Kyrios (2007) devised a self-report questionnaire that captured self-ambivalence, 
and conducted a study comparing people with a diagnosis of OCD, anxious controls, 
and community controls. They found that OCD participants were significantly more 
ambivalent than the non-clinical groups, but did not differ from anxious controls. Bhar 
and Kyrios suggested that there may have been the possibility of a sampling problem 
because both groups showed equally strong OCD beliefs. As such, the authors 
concluded that self-ambivalence may not be specific to OCD, but it is at least relevant. 
Additionally, as these authors note, their correlational study does not establish that 
self-ambivalence is the cause of OCD phenomena and beliefs. These authors have 
subsequently only extended this research to hoarding. Frost, Kyrios, McCarthy, and 
Mathews (2007) investigated the relationship between self-ambivalence and hoarding 
in a nonclinical population of undergraduate students. Their results indicated that self- 
ambivalence was correlated with materialism, compulsive hoarding, and compulsive 
buying after controlling for depression and indecisiveness.
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Eliciting self-ambivalence
In this study we heed Rachman’s advice who warns against “staying too long in the 
purgatory of correlational analysis and suggests moving up the causal ladder to where 
connections may be clearer (O’Connor & Aardema’, 2007 p .181)”. We believe that a 
causal relationship between self-ambivalence and OCD phenomena can be 
demonstrated by experimentally manipulating self-ambivalence. That is, we 
hypothesize that the misinterpretation of normal intrusions and the resulting negative 
self-evaluation can be explained by assuming the existence of the construct of self­
ambivalence. There is some additional evidence to suggest that self-ambivalence can 
be successfully manipulated in the laboratory and that it is in fact related to self- 
evaluation. Riketta and Ziegler (2007), writing from a social psychological 
perspective, investigated how self-evaluation changes in response to self-relevant 
positive or negative events and found that higher (elicited) self-ambivalence predicted 
more negative self-evaluation. Their research was based on attitude ambivalence and 
the ambivalence amplification hypothesis (Katz, 1981). With respect to the latter, they 
reviewed evidence that self-ambivalence could be amplified by involving participants 
in a success or failure task. They measured self-ambivalence before the task and found 
that the failure condition was more related to negative self-evaluations captured 
through self-report after the completion of the task. Because self-esteem is related to 
negative self-evaluation they clarified that self-ambivalence exerted its influence on 
self-evaluation even when global self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965) was controlled for. 
The OC phenomenon of interest in this study is checking.
Checking as an OC phenomenon in experimental research
Checking is one of the most common compulsive solutions to obsessions (e.g. Clark, 
2004). A number of authors have used paradigms that capture checking, but 
investigated the phenomenon’s relationship to responsibility rather than self- 
evaluation. They demonstrated that induction of responsibility in non-patients also 
leads to an increase in OCD-like behaviours compared to control conditions. For 
example, Ladouceur and colleagues (Ladouceur et al., 1995; 1997) designed a much
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replicated paradigm to capture perseveration using a pill sorting task. Their 
independent variable was level of responsibility, which was either high or low. Their 
results indieated, amongst other findings, that participants in the high responsibility 
group displayed more checking behaviours. Bouchard, Rhe'aume and Ladouceur 
(1999) involved two groups of participants, moderate, and high in perfectionism in 
two conditions where responsibility was manipulated (high and low). Their results 
indicated that both groups displayed more checking, assessed using Ladouceur et al’s 
paradigm (1995; 1996), in the high responsibility condition.
Finally, more reeently, Amtz et al. (2007) experimentally manipulated responsibility 
by involving participants with OCD, anxious controls, and non-anxious controls in a 
high and low responsibility condition. These authors also used a pill sorting task based 
on Ladouceur et al.’s (1995; 1996) paradigm to capture checking. They found that 
participants with OCD demonstrated higher checking behaviours in the high 
responsibility eondition.
The phenomenon of checking has therefore primarily been tested in the context of 
responsibility. The relationship between beliefs around responsibility and valued self­
domains such as morality or competence has not yet been investigated. However, in 
the work cited above, responsibility is linked with perceived consequences for other 
persons that are contingent on the partieipant’s performance in the task. It is possible 
that morality and competence as valued domains are broader constructs as they entail 
fundamental beliefs about the self. In this study the outcome of performance will be 
related to basic judgements about the self rather than perceived consequences of its 
actions.
Aim of the study
Bhar and Kyrios’ (2007) have made a significant contribution by bringing Guidano 
and Liotti’s work to the foreground of eontemporary empirieal research. This study 
follows their work and involved three conditions in a two stage experiment. In the first 
stage participants underwent a task that was designed to leave them in doubt about
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their performance. In the control conditions participants were expected to attribute 
their negative performance to the environment. However, in the two experimental 
conditions they were expeeted to attribute their negative performance to two different 
self-domains: morality and competence.
The use of the driving paradigm in OCD is a novel idea and is ideal for a number of 
reasons. Driving is an important activity in the UK and it constitutes a significant part 
of people’s lives and it could be therefore considered an activity that can easily be 
imbued with importance of different self-domains. Driving is also an activity that can 
be quite risky and can have severe consequenees. Additionally, for those OCD 
patients that are worried about harming others, driving related harm such as road 
traffic accidents are a common concern (Clark, 2004). Clinieally, patients report worry 
over having eaused an aecident, but remain ambivalent about the possibility of having 
done so. As a result they have to check repeatedly that this has not been the case. In 
Guidano and Liotti’s thinking, the ambivalence about having caused an aceident 
would be seen as resulting in activating ambivalence about one’s own self-worth. 
Guidano and Liotti would suggest that the patients’ concern is implicitly about their 
morality or lovability.
We then hypothesized that participants in the experimental conditions would exhibit 
more of an OCD behaviour, perseveration or checking. We adapted some of the 
principles of Ladouceur et al’s (1995; 1996) paradigm in a photograph sorting task. 
The use of nonclinieal controls is usual in experimental research in OCD based on 
theoretical work (Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984). As 
mentioned above, it has been shown that manipulating a hypothesized OC cause 
(responsibility and perfectionism) on nonclinieal controls increases checking 
behaviours (Ladouceur et ah, 1995; Ladouceur, Rhe'aume, & Aublet, 1997; Mancini, 
D’Olimpio, & Cieri, 2004).
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Figure 1: Graphie depiction of experimental manipulation
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Method 
Participants
Twenty one participants were recruited from a doctoral course at the psychology 
department at the University of Surrey (N=19), as well as the authors’ personal 
contacts (N=2). Six of the participants were male and fifteen were female. Invitation 
involved circulating an advertisement sheet through email and by direct personal 
contact. There were a number of exclusion criteria in this study, particularly due to the 
nature of the driving simulator, and the possibility of experiencing motion sickness. 
Firstly potential participants were advised that they would be exposed to information 
related to road traffic accidents and their consequences, and that this could be 
upsetting. It was emphasized that this was more likely to be so if themselves or a 
person close to them had been involved in a road traffic accident. Secondarily because 
of the nature of the driving simulator, potential participants were advised not to 
participate in this study if they had a history of motion sickness; or were worried 
about feeling nauseous or being sick; or if they were continuing to experience the 
physical or psychological effects of a road traffic accident. They were also advised not 
to take part if they were fatigued, had a hangover, an upset stomach, a head cold, an 
ear infection or blockage, an upper respiratory illness, were pregnant, or had recently 
taken medication or alcohol. They were told that with the exception of pregnancy, it 
would be possible they could take part again once these issues were resolved. Because 
of the use of deception, potential participants that had diagnosed or undiagnosed OCD 
could not be warned, so special attention was paid during the debriefing to address 
this possibility. Participants that did not meet the exclusion criteria were given a time 
to participate.
Materials & Procedure
The study was advertised as an invitation to participate in a research that uses the 
University’s driving simulator to see how people perform on different routes. We 
suggested that we hoped the data from this study would be useful in developing
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greater understanding of driver performance in different situations in order to inform 
interventions to help reduce the occurrence of road traffic accidents. We explained 
that volunteers will be invited to take part in three driving related tasks.
The study involved a between participants design, with three conditions, and three 
dependent variables. The independent variable was the manipulation of self­
ambivalence, and involved one control and two experimental conditions (morality and 
competence). The first dependent variable was a behavioural index of doubt, captured 
in the second stage of the experiment by perseveration. The second dependent variable 
was time taken to complete the post-simulator task. The third dependent variable was 
a self-reported rating of confidence in performance in the post simulator task.
Participants were initially welcomed to a small reception room and seated at a table 
with the experimenter to go through the study’s documents. They were initially given 
an information sheet as in standard practice; however the information sheet was part 
of the experimental manipulation. Firstly, we had included a paragraph which detailed 
the consequences of road traffic accidents for physical and mental health. We 
anticipated that this would highlight these in the participants’ mind:
In this study, we are using the driving simulator to see how people perform on 
different routes. We hope the data from this study will be useful in developing greater 
understanding of driver performance in different situations in order to inform 
interventions to help reduce the occurrence of road traffic accidents. Careless driving 
can lead to the death or serious injury of pedestrians, other road users, the driver and 
his/her passengers. In June 2011, the Department of Transport reported that 24,560 
people were killed or seriously injured on roads in the UK. The driver and passengers 
can sustain traumatic abrasion and crush injuries either from being thrown forward 
inside the vehicle or from being thrown from the moving vehicle onto the road. 
Pedestrians and other vulnerable road users, such as pedal cyclists, can sustain 
primary traumatic injuries from being struck by the moving vehicle, and secondary 
traumatic injuries from the force of hitting the road surface following contact with a 
moving vehicle. In a third of fatal road traffic accidents, death does not occur 
immediately but some weeks later due to infection, a blood clot or multiple organ
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failure. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, a potentially disabling psychiatric condition, 
is also common in people who have survived or witnessed a serious road traffic 
accident. This disorder produces flashbacks, nightmares, anxiety and depression. 
Given the consequences of careless driving, studies of driver performance are 
essential.
The next piece of information varied according to condition and the purpose was to 
introduce a priming effect on the participants. Driving was therefore presented as 
either a morally or competence laden activity for the experimental conditions. We 
would expect participants to experience doubt about their performance and 
hypothesize that they would experience ambivalence about their worth in the specific 
self-relevant domain. However, that would not be the case for the control condition.
Morality condition
Research shows that safe drivers (i.e. those who have fewer accidents, observe speed 
limits and other rules of the road) are those who score high on measures of ‘driver 
social responsibility’. ‘Socially responsible drivers’ are those who believe that the 
protection of other road users is their duty. A person with high ‘driver social 
responsibility’ is conscientious and feels responsible for the welfare and safety of 
others and consequently is much less likely to get involved in a road accident. 
Furthermore, socially responsible drivers also show higher levels of personal moral 
characteristics such as honesty, sincerity, integrity and trustworthiness in other areas 
of life. Research suggests that road deaths could be halved if everyone drove like the 
most social responsible drivers.
Competence condition
Research shows that safe drivers (i.e. those who have fewer accidents, observe speed 
limits and other rules of the road) are those who score high on measures of ‘driver 
competence’. Competent drivers are those who possess skill in handling and 
positioning a vehicle. A person with high ‘driver competence’ anticipates risks, and 
responds quickly, both physically and cognitively, to unexpected situations, and 
consequently is much less likely to get involved in a road accident. Furthermore, 
competent drivers also use their cognitive functions more effectively than other people
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to exercise judgement, planning and behavioural control in other areas of life. 
Research suggests that road deaths could be halved if everyone drove like the most 
competent drivers.
Control or Self-neutral condition
Research shows that some road environments are safer than others. In other words, in 
some environments fewer accidents occur, and people find it easier to observe speed 
limits and other rules of the road. Safe roads are easier to drive on carefully because 
they make fewer demands on the driver. On unsafe roads, it is harder for everyone to 
anticipate risks, to respond to hazards, and all drivers are more likely to put 
themselves and others at risk in such environments. Consequently everyone is more 
likely to get involved in a road accident in an unsafe environment. Research suggests 
that road deaths could be halved if all driving environments could be made safe.
To underscore the purpose of the study participants were also given one of three 
things in the detailed description of what the study entailed:
a. Your performance in this test will be a good indication of the extent to 
which you are a socially responsible driver or not (morality condition).
b. Your performance in this test will be a good indication of the extent to 
which you are a competent driver or not (competence condition).
c. Your performance in this test will help us to figure out which kinds of 
driving environment are safe for everybody and which are unsafe for 
everybody (control condition).
Trial Simulation. Participants then signed consent forms and completed demographic 
background forms. They were told that they would take part firstly in a brief (5 to 7 
minute) simulation to familiarise themselves with the simulator and establish whether 
they would experience any symptoms of motion sickness. Additionally, this aimed to 
establish driving behaviours that would ensure the success of the experimental 
manipulation such as driving on the left hand lane and using the mirrors (see below).
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Driving Simulation. Following this, participants undertook the main simulation which 
lasted between 10 and 15 minutes. The nature and function of this simulation was to 
introduce doubt about the participant’s ability to be a safe driver. This was achieved 
by creating ambiguity about whether the participant had caused an accident. This is a 
common concrete fear of people with OCD and so is a good OCD analogue. We had 
developed a scenario in which the participant had to overtake a cyclist, but the task 
was made incredibly difficult because a stream of traffic is overtaking the driver at the 
point at which the driver needs to overtake the cyclist.
The simulation was designed in a way that strengthened ambiguity. Firstly, we 
deactivated the collision alarms and explained that the simulation does not stop if 
there is an accident. As a result the participant would not be able to tell if they had hit 
the cyclist or the overtaking cars. In fact when having an accident, the car went 
through other vehicles. Secondly, after the participant had overtaken the cyclist, we 
had removed feedback from the mirrors so that the participant could no longer see the 
cyclist. This was unlike other vehicles which could be seen in the mirrors after they 
had been overtaken. In this simulation checking the mirrors resulted in ambiguous 
feedback about what has happened. The driver’s face was also video recorded so 
playback of the recording can ascertain that the participant did indeed look at the 
mirrors after having overtaken the cyclist. The crucial scenario happened in the latter 
third of the drive. The whole simulation lasted 10-15 minutes. From piloting this study 
we discovered that volunteers naïve to the study were unsure whether they had hit the 
cyclist. They either offered this feedback voluntarily, or when asked about how they 
found the simulation.
Post Simulation Questionnaire. Following completion of this task, participants were 
asked to complete a number of post-simulator questions. The questions in this 
segment aimed to target self-perceived performance and crucially, to establish 
whether induction of doubt was successful. This was established in the last item (9). 
However, a number of other questions were introduced in order to assess predicted 
effects of the experimental manipulation. Questions 1 and 3 were neutral distractors:
For each set of statements, please check ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.
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1 .1 thought that the simulation was realistic.
2 .1 drove in a way that might have put someone at risk.
3 .1 found it difficult to handle and to position the vehicle.
4. This was a safe driving environment.
5 .1 feel happy about the quality of my performance in the simulation
6 .1 showed that I was a conscientious driver through my performance today.
7 .1 anticipated hazards and avoided them well.
8. This was a difficult driving environment that would challenge anyone.
9. None of my actions resulted in an accident in the simulation.
Post Simulator Task. Participants were then asked to take part in a post simulation 
task. They were seated at a desk and were instructed that they would be shown a series 
of stills taken from a standard hazard perception task which they would have to sort 
into three different piles, according to the nature of the hazard present. Participants 
were asked to take this task as seriously as if they were being examined in an actual 
driving test. Participants were told that they would be timed and video recorded.
We recorded the following variables which we hypothesized represented 
perseveration or checking. Compulsive preservation is an obsessive compulsive 
behaviour. The first variable was ‘instances of checking’ and was captured by i) times 
the participant hesitated before laying the photograph into a sorter. Hesitation was 
considered to be any pause lasting more than 2 seconds ii) changes in direction and 
placing the photograph in a different sorter than the original trajectory suggested, iii) 
times the participant returned to a still previously sorted and picked it up/and or 
moved it to another sorter and iv) d) voicing doubt about the nature of the hazard. The 
second variable was overall time spent in the task. The third variable was confidence 
in performance and was assessed in a 1-10 scale administered after the task.
We hypothesize that participants in the two experimental conditions would check 
more often, would take more time to complete the task, and would report lower
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confidence in their performance. We hypothesized that this will be the result of their 
self-ambivalence having been activated due to their performance in the first task.
Ethical considerations
Because this study involves the use of deception particular attention was paid to 
debriefing. Participants’ performance was normalised and they were told that it would 
have been impossible for anyone to not have doubts about having caused an accident. 
The crucial aspect about the debrief was that if participants had personally found the 
task hard or they doubted, this was likely due to the fact that they have just taken part 
in a simulation in which they were deliberately made to doubt their performance, 
regardless of condition. However, for those who were told that driving was related to 
with their morality or competence, this doubt was hypothesised to be stronger.
Analysis and results
Descriptive statistics are presented in table 1.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Control
Condition
Morality Competence
Perseveration
Mean
1188
SD
1.25
Mean SD 
6.50 2.26
Mean SD 
3.86 3.02
Time 164.38 50.52 223.33 64.87 184.29 87.69
Performance 6.63 1.19 6.33 1.2 6.71 2.14
SD=Standard deviation, Perseveration=number of instances, Time=seconds, Perfonnance=l out o f 10 rating
19 of 21 participants answered ‘No’ to question 9, that is whether “None of their 
actions had caused an accident”. This was the question that established whether the 
experimental manipulation had likely been successful. However, we decided to 
provisionally include them in the analysis; from informal observations during the 
running of the study, we had become curious whether there might be a discrepancy 
between objective measures and self-report (also DVl and DV2 vs DV3).
A Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was run with Condition (control, 
morality & competence) as the independent variable and perseveration, time taken to
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complete the post simulator task (time), and self-rating of confidence on performance 
(performance) as the dependent variables.
Analysis was performed using SPSS for Windows 19. The data were tested for 
normality using Shapiro-Wilks statistic and dependent variables were found to be 
normally distributed across all three conditions. Using Roy’s largest root, there was a 
significant effect of condition on perseveration, time, and performance (0=0.60, 
F(3,17)=3.42, p=0.04). The multivariate test was followed by univariate tests 
(ANOVAs), which indicated that condition had a significant effect on perseveration 
(F(2,18)=5.90, p=0.02). Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variance was marginally 
significant (L=0.048) so Welch’s statistic was used to obtain a more robust f-ratio 
(Field, 2010). However, condition did not have an effect on either time (F(2,18)=1.27, 
p=0.30) or performance (F(2,18)=0.10, p=0.90) at the a=0.05 level (table 2).
Table 2
ANOVAs results
F-statistic Significance
Perseveration 5.90 0.02
Time 1.27 0.30
Performance 0.10 0.90
ANOVA=Analysis o f variance
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A post-hoc test was conducted to explore the effect of condition on perseveration. 
Because the assumption of homogeneity of variance had been violated, Games- 
Howell was used as a post-hoc test (Field, 2010). The test indicated a significant 
difference between the morality and control conditions (p=0.02), but not between 
competence and control (p=0.72) or morality and competence conditions (p=0.21). 
Table 3 depicts the relationship between the dependent variables.
Table 3
Scatterplot matrix for the dependent variables
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Discussion
The current study has tentatively addressed two areas. Firstly, it has investigated self­
ambivalence as a potential factor in OC checking. Additionally, it is the second study 
to examine a potential relationship between a threat to the morality domain and OC 
phenomena (see also Doron et al. 2012 for contamination fears), and the first to relate 
a threat to morality to the phenomenon of checking. This study has also demonstrated 
that checking (perseveration) may be experimentally induced by eliciting ambivalence 
about the morality of the self.
Two participants reported that they did not consider any of their actions as having 
caused an accident. This entailed the possibility that they needed to be removed from 
the analysis. However, examination of their data revealed that they both had high 
instances of checking behaviours, above the average of the condition (A=5, mean for 
condition was 3.86; B=8; mean for condition was 6.50). Simultaneously, their high 
instances of checking behaviours were matched with high self-reports of performance 
(A=8, mean for condition was 6.71; B=7; mean for condition was 6.33). Indeed Table 
3 demonstrates that after checking behaviours exceed a certain amount of instances, 
self-report rating of performance increases rapidly. This highlighted the possibility 
that if participants’ doubt exceeded a certain threshold, they might subsequently have 
felt the need to protect their self-esteem by reporting high performance (see below as 
well).
The time taken to complete the post-simulation tasks did not significantly differ across 
conditions. However, Table 1 indicates that the mean time in the morality condition 
(223.33 seconds) was larger than the time in the competence (184.29s) and control 
(164.38s) conditions. It is possible that the small sample (N=21) and having fewer 
participants in the morality condition than in others did not allow a possible difference 
to emerge. It is likely wiser to resist interpreting about this variable until a larger and 
more equally distributed sample can be achieved for the purposes of this study.
The finding that morality is related to OC phenomena has a long history of 
investigation. It specifically resonates with Doron et al.’s findings (2012) that a threat
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to self-evaluation increases an OC phenomenon (contamination behaviours). Although 
the two studies address different OC phenomena (checking and contamination) they 
can be seen as potentially comparable based on the theoretical and empirical finding 
that patients with a diagnosis of OCD can display multiple OC behaviours or alternate 
between them. However, a more robust approach would be to experimentally test for 
both checking and contamination related behaviours in the context of the same study, 
both in nonclinieal and clinical populations.
There was no difference across conditions on the self-report of performance in the 
post-simulator task. In fact, the results were almost identical (control=6.63, 
morality=6.33, competence=6.71) and marginally above average despite the 
differences, even if not significant, in the other variables. This variable, unlike 
perseveration and time is a subjective rather than objective measure. Unlike the other 
variables which capture checking as a response to doubt, this variable is a report of 
doubt. This could be understood to be a stage prior to checking as it is a mental rather 
than behavioural expression. These findings resonate with Ladouceur et al’s. (1995) 
study which involved an experimental manipulation of responsibility (high and low 
conditions) and also did not yield any group differences in the self-report of doubt.
It also noteworthy that the mean response was marginally above average. It could 
therefore be speculated that, as a general trend, participants were trying to offer a 
response that would not be seen as too high, as they were doubtful about their self- 
worth at the moment, but also not so low that they would be seen to admit it openly. 
Nonetheless, it also appeared that higher levels of doubt were related to higher reports 
of performance; implying, as already stated, that experiencing self-ambivalence and 
therefore doubt beyond a certain degree required the participants to change strategy 
into verbally protecting their self-worth.
A somewhat more surprising finding is that competence did not have an effect on any 
of the three variables. This is at odds with Doron et al. (2007; 2008) having found a 
relationship between scholastic and particularly job competence and various OCD 
dimensions (responsibility, importance of control of thoughts), in both nonclinieal and 
clinical populations.
190
Returning to Salkovskis original suggestion to extend responsibility to include care for 
self-evaluation it is also possible to offer a tentative explanation for the possibility of 
competence not having an effect. Morality may be seen as a quality that is developed 
and one is responsible for maintaining through one’s conduct. However, our 
description of competence as based in cognitive-motor skills might have played into 
popular discourses about the relative impact of nature versus nurture and the 
possibility that competence as defined here is genetically determined and outside the 
control of the individual. Having considered this possibility, it is also important to 
note that as can be seen from Table 1, perseveration and time were higher than the 
control condition. It is therefore possible that the effect of competence may be present, 
but smaller than that of morality. At this moment it is not possible to draw firm 
conclusions. However, reformulating our script for competence to closely follow the 
principles of scholastic and job competence, and to highlight the personal 
responsibility for developing competence may be helpful in subsequent research.
Limitations
The first limitation we considered about the current study is the duration which was 
around fifty minutes. This meant that adding more measures would become 
cumbersome for participants. This has prevented us from including more measures 
that might enrich our conclusions such as controlling for self-esteem, anxiety or 
depression (e.g Ladouceur et al., 1995). The population for this study was also 
disproportionately represented by female participants and additional male participants 
before submitting for publication would be useful. We have also considered in 
retrospect that further research should control for driving experience to address the 
possibility that more experienced drivers would be more robust in resisting the effect 
of the experimental manipulation.
Time limitations unfortunately did not allow for a second rater to assess the coding 
scheme devised for capturing checking. We do not therefore have any data about 
inter-rater reliability in this study. Additionally, as the experimenter was not blind to
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the experimental conditions, there was the possibility of bias. A follow up should 
include such data. Moreover, we have considered additional ways of coding checking. 
It might be helpful to establish a baseline based on time taken to sort most stills, and 
identify any outliers which could subsequently be counted as instances of checking. 
We suggest that further study should also code glances by establishing whether 
participants turn to glance at a still after they have sorted it. Furthermore participants 
could be asked to sort any stills that they are unsure about into a fourth pile and the 
numerical value could then be a separate variable or aggregated with the rest of the 
behavioural index. It may also be possible to devise an undoubtedly complex scheme 
for coding facial doubt.
Implications for research and clinical practice
Previous research and clinical experience suggests that self-ambivalence is unlikely to 
be the only mechanism at work in OCD. It is likely that such traits as perfectionism, 
inflated responsibility, need for thought control, overestimation of the importance of 
thoughts, and overestimation of danger might interact to bring about perseverative 
phenomena of clinical severity. Moreover we also consider that our design may have 
broader applications than OC phenomena in OCD; for example, it may be worthwhile 
to expand this line of research to eating disorders, an area of psychopathology that 
bears similarities to OCD.
Therapeutically speaking, it is possible that morality is not only a valued domain, but 
may be one of a few valued domains, i.e. these patients may be putting ‘all of their 
eggs in one basket’ (Doron & Kyrios, 2005). It is possible that if self-worth is 
distributed to more than one domains, the stakes of one domain being threatened 
might not be high enough to warrant the extreme reactions observed in OC 
phenomena. We therefore concur with Doron et al.’s recommendations about 
preliminary applications of this developing body of evidence. These authors suggest 
cognitive restructuring of distorted self-perceptions and replacing these with more
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balanced and appropriate evaluations. They also recommend techniques that can 
broaden a patient’s value domains by attending to daily activities and enriching their 
rewarding activity repertoire.
We also agree with Doron et al. (2012) about the potential usefulness of exploring the 
meaning of morality for individual patients. However, we can already identify some 
subtle, but crucial ethical consequences that flow from these research findings. We 
would like to draw attention to one of Doron et al. (2012) recommendations:
“For instance, clients may hold rigid perceptions of morality (e.g., moral people do 
not have sexual urges or thoughts before marriage) and exhibit over-reliance on this 
specific self-domain for their self-worth (p.888).”
We can already notice that working with morality could be complicated by the 
therapist’s own assumptions about the content as well as the importance of morality, 
particularly if the patient is of a different ethnicity, sex, religious, or sexual 
orientation. We would warn against making too many assumptions about ‘rigidity’ 
and normality when exploring these issues.
Another way to make use of these findings clinically is to use what in Dialectical 
Behaviour Therapy is called ‘Behavioural Chain Analysis’. This would involve 
working with the patient to go through the sequence of their behaviours prior to the 
onset of an obsession and attempting to identify the specific internal or external 
trigger to the intrusive thoughts. Exploration could lead to identifying the potential 
impact of the event on the patient’s moral self-worth. It might then be possible to 
engage in a collaborative discussion of challenging the links that the patient non- 
consciously makes between the trigger and their view of the self. If the relationship 
between perseveration and self-report of performance that our data suggests is valid, 
this would also indicate a need to be sensitive to patients experiencing shame and 
reluctance to verbalise the extent of the threat they experienced to their self- 
evaluation.
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Personal Reflection
Conducting this study was a wonderful opportunity as I had not been involved in a 
piece of quantitative research since my undergraduate training. One of the major 
differences this time was the extent of my personal contribution to the design. This 
differed from my minimal involvement at the time, as I had joined an existing 
research effort and the majority of the design had been the work of a post-doc man at 
the University. This was therefore a great opportunity to get to grips with all aspects 
of designing my own piece of quantitative work. As a result, in this year’s work I have 
felt increasingly confident about my capacity to interpret quantitative studies and to 
critically evaluate a broader range of research. Consequently, my confidence in 
practicing in the NHS has also increased as I have been able, and have indeed enjoyed 
sharing, and disseminating research findings with my colleagues from other 
disciplines. As this is a major function of applied psychologists in the public sector, I 
believe that this has helped me settle into my emerging identity as a counselling 
psychologist more successfully.
Switching to a different set of epistemological assumptions this year also meant 
continuing to grapple with the complexity of following different models of research 
and practice. This year marked my return to a positivist framework and the issue of 
self-regulation around OCD, but this time it was from a cognitive rather than a 
psychodynamic perspective (although “self-ambivalence” (Guidano and Liotti, 1983) 
is a cognitive reinterpretation of a classic psychodynamic formulation (Freud, 1894; 
1896; 1915). This piece of work dovetailed with the epistemological assumptions of 
clinical CBT practice; it was an opportunity to deepen my knowledge of this model, 
which was helpful, as I knew much less about it than I did about the psychodynamic. 
Simultaneously, my clinical work this year was at a research busy eating disorders 
unit where a positivist discourse was very present. I think that this conjunction 
allowed insights from both research and clinical practice to weave into each other. It 
was therefore, enjoyable that both my research and clinical practice were to some 
extend harmonious. Last year I had felt a need to hold a lot of tension due to 
practicing within a more modernist psychodynamic setting whilst using a more post­
modern approach to research.
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Nonetheless, I sometimes feel unsure about some of the assumptions of positivist 
research and the strong realist position that it relies on. My engagement with discourse 
analysis and social constructionism in last year’s research had certainly shaken some 
of my valued beliefs. One of my dilemmas centres on the issue of specificity. I think 
that quantitative work is much more demanding of this than qualitative work which 
may even celebrate and hold ambiguity and dissonance. On the contrary, quantitative 
work requires a high degree of refinement and detail in conceptual and experimental 
design. I do enjoy the precision and need for highly focused thinking that such a study 
requires, even if I am not always able to sustain it!
Moreover, I certainly consider that the laboratory situation is a social encounter and it 
is of course not treated as such within the field of experimental psychology. One 
specific issue that I kept coming back to was the assumption that as an experimenter I 
can maintain an environment free of interpersonal confounding variables. Yet, as a 
clinician I know well that there is much communication that happens unconsciously 
and there is ample experimental evidence in fact to support this. Additionally, if one 
takes the view that in any relational encounter there is always something that is co­
created and is unique to the two participants in question, it may be particularly hard to 
argue for the neutrality of the experimental setting, much like in the clinical setting. 
Furthermore, as I was acquainted with many of the participants who came from my 
course, it has been worthwhile wondering if and how our pre-existing relationship 
might have impacted on their experience of the study. Nevertheless, I still remain very 
curious about these questions and would like to be involved in more quantitative 
research in the future so as to obtain a deeper understanding.
Another issue that I had to struggle with was the use of deception in this study. My 
conviction about the ethical basis and necessity for its use in experimental designs has 
not wavered. However, actually having to do it myself made it quite clear that I had 
underestimated how difficult I would find it. My own experience of this study was 
that it was an immersive experience for the participants and that regardless of the 
experimental manipulations, being observed while driving was an emotional situation. 
I felt quite anxious about the debriefing stage when I would have to explain all aspects
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of the study to my participants and describe to them the experimental manipulation. I 
think that being a clinician as well as a researcher meant that I was taking a bit of a 
different role from my daily work where honesty and directness are the essential 
ingredients of my practice. However, grappling with the debriefing stage also helped 
me to really take on board the significance of the contribution that research 
participants make and the generosity of their participation.
Ultimately, I feel quite grateful for the unique structure of this doctoral course. By 
allowing two rather than one piece of research and encouraging both quantitative and 
qualitative, I feel quite enriched by this experience. In the end, my current position 
would have to be that I remain convinced about the need to explore specific issues 
through multiple epistemological and ontological perspectives.
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Appendix 1: study materials
Study Procedure
Volunteers will be offered a time and date and will be escorted to the driving 
simulator room. They will be seated and told what the study will entail. The script will 
be as follows:
“Thank you fo r coming along today. You already know what this study is about hut 
this information sheet gives you some further detail about what we are doing. After 
reading this, i f  you are still happy to take part, I  will ask you to sign a consent form  
and we can begin.
However, before I  do give you more written information, I  wanted to let you know that 
you will be exposed to information concerning traffic road accidents and their 
consequences that might be upsetting. This is particularly likely to be the case i f  you, 
or a person close to you, have been involved in a road traffic accident. Would you like 
to take a moment to think about this?
“Additionally, I  wanted to remind you that you should not take part at all in this 
study i f  you have a history o f  motion sickness or are worried about feeling nauseous 
or being sick; or, i f  you are continuing to experience physical or psychological effects 
o f a road traffic accident.
Finally, you should not take part todav i f  any o f  the following apply: you are
fatigued, have a hangover, an upset stomach, a head cold, an ear infection or 
blockage, an upper respiratory illness, are pregnant, or you have recently taken 
medication or alcohol. It is possible you can take part once these issues no longer 
apply.
The study will take between 30 and 50 minutes ”.
[The above information is also contained in the participant advertisement sheet].
The participant is also given the Demographic Information sheet at this point.
The participant is then taken to the driving simulator and instructed how it works:
“When you are in the driving simulator, you need to treat it like a real drive as much 
as possible. This means you need to obey speed limits, use your door and rear-view 
mirrors, stop at traffic lights and other junctions, and position yourself in the LEFT- 
HAND lane. You may need to change lane to overtake but you must ALWAYS 
RETURN TO THE LEFT-HAND lane. You will see road signs but the general rule is 
that the speed limit fo r driving in built up areas is 40mph and the speed limit fo r  
driving on the open road is 50mph ”.
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Trial Simulation
The nature and function of the first simulation is firstly to ascertain if participants will 
have a simulator sickness response sufficient to mean they will not be able to take
part. Secondly, and crucially for the target simulation, it is to familiarize the
participant with the simulator. The participant will be told that:
1. They must use left-lane positioning as a rule, use their mirrors and stay to the 
speed limits.
2. They will be explained that there is no motion feedback and will not therefore
be able to sense the speed of the car so they have to check the speed indicator
often.
3. If they have an accident the collision alarm will not sound and the simulation 
will not stop {this is crucial to the experimental manipulation].
4. Participants will be given a verbal command to stop during this simulation, in 
order to familiarize themselves with the brakes. Because there is no motion 
feedback, they have to keep their foot on the stop pedal until they can see that 
the vehicle has stopped.
5. Finally, participants will be told to articulate out loud what they can see in the 
door and rear-view mirrors and what speed they are driving at.
In this segment we will have participants overtake an object in the left lane to ensure 
they focus on observing with the nearside door mirror. The use of the mirrors is 
crucial with respect to the actual simulation and the possibility of experiencing doubt 
about having caused an accident.
Simulator sickness studies suggest there should be a break between simulations. Prior 
to the second simulation the participant will be asked to get out of the car and will be 
asked questions about how they feel and how well they feel they performed.
Stage 1: Driving Simulation
The nature and function of this simulation is to introduce doubt about participant’s 
ability to be a safe driver. This will be achieved by creating ambiguity whether the 
participant had caused an accident. This is a common concrete fear of people with 
OCD and so is a good OCD analogue. We have developed a scenario in which the 
participant has to overtake a cyclist, but the task is made incredibly difficult because a 
stream of traffic is overtaking the driver at the point at which the driver needs to 
overtake the cyclist.
The simulation is designed in a way that strengthens ambiguity. Firstly, because the 
collision alarm is deactivated and the simulation does not stop if there is an accident, 
the participant cannot tell if the have hit the cyclist or the overtaking cars. In fact 
when having an accident, the car goes through other vehicles. Secondly, after the 
participant has overtaken the cyclist, we have removed feedback from the mirrors so 
that the participant can no longer see the cyclist. This is unlike with other vehicles 
where the vehicle can be seen in the mirrors after it has been overtaken. In this 
simulation a check on the mirrors results in ambiguous feedback about what has
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happened. The driver’s face is also video recorded so playback of the recording can 
ascertain that the participant did indeed look at the mirrors after having overtaken the 
cyclist. The crucial scenario happens in the latter third of the drive. From piloting this 
study we discovered that volunteers naïve to the study were unsure whether they had 
hit the cyclist. They either offered this feedback voluntarily, or when asked about how 
they found the simulation.
Post Simulation Questionnaire
Following completion of this task, participants will be asked to complete a number 
post-simulator questions. The questions in this segment aim to tap self-perceived 
performance and, crucially, to establish whether induction of doubt was successful. 
This is established in the last item (9). However, a number of other questions are 
introduced in order to assess predicted effects of the experimental manipulation. 
Questions 1 and 5 are neutral distractors:
For each set of statements, please check ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.
1 .1 thought that the simulation was realistic.
2 .1 drove in a way that might have put someone at risk.
3 .1 found it difficult to handle and to position the vehicle.
4. This was a safe driving environment.
5 .1 feel happy about the quality of my performance in the simulation
6 .1 showed that I was a conscientious driver through my performance today.
7 .1 anticipated hazards and avoided them well.
8. This was a difficult driving environment that would challenge anyone.
9. None of my actions resulted in an accident in the simulation
Stage 2: hazard perception task stills
Participants will then take part in the post simulation task. Participants from all three 
conditions will then be seated at a desk and will be shown a series of stills taken from 
a standard Hazard perception Task. They will be told:
“I  am now going to show you a few  photographs, which I  will ask you to sort into 
three different piles. These photographs may contain ‘hazards \ A hazard is anything 
that would cause you to slow down or change the direction o f your driving. Some 
photographs contain ‘static hazards ’. These depict situations where you must either 
slow down, change the direction o f your driving or both. Some photographs contain 
‘developing hazards ’. These depict situations that could signal or potentially become 
static hazards. Some photographs depict no hazards. I  would like you to do it as fast 
as you can, but also do it correctly. I  would ask you to take this task as seriously as i f  
you were being examined in an actual driving test. I  will also be timing you”.
We will be recording the following variables which we hypothesize represent 
perseveration and therefore measure doubt. Compulsive preservation is an obsessive 
compulsive behaviour. The first variable is doubt and it will be captured by i) times
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the participant hesitates before laying the photograph into a sorter. Hesitation will be 
considered to be any pause lasting more than 2 seconds ii) changes in direction and 
placing the photograph in a different sorter than the original trajectory suggested and 
lii) times the participant returns to a still previously sorted and picks it up/and or 
moves it to another sorter. The second variable is overall time spent in the task. The 
third variable is confidence in performance and will be assessed in a 1-10 scale 
administered after the task.
The experimenter will be seated close to the participant at a position where he can 
have a clear view. The participant will also be videotaped so that recording 
behavioural variables does not itself risk missing any hesitations. We hypothesize that 
participants in the two experimental conditions will doubt more often, will take more 
time to complete the task and will report lower confidence in their performance. We 
hypothesize that this will be the result of their self-ambivalence having been activated 
due to their performance in the first task. The experimental setup for the second task 
can be seen below:
i
%
Debriefing
Following these two episodes participants will be debriefed and their performance 
normalized. The following debriefing script will be used.
Participants will be asked how they found the study and how they feel. We will then 
say:
“I  would like to explain the purpose o f this study in more detail. All participants were 
randomly assigned to three different conditions. The difference betM’een each would 
be part o f the information M>e include on your information sheet. In our control 
condition we explain to participants that road conditions have a significant effect on 
accidents and therefore expect participants to attribute a possible accident to road 
conditions. In the first experimental condition we tell participants that driving is 
related to morality. In the second we say it is related to competence. None o f this 
information is true. In fact the driving scenario is designed in order to leave you 
feeling that you may have had an accident, but that you can’t be sure about it. I f  you
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were in the control condition we would expect you to attribute any accidents to the 
road conditions rather than the result o f your own personal abilities. However, i f  you 
are on one o f the other conditions we expect you to have some doubt following the 
driving scenario about how competent or moral you are. O f course, your performance 
does not reflect at all on you since this information is made up and the driving 
scenario is designed to have you doubt your performance. Previous research suggests 
that people have some degree o f self-ambivalence where they may not securely hold 
their positive views o f themselves, at least in a particular valued domain. Our 
experimental manipulation targets this self-ambivalence. How does this sound so far? 
(check how participant is feeling. Ensure that (s)he has heard that their performance 
does not indicate anything about them and that their feelings o f  doubt are normal and 
to be expected. Relate this to their specific performance. I f  they have been impacted by 
the study suggest that perhaps morality or performance is one o f  their highly valued 
domains and this is quite normal).
The second part o f  the study tries to capture perseveration. We hypothesize that i f  you 
are now feeling unsure about your how moral or competent you are as a result o f  your 
performance, you might experience doubt about your subsequent performance. We 
would expect you then to persevere more in this task, by returning more often to stills 
you have finished or to take up more time overall. We might also expect you to 
designate that your performance was not good on the 1-10 scale. On average, we are 
expecting that participants will show greater doubt when their morality or 
competence have been threatened.
[The crucial thing about the debrief is that, if participants have personally found the 
task hard or they doubted, this is likely due to the fact that they have just taken part in 
a simulation in which we deliberately made them doubt their performance, regardless 
of condition. But for those we told that driving was to do with their morality or 
competence, this doubt we think will be stronger].
To address the possibility that the participants may have diagnosed or undiagnosed 
OCD, they will be asked if they are worried about any aspect of the study. They will 
be specifically be asked if they are finding it difficult ‘to get their minds o ff whether 
they hit the cyclist, their performance or any other aspect related to their self- 
evaluation. If that is the case they will be asked if this has happened to them before. If 
participants agree that they are often preoccupied with thoughts about themselves or 
events in their environment, we will suggest that they seek advice from their GP.
Do you have any questions or comments? ”
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Participant Advertisement Sheet
Dear student
I am a trainee Counselling Psychologist conducting a research study that uses the 
University’s driving simulator to see how people perform on different routes. We 
hope the data from this study will be useful in developing greater understanding of 
driver performance in different situations in order to inform interventions to help 
reduce the occurrence of road traffic accidents. Volunteers will be invited to take part 
in three driving related tasks.
In order to conduct this study I am seeking people who have a valid full UK driving 
license. If you would like to volunteer for the research then I would like to arrange a 
time for you to do so. The study is taking place at the University of Surrey on 
Wednesdays and should take 30-50 minutes. Although the experience itself should be 
reward enough (!) you can also choose a sweet to take away. First and second year 
psychology students can also earn a lab token.
Please note that participating in the study involves being exposed to information about 
road traffic accidents that may be upsetting, particularly if you or a person close to 
you has been involved in a such an event.
You should not take part if you are continuing to experience physical or 
psychological effects of a road traffic accident. Being in the simulator can produce 
mild feelings of motion sickness and, in some people, sweating, nausea or vomiting. 
If you are concerned about this or you know you have a history of motion sickness, 
you should not take part.
Finally, you should not take part todav if any of the following apply: you are
fatigued, have a hangover, an upset stomach, a head cold, an ear infection or blockage, 
an upper respiratory illness, are pregnant, or you have recently taken medication or 
alcohol. It is possible you can take part once these issues no longer apply.
The data collected in this study will be confidential and all information will be 
handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act of 1988. Your name will not be 
stored with your data and reports of this study will not include individual data in a 
form by which you could be identified. You may discontinue all participation in this 
study at any time without giving an explanation.
The study has received a favourable ethical opinion from the Ethics Committee of the 
Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences at the University of Surrey. If you would like to 
take part in this research, find out more about it or arrange a meeting to discuss the 
research further, please write to me at nt00037@surrey.ac.uk.
Further concerns about any aspect of this study may also be referred to Laura Simonds 
and Peter Hegarty, research supervisors:
Dr. Laura Simonds
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Email: l.simonds@surrey.ac.uk 
Telephone: 01483 68 6936
Dr. Peter Hegarty
Email: p.hegarty@surrey.ac.uk
Telephone: 01483 68
Address:
Psychology Department, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH, United 
Kingdom.
Kind regards 
Nikolaos Tsigaras
Counselling Psychologist in training
207
Information sheet
Title of study: An investigation of driving skill in a simulated environment
Background to the study: In this study, we are using the driving simulator to see how 
people perform on different routes. We hope the data from this study will be useful in 
developing greater understanding of driver performance in different situations in order 
to inform interventions to help reduce the occurrence of road traffic accidents. 
Careless driving can lead to the death or serious injury of pedestrians, other road 
users, the driver and his/her passengers. In June 2011, the Department of Transport 
reported that 24,560 people were killed or seriously injured on roads in the UK. The 
driver and passengers can sustain traumatic abrasion and crush injuries either from 
being thrown forward inside the vehicle or from being thrown from the moving 
vehicle onto the road. Pedestrians and other vulnerable road users, such as pedal 
cyclists, can sustain primary traumatic injuries from being struck by the moving 
vehicle, and secondary traumatic injuries from the force of hitting the road surface 
following contact with a moving vehicle. In a third of fatal road traffic accidents, 
death does not occur immediately but some weeks later due to infection, a blood clot 
or multiple organ failure. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, a potentially disabling 
psychiatric condition, is also common in people who have survived or witnessed a 
serious road traffic accident. This disorder produces flashbacks, nightmares, anxiety 
and depression. Given the consequences of careless driving, studies of driver 
performance are essential.
» T h e  next piece of text varies according to co n d itio n «
Morality condition
Research shows that safe drivers (i.e. those who have fewer accidents, observe speed 
limits and other rules of the road) are those who score high on measures of ‘driver 
social responsibility’. ‘Socially responsible drivers’ are those who believe that the 
protection of other road users is their duty. A person with high ‘driver social 
responsibility’ is conscientious and feels responsible for the welfare and safety of 
others and consequently is much less likely to get involved in a road accident. 
Furthermore, socially responsible drivers also show higher levels of personal moral 
characteristics such as honesty, sincerity, integrity and trustworthiness in other areas 
of life. Research suggests that road deaths could be halved if everyone drove like the 
most social responsible drivers.
Competence condition
Research shows that safe drivers (i.e. those who have fewer accidents, observe speed 
limits and other rules of the road) are those who score high on measures of ‘driver 
competence’. Competent drivers are those who possess skill in handling and 
positioning a vehicle. A person with high ‘driver competence’ anticipates risks, and 
responds quickly, both physically and cognitively, to unexpected situations, and 
consequently is much less likely to get involved in a road accident. Furthermore, 
competent drivers also use their cognitive functions more effectively than other people 
to exercise judgement, planning and behavioural control in other areas of life.
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Research suggests that road deaths could be halved if everyone drove like the most 
competent drivers.
Self-neutral condition
Research shows that some road environments are safer than others. In other words, in 
some environments fewer accidents occur, and people find it easier to observe speed 
limits and other rules of the road. Safe roads are easier to drive on carefully because 
they make less demands on the driver. On unsafe roads, it is harder for everyone to 
anticipate risks, to respond to hazards, and all drivers are more likely to put 
themselves and others at risk in such environments. Consequently everyone is more 
likely to get involved in a road accident in an unsafe environment. Research suggests 
that road deaths could be halved if all driving environments could be made safe.
What participation involves:
2. You will be asked some general questions about your driving experience.
3. You will take part in the first driving simulation. This will last approximately 
10 minutes » n e x t  piece of text varies according to condition«
a. Your performance in this test will be a good indication of the extent to 
which you are a socially responsible driver or not.
b. Your performance in this test will be a good indication of the extent to 
which you are a competent driver or not.
c. Your performance in this test will help us to figure out which kinds of 
driving environment are safe for everybody and which are unsafe for 
everybody.
4. You will be given a brief break and asked some questions about your 
experience of the simulation
5. You will take part in the second driving simulation. This will last 
approximately 15 minutes and is primarily designed to test how you use 
observation skills in a changing driving environment.
6. You will be given a brief break and asked some questions about your 
experience of the simulation
7. You will take part in a Hazard Perception photograph sorting task (this part is 
not done in the simulator). This will take approximately 10-15 minutes.
8. You will be asked some questions about your experience of this test
9. Debriefing
Withdrawing from the study: Throughout each simulation, the experimenter will 
visually check on your wellbeing, but he cannot say anything that might distract you. 
So, you must signal immediately to him if you feel sick, sweaty or overly anxious. At 
this point, the simulation will be stopped.
Data protection: all data will be stored securely and processed in accordance with 
the principles of the Data Protection Act (1998). Your participation will remain 
confidential to the research team and you will not be identifiable in any publications 
or presentations arising from this research. It is possible that the research team will 
want to analyse the data again at some point in the future or use it for educational 
purposes. The data will always be anonymised, however, so you will never be 
identifiable. You can choose to withdraw your data after you have participated.
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However, you need to do so before June 2012 when the study will be submitted for 
examination.
The study has received a favourable ethical opinion from the Ethics Committee of the 
Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences at the University of Surrey. Further concerns 
about any aspect of this study may also be referred to Laura Simonds and Peter 
Hegarty, research supervisors:
Dr. Laura Simonds
Email: l.simonds@surrey.ac.uk
Telephone: 01483 68 6936
Dr. Peter Hegarty
Email: p.hegarty@surrey.ac.uk
Telephone: 01483 68
Address:
Psychology Department, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH, United 
Kingdom.
Kind regards 
Nikolaos Tsigaras
Counselling Psychologist in training
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Consent Form
I the undersigned voluntarily agree to take part in this study investigating how people 
perform on different driving routes. I understand that the study will take between 30 
and 50 minutes.
I have read and understood the Information Sheet provided. I have been advised 
about any discomfort and possible ill-effects on my health and well-being which may 
result. I understand that after completion of the study I will be been given the 
opportunity to ask questions on all aspects of the study.
I agree to inform the researcher immediately if I suffer any deterioration of any kind 
in my health or well-being, or experience any unexpected or unusual symptoms during 
or after the study.
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time without needing to 
justify my decision and without prejudice. I have been given a copy of this consent 
form.
I understand that all personal data relating to participants is held and processed in the 
strictest confidence, and in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). I agree 
that if I choose to withdraw my data after participation I need to do so before June 
2012 when the study will be submitted for examination.
The study has received a favourable ethical opinion from the Ethics Committee of the 
Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences at the University of Surrey.
I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to participating 
in this study. I have been given adequate time to consider my participation and agree 
to comply with the instructions and restrictions of the study.
Name of volunteer (BLOCK CAPITALS)
Signed
Date
Name of researcher (BLOCK CAPITALS)
Signed
Date
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Demographic Information
To begin, Fd like to get some basic information about you (such as your age, 
education and occupation). The reason that Fd like this information is so that I can 
show those who read my research report that I managed to obtain the views of a cross- 
section of people. The information that you give will never be used to identify you in 
any way because this research is entirely confidential. However, if you don’t want to 
answer some of these questions, please don’t feel that you have to.
Are you
(tick the appropriate answer)
Male Female
2. How old are you? [ ] years
3. How would you describe your ethnic origins?^
Choose one section from (a) to (e) and then tick the appropriate category to indicate 
your ethnic background.
White
British_________________________________ __
Irish ■
Any other White background, please write in below
Mixed
White and Black Caribbean________________ __
White and Black African 
White and Asian
Any other mixed background, please write in below
(c) Asian or Asian British
Indian__________________________________ __
Pakistani_______________________________ __
Bangladeshi_____________________________ __
Any other Asian background, please write in below
Black or Black British
Caribbean_________________________________
African
Any other Black background, please write in below
The format of this question is taken from the 2001 UK census.
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Chinese or Other ethnic group 
Chinese
Any other, please write below
4. What is your highest educational qualification? 
(tick the appropriate answer)
None__________________________ __
GCSE(s)/0-level(s)/CSE(s)
A-level(s)/AS -level(s)____________ __
Diploma (END, SRN, etc.)
Degree_________________________ __
Postgraduate degree/diploma______ __
5. What is your current occupation (or, if you are no longer working, what was 
your last occupation?)
6. What is your current legal marital status? 
(tick the appropriate answer)
Single __
Married
Civil partnership
Divorced/separated __
Widowed
7. a) Do you have any children?
(tick the appropriate answer)
Yes  (go to part b) No___
b) How many children do you have? [ ]
8. How long have you held a full UK driving licence?
9. How many hours, on average, do you drive per week?
10. Please mark on a 1-10 scale, how careful a driver you think you are
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Risk Assessment
The use of the driving simulator may possibly cause anxiety, but this is unlikely to be 
more than every day driving stress. The experience of being observed during 
performance is assumed to have been already experienced during driving 
examinations.
Participants will be given an information sheet prior to participating in the study. They 
will be verbally advised that they will be exposed to information related to road traffic 
accidents and their consequences that can be upsetting. It will be emphasized that this 
is more likely to be so if themselves or a person close to them have been involved in a 
road traffic accident.
They will be advised not to participate in this study they have a history of motion 
sickness or are worried about feeling nauseous or being sick; or, if they are continuing 
to experience physical or psychological effects of a road traffic accident.
They will be advised not to take part on the particular day if they are fatigued, have a 
hangover, an upset stomach, a head cold, an ear infection or blockage, an upper 
respiratory illness, are pregnant, or they have recently taken medication or alcohol. 
They will be told that with the exception of pregnancy, it is possible they can take part 
once these issues no longer apply.
Participants will be told that throughout each simulation, the experimenter will 
visually check on their wellbeing, but he cannot say anything that might distract them. 
Participants will be advised to signal immediately to him if they feel sick, sweaty or 
overly anxious. At this point, the simulation will be stopped.
There is a possibility that participants may indeed have a diagnosed or undiagnosed 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder. If the experimental hypothesis has merit, it is 
possible such participants may experience rumination as a result of participation. This 
is dealt during the debriefing stage. It is not possible to unequivocally determine if any 
preoccupation is at a level of clinical significance. However, we will ask participants 
to seek advice from their GP.
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Appendix 2: Journal of Anxiety Disorders’ author guidelines
Ethics in publishing
For information on Ethics in publishing and Ethical guidelines for journal publication 
see http://www.elsevier.com/publishingethics and 
http://www.elsevier.com/ethicalguidelines.
Conflict of interest
All authors are requested to disclose any actual or potential conflict of interest 
including any financial, personal or other relationships with other people or 
organizations within three years of beginning the submitted work that could 
inappropriately influence, or be perceived to influence, their work. See also 
http://www.elsevier.com/conflictsofinterest.
Submission declaration
Submission of an article implies that the work described has not been published 
previously (except in the form of an abstract or as part of a published lecture or 
academic thesis or as an electronic preprint, see
http://www.elsevier.com/postingpolicvk that it is not under consideration for 
publication elsewhere, that its publication is approved by all authors and tacitly or 
explicitly by the responsible authorities where the work was carried out, and that, if 
accepted, it will not be published elsewhere including electronically in the same form, 
in English or in any other language, without the written consent of the copyright- 
holder.
Changes to authorship
This policy concerns the addition, deletion, or rearrangement of author names in the 
authorship of accepted manuscripts:
Before the accepted manuscript is published in an online issue: Requests to add or 
remove an author, or to rearrange the author names, must be sent to the Journal 
Manager from the corresponding author of the accepted manuscript and must include: 
(a) the reason the name should be added or removed, or the author names rearranged 
and (b) written confirmation (e-mail, fax, letter) from all authors that they agree with 
the addition, removal or rearrangement. In the case of addition or removal of authors, 
this includes confirmation from the author being added or removed. Requests that are 
not sent by the corresponding author will be forwarded by the Journal Manager to the 
corresponding author, who must follow the procedure as described above. Note that: 
(1) Journal Managers will inform the Journal Editors of any such requests and (2) 
publication of the accepted manuscript in an online issue is suspended until authorship 
has been agreed.
After the accepted manuscript is published in an online issue: Any requests to add, 
delete, or rearrange author names in an article published in an online issue will follow
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the same policies as noted above and result in a corrigendum.
Copyright
Upon acceptance of an article, authors will be asked to complete a ’Journal Publishing 
Agreement’ (for more information on this and copyright see 
http://wwv\^elsevier.com/copvright). Acceptance of the agreement will ensure the 
widest possible dissemination of information. An e-mail will be sent to the 
corresponding author confirming receipt of the manuscript together with a ’Journal 
Publishing Agreement’ form or a link to the online version of this agreement. 
Subscribers may reproduce tables of contents or prepare lists of articles including 
abstracts for internal circulation within their institutions. Permission of the Publisher 
is required for resale or distribution outside the institution and for all other derivative 
works, including compilations and translations (please consult 
http://www.elsevier.com/permissions). If excerpts from other copyrighted works are 
included, the author(s) must obtain written permission from the copyright owners and 
credit the source(s) in the article. Elsevier has preprinted forms for use by authors in 
these cases: please consult http://www.elsevier.com/permissions.
Retained author rights
As an author you (or your employer or institution) retain certain rights; for details you 
are referred to: http://ww^.elsevier.com/authorsrights.
Role of the funding source
You are requested to identify who provided financial support for the conduct of the 
research and/or preparation of the article and to briefly describe the role of the 
sponsor(s), if any, in study design; in the collection, analysis and interpretation of 
data; in the writing of the report; and in the decision to submit the article for 
publication. If the funding source(s) had no such involvement then this should be 
stated. Please see http://www.elsevier.com/funding.
Funding body agreements and policies
Elsevier has established agreements and developed policies to allow authors whose 
articles appear in journals published by Elsevier, to comply with potential manuscript 
archiving requirements as specified as conditions of their grant awards. To learn more 
about existing agreements and policies please visit 
http://www.elsevier.com/fundingbodies.
Open access
This journal offers you the option of making your article freely available to all via the 
ScienceDirect platform. To prevent any conflict of interest, you can only make this 
choice after receiving notification that your article has been accepted for publication. 
The fee of $3,000 excludes taxes and other potential author fees such as color charges. 
In some cases, institutions and funding bodies have entered into agreement with 
Elsevier to meet these fees on behalf of their authors. Details of these agreements are
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available at http://www.elsevier.com/fundingbodies. Authors of accepted articles, who 
wish to take advantage of this option, should complete and submit the order form 
(available at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/openaccessform.pdf). Whatever access 
option you choose, you retain many rights as an author, including the right to post a 
revised personal version of your article on your own website. More information can be 
found here: http://www.elsevier.com/authorsrights.
Language and language services
Please write your text in good English (American or British usage is accepted, but not 
a mixture of these). Authors who require information about language editing and 
copyediting services pre- and post-submission please visit &  
http://webshop.elsevier.com/languageservices or our customer support site at 
http://support.elsevier.com for more information.
Language and language services
Please write your text in good American English. Authors who require information 
about language editing and copyediting services pre- and post-submission please visit 
http://www.elsevier.com/languagepolishing or our customer support site at 
http://epsupport.elsevier.com for more information. Please note Elsevier neither 
endorses nor takes responsibility for any products, goods or services offered by 
outside vendors through our services or in any advertising. For more information 
please refer to our Terms & Conditions: http://www.elsevier.com/termsandconditions.
Submission
Submission to this journal proceeds totally online and you will be guided stepwise 
through the creation and uploading of your files. The system automatically converts 
source files to a single PDF file of the article, which is used in the peer-review 
process. Please note that even though manuscript source files are converted to PDF 
files at submission for the review process, these source files are needed for further 
processing after acceptance. All correspondence, including notification of the Editor's 
decision and requests for revision, takes place by e-mail removing the need for a paper 
trail.
Additional Information 
Editorial guidance
The Journal o f  Anxiety Disorders publishes articles of relevance to the epidemiology, 
psychopathology, etiology, assessment, treatment, and prevention of the anxiety 
disorders in both child and adult populations. The format of the articles includes 
randomized controlled trials, single case clinical outcome studies, theoretical 
expositions, epidemiological studies, early mechanisms of risk, genetic and biomarker 
studies, neuroimaging studies, critical literature reviews, meta-analyses, and 
dissemination and implementation studies. We are also interested in evaluations of 
novel treatment delivery strategies, including the use of information technologies. 
Authors are encouraged to use methodologically rigorous sampling, structured or
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reliability procedures where appropriate. With the exponential increase in the number 
of submissions to the journal over the last several years, there has been a need to make 
difficult decisions regarding the type of manuscripts that we believe are most relevant 
and useful to JAD readers. Although analogue studies and studies using non-clinical 
samples often are excellent approaches to controlled research, particularly in the area 
of etiology, others represent only very minor variations on repetitive themes, failing to 
advance the field in any meaningful way. Therefore, given limited journal space, we 
will no longer accept studies based on analogue samples unless they use a tightly 
controlled experimental design in order to enhance our understanding of etiology.
Submitted papers must comply with the style requirements of the Publication Manual 
o f the American Psychological Association (6th Ed). Copies of the Manual may be 
ordered from B»http://www.aDa.org/books/4200066.aspx.
Use of wordprocessing software
It is important that the file be saved in the native format of the wordprocessor used. 
The text should be in single-column format. Keep the layout of the text as simple as 
possible. Most formatting codes will be removed and replaced on processing the 
article. In particular, do not use the wordprocessor’s options to justify text or to 
hyphenate words. However, do use bold face, italics, subscripts, superscripts etc.
When preparing tables, if you are using a table grid, use only one grid for each 
individual table and not a grid for each row. If no grid is used, use tabs, not spaces, to 
align columns. The electronic text should be prepared in a way very similar to that of 
conventional manuscripts (see also the Guide to Publishing with Elsevier: 
http://www.elsevier.com/guidepublication). Note that source files of figures, tables 
and text graphics will be required whether or not you embed your figures in the text. 
See also the section on Electronic artwork.
To avoid unnecessary errors you are strongly advised to use the 'spell-check' and 
'grammar-check' functions of your wordprocessor.
Article structure
Subdivision - numbered sections
Divide your article into clearly defined and numbered sections. Subsections should be 
numbered 1.1 (then 1.1.1, 1.1.2,...), 1.2, etc. (the abstract is not included in section 
numbering). Use this numbering also for internal cross-referencing: do not just refer to 
'the text'. Any subsection may be given a brief heading. Each heading should appear 
on its own separate line.
Introduction
State the objectives of the work and provide an adequate background, avoiding a 
detailed literature survey or a summary of the results.
Material and methods
Provide sufficient detail to allow the work to be reproduced. Methods already 
published should be indicated by a reference: only relevant modifications should be 
described.
218
Theory/calculation
A Theory section should extend, not repeat, the background to the article already dealt 
with in the Introduction and lay the foundation for further work. In contrast, a 
Calculation section represents a practical development from a theoretical basis.
Results
Results should be clear and concise.
Discussion
This should explore the significance of the results of the work, not repeat them. A 
combined Results and Discussion section is often appropriate. Avoid extensive 
citations and discussion of published literature.
Conclusions
The main conclusions of the study may be presented in a short Conclusions section, 
which may stand alone or form a subsection of a Discussion or Results and Discussion 
section.
Appendices
If there is more than one appendix, they should be identified as A, B, etc. Formulae 
and equations in appendices should be given separate numbering: Eq. (A.l), Eq. (A.2), 
etc.; in a subsequent appendix, Eq. (B.l) and so on. Similarly for tables and figures: 
Table A .l; Fig. A .l, etc.
Essential title page information
The title page must be the first page of the manuscript file.
• Title. Concise and informative. Titles are often used in information-retrieval 
systems. Avoid abbreviations and formulae where possible.
• Author names and affiliations. Where the family name may be ambiguous 
(e.g., a double name), please indicate this clearly. Present the authors' 
affiliation addresses (where the actual work was done) below the names. 
Indicate all affiliations with a lower-case superscript letter immediately after 
the author's name and in front of the appropriate address. Provide the ftill 
postal address of each affiliation, including the country name, and, if available, 
the e-mail address of each author.
• Corresponding author. Clearly indicate who will handle correspondence at all 
stages of refereeing and publication, also post-publication. Ensure that 
telephone and fax numbers (with country and area code) are provided in 
addition to the e-mail address and the complete postal address.
• Present/permanent address. If an author has moved since the work described 
in the article was done, or was visiting at the time, a "Present address" (or 
"Permanent address") may be indicated as a footnote to that author's name.
The address at which the author actually did the work must be retained as the 
main, affiliation address. Superscript Arabic numerals are used for such 
footnotes.
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Abstract
A concise and factual abstract is required. The abstract should state briefly the purpose 
of the research, the principal results and major conclusions. An abstract is often 
presented separately from the article, so it must be able to stand alone. For this reason. 
References should be avoided, but if essential, then cite the author(s) and year(s).
Also, non-standard or uncommon abbreviations should be avoided, but if essential 
they must be defined at their first mention in the abstract itself. The abstract should 
not exceed 150 words in length and should be submitted on a separate page following 
the title page.
Graphical abstract
A Graphical abstract is optional and should summarize the contents of the article in a 
concise, pictorial form designed to capture the attention of a wide readership online. 
Authors must provide images that clearly represent the work described in the article. 
Graphical abstracts should be submitted as a separate file in the online submission 
system. Image size: Please provide an image with a minimum of 531 x 1328 pixels (h 
X w) or proportionally more. The image should be readable at a size of 5 x 13 cm 
using a regular screen resolution of 96 dpi. Preferred file types: TIFF, EPS, PDF or 
MS Office files. See http://www.elsevier.com/sraohicalabstracts for examples.
Authors can make use of Elsevier's Illustration and Enhancement service to ensure the 
best presentation of their images also in accordance with all technical requirements: m  
Illustration Service.
Highlights
Highlights are mandatory for this journal. They consist of a short collection of bullet 
points that convey the core findings of the article and should be submitted in a 
separate file in the online submission system. Please use 'Highlights' in the file name 
and include 3 to 5 bullet points (maximum 85 characters, including spaces, per bullet 
point). See http://www.elsevier.com/highlights for examples.
Keywords
Include a list of four to six keywords following the Abstract. Keywords should be 
selected from the APA list of index descriptors unless otherwise approved by the 
Editor.
Abbreviations
Define abbreviations that are not standard in this field in a footnote to be placed on the 
first page of the article. Such abbreviations that are unavoidable in the abstract must 
be defined at their first mention there, as well as in the footnote. Ensure consistency of 
abbreviations throughout the article.
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M ath formulae
Present simple formulae in the line of normal text where possible and use the solidus 
(/) instead of a horizontal line for small fractional terms, e.g., X/Y. In principle, 
variables are to be presented in italics. Powers of e are often more conveniently 
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Footnotes
Footnotes should be used sparingly. Number them consecutively throughout the 
article, using superscript Arabic numbers. Many wordprocessors build footnotes into 
the text, and this feature may be used. Should this not be the case, indicate the position 
of footnotes in the text and present the footnotes themselves separately at the end of 
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Table footnotes
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General points
• Make sure you use uniform lettering and sizing of your original artwork.
• Save text in illustrations as 'graphics' or enclose the font.
• Only use the following fonts in your illustrations: Arial, Courier, Times, Symbol.
• Number the illustrations according to their sequence in the text.
• Use a logical naming convention for your artwork files.
• Provide captions to illustrations separately.
• Produce images near to the desired size of the printed version.
• Submit each figure as a separate file.
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resolution is too low;
• Supply files that are too low in resolution;
• Submit graphics that are disproportionately large for the content.
Color artwork
Please make sure that artwork files are in an acceptable format (TIFF, EPS or MS 
Office files) and with the correct resolution. If, together with your accepted article, 
you submit usable color figures then Elsevier will ensure, at no additional charge, that 
these figures will appear in color on the Web (e.g., ScienceDirect and other sites) 
regardless of whether or not these illustrations are reproduced in color in the printed 
version. For color reproduction in print, you will receive information regarding 
the costs from Elsevier after receipt of your accepted article. Please indicate your 
preference for color: in print or on the Web only. For further information on the 
preparation of electronic artwork, please see 
http://www.elsevier.com/artworkinstructions.
Please note: Because of technical complications which can arise by converting color 
figures to 'gray scale' (for the printed version should you not opt for color in print) 
please submit in addition usable black and white versions of all the color illustrations.
Figure captions
Ensure that each illustration has a caption. Supply captions separately, not attached to 
the figure. A caption should comprise a brief title (not on the figure itself) and a 
description of the illustration. Keep text in the illustrations themselves to a minimum 
but explain all symbols and abbreviations used.
Tables
Number tables consecutively in accordance with their appearance in the text. Place 
footnotes to tables below the table body and indicate them with superscript lowercase 
letters. Avoid vertical rules. Be sparing in the use of tables and ensure that the data 
presented in tables do not duplicate results described elsewhere in the article.
References
Citation in text
Please ensure that every reference cited in the text is also present in the reference list 
(and vice versa). Any references cited in the abstract must be given in full. 
Unpublished results and personal communications are not recommended in the 
reference list, but may be mentioned in the text. If these references are included in the 
reference list they should follow the standard reference style of the journal and should 
include a substitution of the publication date with either 'Unpublished results' or 
'Personal communication'. Citation of a reference as 'in press' implies that the item has 
been accepted for publication.
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Web references
As a minimum, the full URL should be given and the date when the reference was last 
accessed. Any further information, if known (DOI, author names, dates, reference to a 
source publication, etc.), should also be given. Web references can be listed separately 
(e.g., after the reference list) under a different heading if desired, or can be included in 
the reference list.
References in a special issue
Please ensure that the words 'this issue' are added to any references in the list (and any 
citations in the text) to other articles in the same Special Issue.
Reference style
Text: Citations in the text should follow the referencing style used by the American 
Psychological Association. You are referred to the Publication Manual of the 
American Psychological Association, Sixth Edition, ISBN 978-1-4338-0561-5, copies 
of which may be ordered from B»http://books.apa.org/books.cfm?id=4200067 or APA 
Order Dept., P.G.B. 2710, Hyattsville, MD 20784, USA or APA, 3 Henrietta Street, 
London, WC3E 8LU, UK.
List: references should be arranged first alphabetically and then fiirther sorted 
chronologically if necessary. More than one reference from the same author(s) in the 
same year must be identified by the letters 'a', 'b', 'c', etc., placed after the year of 
publication.
Examples:
Reference to ajournai publication:
Van der Geer, J., Hanraads, J. A. J., & Lupton, R. A. (2010). The art of writing a 
scientific article. Journal o f  Scientific Communications, 163, 51-59.
Reference to a book:
Strunk, W., Jr., & White, E. B. (2000). The elements o f  style. (4th ed.). New York: 
Longman, (Chapter 4).
Reference to a chapter in an edited book:
Mettam, G. R., & Adams, L. B. (2009). How to prepare an electronic version of your 
article. In B. S. Jones, & R. Z. Smith (Eds.), Introduction to the electronic age (pp. 
281-304). New York: E-Publishing Inc.
Video data
Elsevier accepts video material and animation sequences to support and enhance your 
scientific research. Authors who have video or animation files that they wish to submit 
with their article are strongly encouraged to include these within the body of the 
article. This can be done in the same way as a figure or table by referring to the video 
or animation content and noting in the body text where it should be placed. All 
submitted files should be properly labeled so that they directly relate to the video file's 
content. In order to ensure that your video or animation material is directly usable, 
please provide the files in one of our recommended file formats with a preferred 
maximum size of 50 MB. Video and animation files supplied will be published online 
in the electronic version of your article in Elsevier Web products, including 
ScienceDirect: E34^httn://www.sciencedirect.com. Please supply 'stills' with your files: 
you can choose any frame from the video or animation or make a separate image.
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These will be used instead of standard icons and will personalize the link to your 
video data. For more detailed instructions please visit our video instruction pages at 
http://www.elsevier.com/artworkinstructions. Note: since video and animation cannot 
be embedded in the print version of the journal, please provide text for both the 
electronic and the print version for the portions of the article that refer to this content.
Supplementary data
Elsevier accepts electronic supplementary material to support and enhance your 
scientific research. Supplementary files offer the author additional possibilities to 
publish supporting applications, high-resolution images, background datasets, sound 
clips and more. Supplementary files supplied will be published online alongside the 
electronic version of your article in Elsevier Web products, including ScienceDirect: 
&»httn://www.sciencedirect.com. In order to ensure that your submitted material is 
directly usable, please provide the data in one of our recommended file formats. 
Authors should submit the material in electronic format together with the article and 
supply a concise and descriptive caption for each file. For more detailed instructions 
please visit our artwork instruction pages at 
http://www.elsevier.com/artworkinstructions.
Submission checklist
The following list will be useful during the final checking of an article prior to 
sending it to the journal for review. Please consult this Guide for Authors for further 
details of any item.
Ensure that the following items are present:
One author has been designated as the corresponding author with contact details:
• E-mail address
• Full postal address
• Telephone and fax numbers
All necessary files have been uploaded, and contain:
• Keywords
• All figure captions
• All tables (including title, description, footnotes)
Further considerations
• Manuscript has been 'spell-checked' and 'grammar-checked'
• References are in the correct format for this journal
• All references mentioned in the Reference list are cited in the text, and vice versa
• Permission has been obtained for use of copyrighted material from other sources 
(including the Web)
• Color figures are clearly marked as being intended for color reproduction on the 
Web (free of charge) and in print, or to be reproduced in color on the Web (free of 
charge) and in black-and-white in print
• If only color on the Web is required, black-and-white versions of the figures are also 
supplied for printing purposes
For any further information please visit our customer support site at G+ 
http://support.elsevier.com.
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Use of the Digital Object Identifier
The Digital Object Identifier (DOI) may be used to cite and link to electronic 
documents. The DOI consists of a unique alpha-numeric character string which is 
assigned to a document by the publisher upon the initial electronic publication. The 
assigned DOI never changes. Therefore, it is an ideal medium for citing a document, 
particularly ’Articles in press’ because they have not yet received their full 
bibliographic information. The correct format for citing a DOI is shown as follows 
(example taken from a document in the journal Physics Letters B): 
doi : 10.1016/j .physletb.2010.09.059
When you use the DOI to create URL hyperlinks to documents on the web, the DOIs 
are guaranteed never to change.
Proofs
One set of page proofs (as PDF files) will be sent by e-mail to the corresponding 
author (if we do not have an e-mail address then paper proofs will be sent by post) or, 
a link will be provided in the e-mail so that authors can download the files themselves. 
Elsevier now provides authors with PDF proofs which can be annotated; for this you 
will need to download Adobe Reader version 7 (or higher) available free from s f  
http://get.adobe.com/reader. Instructions on how to annotate PDF files will 
accompany the proofs (also given online). The exact system requirements are given at 
the Adobe site: B»http://www.adobe.com/products/reader/tech-specs.html.
If you do not wish to use the PDF annotations function, you may list the corrections 
(including replies to the Query Form) and return them to Elsevier in an e-mail. Please 
list your corrections quoting line number. If, for any reason, this is not possible, then 
mark the corrections and any other comments (including replies to the Query Form) 
on a printout of your proof and return by fax, or scan the pages and e-mail, or by post. 
Please use this proof only for checking the typesetting, editing, completeness and 
correctness of the text, tables and figures. Significant changes to the article as 
accepted for publication will only be considered at this stage with permission from the 
Editor. We will do everything possible to get your article published quickly and 
accurately -  please let us have all your corrections within 48 hours. It is important to 
ensure that all corrections are sent back to us in one communication: please check 
carefully before replying, as inclusion of any subsequent corrections cannot be 
guaranteed. Proofreading is solely your responsibility. Note that Elsevier may proceed 
with the publication of your article if no response is received.
Offprints
The corresponding author, at no cost, will be provided with a PDF file of the article 
via e-mail. For an extra charge, paper offprints can be ordered via the offprint order 
form which is sent once the article is accepted for publication. The PDF file is a 
watermarked version of the published article and includes a cover sheet with the 
journal cover image and a disclaimer outlining the terms and conditions of use.
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For inquiries relating to the submission of articles (including electronic submission) 
please visit this journal's homepage. Contact details for questions arising after 
acceptance of an article, especially those relating to proofs, will be provided by the 
publisher. You can track accepted articles at http://www.elsevier.com/trackarticle. 
You can also check our Author FAQs thttp://www.elsevier.com/authorFAO) and/or 
contact Customer Support via Bfhttp://support.elsevier.com.
